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The United States has reached a milestone in the evolution
of its post-Cold War security policy. On August 2, 1990, Presi-
dent George Bush unveiled a new national security strategy,
renouncing many of the principles that guided U.S. defense poli-
cies for the past 40 years and charting a radically different
approach to security in the future. 2  This book analyzes the
implications of the new strategy for U.S. forces and alliance
relations, and examines the difficulties of transforming Presi-
dent Bush's vision into reality.
General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and a principal architect of the new
strategy, cites two factors that helped dictate a sharp break
with past security policy. The first is the "absolute, total
demise of the Cold War." Powell argues that "The Cold War and
all of its military totems are gone: the Bt-rlin Wall, the Iron
Curtain, the Warsaw Pact, the Brezhnev Doctrine, all gone, tossed
into the dustbin of history .... " The second factor is that of
plummeting defense budgets. Powell states that "with the Cold
War ending, the American and other Western publics and their
elected representatives are clamoring for, and rightfully expect-
ing, reductions in defense spending" -- a steep downward trend
"which will not be reversed."
However, while those changes highlight the need to recast
U.S. defense policy, they will also make that task increasingly
difficult. More than Cold War nostalgia prompted GEN Powell to
lament the loss of "old tried and true buddies" such as the
Warsaw Pact 4 From a strategic planning perspective, the Soviet
threat of the past 40 years made life frightening, but also
relatively simple. Most Americans agreed who the archenemy was.
The task was to tailor U.S. foreign and defense policies to meet
that challenge. Indeed, since the move toward "competitive
strategies" began in the mid-1980s, the dominant trend in Depart-
ment of Defense planning has been to shape U.S. programs ever
more carefully to exploit Soviet weaknes es and channel U.S-
Soviet competition in favorable directions.
President Bush has broken with that trend. Under the new
national security strategy, the U.S. will no longer focus on the
requirement to fight the Soviet Union in a global scale, short
warning, Europe-centered war. Instead, down-sized U.S. regional
forces will be maintained in the Atlantic and Pacific areas, with
a rclatively small contingency force created to fight what
President Bush calls "come as you are conflicts" in the Third
World.' To guard against the possible resurgence of the Soviet
Cold War threat or the rise of some other powerful adversary, the
U.S. will retain the ability to "reconstitute" the large-scale
forces needed to deter (and, if necessary, defeat) that adversary
in a global war. Reconstitution in this sense does not rely on
the mobilizatir . of reserves; most reserve forces will be slashed
under the new national security strateqy. Rather, reconstitution
involves creating "wholly new forces."
This strategy is unlikely to be implemented exactly as
Prrident Bush has outlined it. As he points out, Congress and
the President share the responsibility for reshaping U.S. de-
fenses. Unless President Bush can convince Congress to appropri-
ate the funds necessary to restructure U.S. forces, and to enact
other changes proposed by that new strategy, key elements of that
strategy may never move beyond the realm of wishful thinking.
U.S. allies in NATO and the Far East will also have an important
say over the American military posture abroad.
Yet, neither is the new national security strategy doomed to
failure. President Bush has taken a giant step toward freeing
U.S. security policy from the dictates of the Cold War; the fate
of that strategy depends on the military, foreign policy and
budget issues it will raise, and on the way such issues are
resolved in the domestic policymaking process and in negotiations
with U.S. allies. What is new about the new national security
strategy? What sort of factors will be crucial to its effective-
ness and political viability?
NEW PRINCIPLES, NEW UNCERTAINTIES
The end of the Cold War has prompted an outpouring of analy-
sis as to how American strategy ought to change. 8  The new na-
tional security strategy advocated by President Bush does not go
as far as some of these proposals in recasting the ends and means
of U.S. policy. Nevertheless, Bush has proposed son- important
departures from the past.
One of the most striking changes in the new national securi-
ty strategy is the decline in U.S. defense spending it would
incorporate. That decline began prior to the Aspen speech: U.S.
defense spending has been falling in real terms since the mid-
1980s. Moreover, while Bush's strategy helped set the stage for
further defense reductions, the actual cutbacks slated for FY
91-95 were negotiated in the "budget summit" with Congress months
after the Aspen speech. Congressional pressure for still deeper
cuts has grown in the aftermath of the Soviet coup attempt of
August, 1991. Nevertheless, the cuts already accommodated under
the new strategy would accelerate a fundamental reallocation of
U.S. resources. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney points out that
under the new strategy, the U.S. defense budget will fall to less
than four percent of the gross national product by Fiscal Year
1995, "the lowest level since before the attack on Pearl
Harbor.
,9
The strategy would also reduce the ability of the U.S. to
use force as an instrument of policy. GEN Powell states that
with the 25 percent cutback in U.S force envisioned by the
2
strategy, the U.S. would be unable to fight the 1991 war against
Iraq in the same manner as did before: "We probably could have
done it, but it would have been a longer and much more difficult
process.
,,I0
However, Powell argues that the U.S. is unlikely to need
that ability. With much of the Iraqi army in ruins and the
Soviet Union in disarray, Powell sees no threat looming in the
next five years of the scale posed by Iraq in 1991. "Think hard
about it," Powell has said. "I'm running out of demons. I'm
running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Ii Sung."1 1
If this is threat assessment remains valid, the decline in U.S.
military capabilities may not matter.
The proposed cutback in U.S. defenses may even bolster
overall American power and influence in the realms most important
in the post Cold War era. Paul Kennedy argues that by reducing
defense spending, particularly in research and development (R&D),
the U.S. could improve its economic competitiveness in a way that
is more suitable for carrying out "a number one power's peacetime
strategy. ''1 2 But it is not clear that all such cuts would be of
equal benefit to the U.S. economy, or that if and when a future
military threat emerges to U.S. interests an economic response
could counter that threat.13 What is clear is that under the new
national security strategy, the U.S. will become a declining
military power in terms of overall force levels and defense
expenditures, unable to use that power as it has in the past.
Whether the ends of U.S. policy will be scaled back accord-
ingly is more problematic. The President's official statement of
U.S. strategy, The National Security StrateQy of the United
States, declares that "we cannot be the world's policeman with
responsibility for solving all the world's problems."'1 4  Yet,
that document also identifies a set of objectives so global and
inclusive as to suggest that there may be little decline in the
scale of U.S. foreign commitments. The U.S. is supposed to
"deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the
United States and its allies," as well as "discourage 1xilitary
adventurism" and pursue a variety of other goals abroad.
Within these general objectives, however, some specific U.S.
defense commitments are bound to melt away. Just as the Soviet
threat once helped the U.S. to define its interests abroad, so
the decline of that threat will encourage U.S. decisionmakers to
shed commitments that now seem anachronistic. But the strongest
pressure to narrow U.S. ends will come from declining means. For
example, President Bush has emphasized that "important American
interests in Europe and the Pacific" make maintaining a forward
presence there "an indispensable element of our strategy."'16 Yet
GEN Powell notes that with the cuts envisioned in the new strate-
gy, that presence will have to be much smaller.17 Those reduc-
tions could limit the objectives pursued by the U.S. abroad.
The new national strategy would also recast what GEN Powell
has called a central military strategic concept: deterrence.
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Powell argues that "deterrence must continue to be the motivating
and organizing concept for America's armed forces."' However,
with the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union (particularly after
the failed coup of August, 1991), U.S. strategic nuclear target-
ing policy and other elements of strategic deterrence are in
flux.
Conventional deterrence would change still more radically
under the new strategy. For the past 40 years, U.S. active and
reserve forces, backed up by the threat of nuclear escalation,
were supposed to help deter Soviet attacks against American
allies. The need for such deterrence has declined. However, if
a renewed large-scale threat emerged, conventional deterrence
would no longer be based on reserve and active forces in being.
Apart from relatively small contingency and regional U.S. forces,
deterrence would be based on t' e threat of reconstitution: that
is, on the perceived willingness and ability of the U.S. to
generate new forces on a scale (and with the speed) sufficient to
defeat even Cold War-size threats. This new deterrent posture
demands that "we and our allies must be able to reconstitute a
credible defense faster that any potential opponent can generate
an overwhelming offense." Indeed, "the ability to reconstitute is
what allows us safely and selectively to scale back and restruc-
ture our forces in-being."'19
Would the U.S be able to reconstitute with the necessary
speed and effectiveness? That depends in part on how vigorous
the U.S. defense R&D base has been maintained, how strong an
industrial base remains to transform those R&D initiatives into
the mass production of weapons and platforms, and how quickly the
manpower can be found to operate and maintain those advanced
sorts of military systems. GEN Powell has already cited the U.S.
defense industrial capability as the problem of greatest concern
to the JCS, because the number of producers "of many of our
critical military items is dw tndling drastically and is shrinking
to unacceptably low levels."'12  Reversing that trend in the face
of the much steeper overall spending cuts charted by the new
strategy will be a major challenge.
Moreover, even if the industrial and manpower base exists
for reconstitution in two years, can the U.S. count on having two
years of warning? The authors of the new strategy recognize that
this reliance on speedy reconstitution puts a special burden on
our intelligence. However, the U.S. has suffered failures of
both tactical and strategic warning in the past, and may so again
in the future. The difference is that the increased dependence
of the U.S. on warning and intelligence will also come at a time
of declining force levels and defense spending. A smaller U.S.
military will be less capable of withstanding the initial set-
backs caused by failures of intelligence. This casts a different
light on Secretary Cheney's point that under the new strategy,
U.S. defense spending as a percentage of gross national product
will fall to the lowest level since the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor.
Even if warning is received, the question remains as to
whether the U.S. would respond in a timely and effective fashion.
GEN George Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the
Strategic Air Command, notes that "warning time isn't waging
time unless you exploit it; otherwise it is wasted time." A
number of factors could create special difficulties for beginning
the reconstitution process sufficiently early. First, while
reconstitution depends on early in the emergence of a threat,
warning indicators at time are likely to be ambiguous. Unless
the appearance of an obvious villain makes it easy to identify
the rise of a hostile regime in the Soviet Union or elsewhere,
the recognition of such a threat could be a long and politically
disputatious process.
The expense of reconstitution will mitigate against reacting
against such ambiguous warning indicators. To build wholly new
U.S. forces to help meet a large-scale threat would be enormously
costly. Even if current deficit concerns persist, Congress would
almost certainly agree to appropriate increased defense funds
once that threat became apparent. However, because reconstitu-
tion demands an early response, the President might have to ask
Congress for such funds when the severity of the threat was still
unclear, and when the importance of that threat relative to
domestic spending needs was open to honest disagreement.
This reluctance to act could be reinforced by the perceived
danger of doing so. If policymakers confront a potential adver-
sary, they may fear that U.S. defensive preparations could be
interpreted as a hostile act, thereby provoking the adversary to
build up his own forces and increasing the danger of war. Admin-
istration officials and members of Congress who wanted to avon
such a "spiral" of conflict might argue against reconstitution.
Yet, because reconstitution depends on a prompt, large-scale
response to the emergence of a potential threat, any such delay
could render the U.S. response concept ineffective (and perhaps
even encourage a truly aggressive adversary to behave more reck-
lessly).
CRITICAL ISSUES
To cite these problems is not to argue that they are insolu-
ble. For example, GEN Butler has offered a promising approach to
the issue of responding to ambiguous warning, wherein U.S. deci-
sionmakers would be given a set of "graduated deterrence re-
sponses" to chose from rather than facing an all-or nothing
choice.23 Nevertheless, the new national security strategy
raises a number of issues that merit further analysis. This book
does not attempt to judge whether the strategy ought to be adopt-
ed. Rather, the chapters that follow assess the potential impact
the President's proposal on U.S. forces and alliance relations,
and examine the difficulties that could arise in implementing his
plan for the post-Cold War era.
5
The ability of the defense industrial and manpower base to
support reconstitution is crucial for the new strategy. After a
describing the strategy in detail, Jim Tritten examines that
reconstitution issue and the larger problems surrounding it. The
strategy will also depend on new intelligence and warning re-
quirements. Tom Grassey examines those requirements and the
ability of the U.S. to meet them.
Another topic meriting further consideration is effect the
new strategy will have on forces in being, now and in the future.
President Bush has argued that the U.S. must recast its forces to
meet the needs of the post-Cold War era, rather than merely down-
sizing its current forces. But exactly how the new national
security strategy would affect U.S. military capabilities remains
to be seen. Now that the war against Iraq has provided a test of
U.S. military effectiveness, albeit with weapons built for the
Cold War, Mike Pocalyko examines the lessons that are being
learned--and mislearned--in the evolution of U.S. forces. Con-
gress will also have an important say over those forces and the
implementation of the national security strategy as a whole.
Paul Stockton analyzes the initial congressional response to the
strategy and the outlook for future action on Capitol Hill. As
outlined by President Bush, the new strategy could have a partic-
ularly strong impact on maritime forces. Sam Tangredi examines
that impact, while Bruce MacDonald analyzes how the strategy
(together with changes within the Soviet Union) will affect
nuclear forces.
That strategy is less explicit in recasting the ends, rather
than the means, of U.S. policy. The recognition that the U.S. no
longer needs to build its strategy around the Soviet threat lies
at the heart of the strategy. Nevertheless, President Bush has
yet to clarify how U.S. foreign defense commitments and allied
relationships will be recast accordingly, or how the shrinking of
U.S. forward deployments under the strategy may contribute
(perhaps inadvertently) to such changes. Ed Olson examines the
implications of the new national security strategy for the U.S.
and Asia. Jan Breemer performs a similar analysis for Europe.
In the Conclusion, Jim Wirtz reviews the factors most critical to
the fate of strategy, and examines how the problems raised by
Bush's proposal may eventually be resolved.
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The New National Security Strategy and Base Force
by
James J. Tritten1
On August 2, 1990, President George Bush unveiled a new
national security strategy in a sFeech at the Aspen Institute
entitled "In Defense of Defense."'1 That title is misleading.
Far from defending the U.S. military establishment from the
winds of change, Bush proposed a dramatic restructuring of U.S.
forces and defense policy in response to the decline of the Cold
War. This chapter examines the crucial elements of Bush's new
national security strategy and some unanswered questions that
surround it.
The new national security strategy calls for recasting U.S.
defenses around four major principles: deterrence, forward
presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The first three
of these sound familiar. However, beneath the superficial simi-
larity to past U.S. principles, important differences exist. The
strategy calls for maintaining a much smaller active and reserve
force mix primarily focused on presence and world-wide major
contingency operations--not a Europe-centered global war with the
USSR. This shift from a focus on the "worst case" threat to the
"most likely" case will have major programming and strategy
implications in both the near term and the long run.
If forces were required to fight a major war against the
Soviet Union, the U.S. assumes that there would be sufficient
time to reconstitute them. Specifically, the President has
apparently accepted the consensus of his intelligence community
that the Soviet Union would need "at least one to two years or
longer to regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide
offensive or a global conflict." The U.S. assumes, therefore,
that it will have two year's warning for a Europe-centered global
war with the USSR.
The most important factors which drove this shift in defense
planning are the collapse of the Cold War military threat from
the Soviet Union, and (given that collapse) the decision to cut
at U.S. defense spending by at least 25 percent from fiscal years
1991 - 1995. This reduction is not simply the low end of a peri-
odic cycle of fluctuating defense expenditures--it is a recogni-
tion that the total resources devoted to defense need not be as
high so long as the current political climate remains. Given the
changes inside the Soviet Union following the August 1991 coup
attempt, the need for a new post-Cold War national security
strategy is even more apparent. As Clausewitz wrote, war has
. . . its own grammar, but not its own logic."4 The old politi-
cal logic and lexicon of the Cold War has changed - it is now
time to change the military grammar.
This chapter sets the stage for examining the critical
security issues raised by President Bush's strategy. After a
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brief overview of how the strategy was formulated, the chapter
examines the main elements of the strategy and its proposed
changes in U.S. forces. The final section identifies some unre-
solved issues surrounding the new strategy.
SOURCES OF THE NEW STRATEGY
Instead of a single or even a few documents which describe
the new national security strategy and its associated force
structure, a series of speeches, articles, and reports that must
be consulted to gain a full understanding of Bush's proposal.
The Appendix to this report provides the proper chronology and
full documentation for all primary and secondary source docu-
ments.
Although the President first outlined the new strategy in
his speech at Aspen on August 2, 1990, important details were
gradually revealed by official spokesmen in the following months.
General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS), described the key elements of the new national
security strategy and associated force structure in a series of
speeches beginning late in August 1990 and lasting throughout the
next twelve months.
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Dick Cheney first spoke about
the new strategy at the 32nd Annual Conference of the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on September 6,
1990, and has likewise continued to provide details throughout
the next year. Cheney noted at the IISS Conference that a series
of Congressional and other briefings were to have followed the
Aspen speech, but that he and GEN Powell were able to meet only
once, on August 2, 1990 with the chairman and ranking members of
the four major Congressional armed services committees.
The former Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy (J-5), Lieutenant General (LTG) George Lee Butler, USAF,
gave additional detailed information late in September 1990 at
the National Press Club. From the tenor and content of LTG
Butler's address, it appears that he had a major hand in deveiop-
ing of the new national security strategy or force structure.
Two major sources for Department of Defense (DoD) informa-
tion each year are the annual testimony and reports to Congress.
In an rather unusual move, the February 1991 DoD testimony pre-
ceded delivery of the annual DoD report. The 1991 SECDEF Annual
Report to the President and the ConQress was actually issued at
the end of February, although dated January. This report specif-
ically addresses the new national security strategy and provides
a force structure designed for budgetary and political give and
take. For those who still did not understand that national
strategy and force structure were changing, a copy of the Presi-
dent's Aspen speech was appended.
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Informative testimony was presented, in February 1991, by
the SECDEF and the CJCS before the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC), House Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC). In mid-March 1991, "Scooter" Libby
and Vice CJCS, Admiral (ADM) David E. Jeremiah, USN, appeared
before the HASC and provided the first unclassified details on
future force structure. By the end of March 1991, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued their 1991 Joint Military Net As-
sessment (JMNA) - a major source document on both the new strate-
gy and force structure.
The White House's March 1990 edition of the National Securi-
ty Strategy of the United States should have been revised about
the same time as the initial series of speeches were made about
the new national security strategy. This document ought to have
appeared at least at the time of the Administration's initial
testimony on the strategy before Congress and release of the
SECDEF's annual report. The revised version of the National
Security Strategy of the United States, incorporating the new
national security strategy, finally appeared in August 1991.6
This publication, a major source document for the new strategy,
codifies what had been said previously by others, and added a few
new details.
The JCS are preparing a follow-on document, termed the
National Military Strategy for the 1990s, that should be avail-
able before the end of the year. The JCS National Military
Strategy will be based upon President Bush's: Aspen speech,
National Security Strategv of the United States, and further
explanations of what is meant by the "new world order." This new
JCS document is being prepared in consultation with the command-
ers of the various unified and specified commands. GEN Powell
gave a preview of this document when he testified, in September
1991, to Congress on the Future of U.S. Military Bases.
At the end of September, President Bush addressed the nation
on national television. Bush outlined the new strategy and Base
Force and the reasons for them. The President then announced
major initiatives to reduce nuclear forces, our nuclear alert
status, expand strategic arms control agreements with the USSR,
and to provide for limited defenses against ballistic missile
attack.
Reviewing the list of primary source documents, a number of
implications emerge. First, there appears to be a very "top-
down" re-direction in defense strategy and force structure.
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From the public record, there were only a handful of individuals
who orchestated the new concepts and there were few authorized
spokesmen. The usual indicators of a debate were absent -
discussion by other senior military officials does not appea
until well after the new concepts were articulated in public.
The manner in which the strategy was announced tells the story of
a major review and change in Administration policy done by a few
individuals at the top rather than with the full participation of
the vast federal bureaucracy.
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The second point is that, despite their obvious concern with
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the SECDEF and the
CJCS were simultaneously fashioning the new national security
strategy and force structure. The Secretary has stated repeated-
ly that there were two major elements underway with defense in
late 1990 and early 1991 - the military buildup in Saudi Arabia
and the new national security strategy and force structure.
Secretary Cheney and GEN Powell were two of only a few people who
were involved in both.
A third matter is that the new national security strategy is
nameless. Inside the Washington beltway, the strategy is known
as the "new strategy," the new "Defense Strategy," the "Presi-
dent's strategy," and "the U.S. military's new regional contin-
gencies strategy." It has also been referred to, informally, as
the "Aspen Strategy," the "reconstitution strategy," "U.S. Na-
tional Defense Policy," and the "strategy for the new world
order," but it appears that the Administration will let academia,
or the press, select the title that will appear in the history
books. In this report, the strategy is uniformly referred to as
the "new national security strategy."
The reason the National Security Strategy of the United
States did not appear until August 1991 and that the strategy
still lacks a formal name, may stem from the fact that the inter-
nal debate and discussion within the Administration has not
ended.11 Rather than a "bottom-up" product of endless hours of
staff work, involving all the major defense and industrial par-
ticipants, the new national security strategy is analogous to
recent shifts in military doctrine in the USSR - with perhaps
even more debate in the USSR that has yet occurred in the U.S.
By the end of September 1991, enough details of the President's
new strategic concepts were available to make an in-depth assess-
ment of the new national security strategy's impact.
THE PRESIDENT'S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Among GEN Powell's most frequent themes in discussing the
new national security strategy over the past year were enduring
and emerging realities. According to Powell, the two major
emerging realities that prompted the new national security
strategy were the end of the Cold War and declining defense
budgets. Powell identified a number of enduring and emerging
realities addressed by the new strategy: persistent Soviet mili-
tary power, vital interests across the Atlantic, in Europe and
the Middle East, and in the Pacific, and the unknown threat - the
crisis that no one expected. The new national security strategy
responds to these concerns by adopting the following principles
of U.S. defense policy.
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Reconstitution Against the Soviet Union
Secretary Cheney said shortly before his departure from
Moscow in October 1990, that "We are changing our strategy and
our doctrine as a result of changes in the Soviet Union and
changes in Europe. We no longer believe it is necessary to us to
be prepared to fight a major land war in Europe. . ." The shift
in focus from the Soviet threat and a European-centered global
war is a major change in both program and war planning. The
Armed Services must now attempt to justify procuring defense
programs for reasons other than those routinely used since the
end of World War II. Already, the Services and the JCS have
begun reviewing existing war and contingency plans for their
responsiveness to the new political realities.
A fundamental component of the President's new national
security strategy is that, assuming a two-year warning of a
Europe-centered global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate
wholly new forces - rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary.
Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary will be disband-
ed, not put into the reserves, since the risk is deemed accept-
able. Reconstitution is the ability to restore a global war-
fighting capability against the Soviet Union. It includes mobi-
lizing manpower; forming, training, and fielding combat units;
and reactivating the defense industrial base.
Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or
regeneration - it is more like what the United Kingdom had
planned during the interwar years, when it assumed that up to ten
years of strategic warning would be available. New defense
manufacturing capability and new forces and military would be
built essentially from the ground up. Preserving this capability
means protecting our infrastructure and the defense industrial
base, preserving our lead in critical technologies, and stockpil-
ing critical materials. Preserving our alliance structure is
another element of our ability to reconstitute a more significant
forward-based military presence when, and if, it is ever again
required.
Crisis Response
There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an
increased risk of regional conflicts and greater unpredictability
in the international security environment. Today's crises are
extremely dangerous due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry
and weapons of mass destruction and the demonstrated willingness
of Third World nations to use them. GEN Powell reminded Con-
gress, in February 1991, about Operation DESERT STORM where: "We
are clearly at the 'high end' of technology in a conflict with a
so-called 'Third World' nation."
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The U.S. crisis response strategy will focus on limiting
vertical and horizontal escalation as well as escalation over
time; i.e. swift termination and containing the conflict to the
theater of origin. Obviously, actions outside the affected
theater will be considered if they are necessary to ensure suc-
cess for a military operation. Prior to committing U.S. forces,
the U.S. military will want to ensure that there is a clear and
present risk to U.S. vital interests and that some military
objective is actually attainable. Moreover, the support and
participation of allies in such conflicts is essential--especial-
ly for the reintroduction of formidable American military power
overseas.
For ease of budget discussion, the U.S. often has used an
illustrative planning scenario. Any planning for contingency
responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more
than one "canned" predicament or a single scenario. The JCS have
now developed a family of likely (and perhaps even unlikely)
events for which the U.S. may elect to commit military forces.
Any regional crisis that has the potential to escalate into a
global conflict should, and will, receive priority.
The conventional conflict scenarios now used by the JCS are
contained in this year's JMNA. They range from peacetime engage-
ment to war escalating from a European crisis with full mobiliza-
tion. Contingencies include: (1) counter-insurgency/counter-
narcotics; (2) lesser regional contingencies, with two sub-cases
(2,000 and 6000 nautical miles from the U.S.); (3) a major re-
gional contingency in Korea; and (4) a major regional contingency
in Southwest Asia.
The JCS recognize that not all crises will evolve in the
same manner. The JMNA outlines four possible types of crises:
(1) a slow-building crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3) immi-
nent conflict; and (4) conflict. The length and intensity of
combat, for planning purposes, is assumed to be 450 days for
counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics, 90 days of low-mid inten-
sity for lesser regional contingencies, 120 days of mid-high
intensity for major regional contingencies, and more than 50 days
of mid-high intensity for a war escalating from a European cri-
sis.
Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series
of measured response options. Responses could include a flexible
minimal force deterrent response, a major deterrent response
(Operation DESERT SHIELD), and more worst-case responses where
combat begins soon after the insertion of troops or simultaneous-
ly. This program of contingency types and measured responses
appears to be a building-block and force sequencing approach to
crisis management. Rather than requiring the deliberate planning
against a single and known threat, the post-Cold War era will be
need more flexible adaptive planning.
The most complex military operation outlined for planning
purposes in the JMNA is a war escalating from a European crisis.
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The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States
speaks of a "potential thkeat to a single flank or region" and a
"limited, conventional threat to Europe." This planning scenario
is not the old European-centered global war with the USSR but
rather something less, handled by existing active duty and re-
serve forces, and not requiring reconstitution.
Peacetime Engagement
According to Secretary Cheney's February 1991 Congressional
testimony, the U.S. will also devise a dynamic "peacetime engage-
ment" strategy to deter low intensity conflict and promote inter-
national stability. The U.S. armed forces will participate in
that strategy largely in the form of overseas presence. In his
Aspen speech, the President alluded to maintaining a forward
presence by exercises. GEN Powell stated at the Royal United
Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), in December 1990,
that forward presence includes military assistance programs. In
his February 1991 testimony to Congress, GEN Powell expanded his
definition of presence to include, but not be limited to: sta-
tioned forces, rotational deployments, access and storage agree-
ments, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance,
port visits, and military-to-military relations. The JMNA adds
combined planning, nation-assistance, peacekeeping efforts,
logistic arrangements, supporting lift, and exchanges to the list
of forms of military presence. The August 1991 National Securi-
ty Strategy of the United States includes training missions and
prepositioned equipment. Other pronouncements include forces
afloat and intelligence sharing and cooperation. These expanded
definitions should be viewed as attempts to ensure that all
planned future activities will satisfy the requirement to main-
tain an overseas presence with a smaller force.
The new National Security Strategy of the United States
declares that regional crises along with forward presence
. ..will be the primary determinant of the size and structure
of our future forces." After assessing the military threats and
the recommended Defense Program, the JCS in the JMNA conclude
that ". . .the Defense Program provides minimum capability to
accomplish national security objectives." The Base Force is that
minimum defense programming force structure necessary to meet
America's enduring needs. It is to this program that we will now
turn.
THE BASE FORCE
Although details of the President's new national security
strategy are still being debated, active duty and ready reserve
forces are likely to decrease significantly. According to an
initial report in the New York Times, 1 2 the "bottom line" numbers
discussed in June 1990 at the White House were: Army, 12 active
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and 6 ready reserve divisions (currently 18 active and 10 re-
serve) and 2 "cadre" or reconstitutable reserve divisions; Air
Force, 25 active and reserve tactical air wings (currently 36);
Navy, 11-12 aircraft carriers (currently 14); and Marine Corps,
150,000 personnel (currently 196,000).
Subsequent reports in the media and the recommended force
levels delivered to the Congress by the Administration are
slightly higher, and reflect budgetary negotiations that parallel
the developing new national security strategy. Force levels
discussed in the most recent (September 1991) reports include the
following additions and changes: a Navy of 448 ships (down from
545), including 12 deployable aircraft carriers and 1 devoted to
training, 13 carrier air wings (CVWs), 150 surface combatants,
with no battleships; a 3 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine
Corps of 159,000 personnel with simultaneous amphibious lift for
the assault echelons of 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs);
15 active and 11 Air Force tactical fighter wings (TFWs), and 181
strategic bombers (down from 268) including 75 B-2s.
Army divisions will apparently break down as follows: active
component - 7 armored, 4 light, 1 infantry; reserve component - 5
armored and 1 light with an additional 2 armored in the new
cadre division category. 1 3 As the U.S. government attempts to
complete a new budget cycle, we will see numerous other force
levels suggested and debated. The June 1990 New York Times
report should be viewed in the context of a minimally acceptable
force that probably was agreed to by the participants before
events in Iraq and Kuwait.
Termed the Base Force, the new force structure advocated by
GEN Powell will be organized into four basic military components:
Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; Atlantic; Pacific; and
a Contingency Force; and four supporting capabilities: Transpor-
tation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and Development
(R&D). This force structure and supporting capabilities are not
contained in the President's speech but were developed parallel
to and in support of the President's new national security
strategy. What constitutes those forces will be debated through-
out the next year. These "Forces" are not meant to represent new
commands, but rather force packages much the same that "Tactical
Air Forces," according to the annual DoD posture statement,
includes aviation forces assigned to the Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps. Once acquired, these packages would then be avail-
able to the existing Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) in the field.
The Strategic Force
The Strategic Force will initially include those offensive
forces that result from START, as modified by the President's
national television speech at the end of September 1991. Bush
announced that he has ordered the immediate stand-down of alert
bombers and those intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs)
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already scheduled for deactivation under START. Previously, START
II goals of 4500 and 3000 warheads for each side had been dis-
cussed openlyl4--clearly those numbers are now on the high side of
our future nuclear arsenal.
Soviet reaction to the President's bold suggestions is
eagerly awaited. After the dramatic events of August 1991 in the
Soviet Union, it is possible unilateral cuts in the Soviet arse-
nal may be welcome; a shift in government and internal power may
also bring about an abrupt change in deterrence philosophy from
war-fighting to assured destruction with minimal forces.
In their February 1991 Congressional testimony, Secretary
Cheney and GEN Powell stated that they were prepared to reduce
strategic bombers from 268 to 181, halt the construction of OHIO
class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at eighteen, not
retrofit all of those submarines with the more advanced TRIDENT
II (D-5) missiles, and consider only the PEACEKEEPER (MX) rail
garrison ICBM and small ICBM as R&D programs, without plans for
their deployment. President Bush told the nation in September
1991 that the mobile PEACEKEEPER and small ICBM programs will be
terminated, retaining the non-mobile small ICBM as the only U.S.
strategic nuclear missile program. ADM Jeremiah told Congress,
in March 1991, that the Base Force would include 550 ICBMs.
Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to such lower
numbers suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic de-
fenses. GEN Powell included the strategic defense initiative
(SDI) in his August 1990 American Legion, December 1990 RUSI and
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)
speeches, and his February 1991 The Officer article. ADM Jeremiah
outlined the need for SDI in a December 1990 speech to the Presi-
dent's National Security Telecommunications Committee:
t . .against an attack by a major power. . ." and "also against
Third World weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic
missiles."
The CinC, U.S. Space Command, GEN Donald J. Kutyna, USAF,
discussed the need for SDI and the Third World ballistic missile
threat in his January 1991 Space Day briefing. He specifically
noted Libyan Colonel Quadhafi's April 1990 statement that he
would have fired missiles at New York. had he the capability, when
previously attacked by U.S. forces. 1 President Bush said in his
State of the Union address, in January 1991, that SDI would be
refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile
strikes jgainst the U.S., its forces overseas, and friends and
allies. 1
In his February 1991 testimony to Congress and subsequent
written report to Congress, Secretary Cheney outlined a reorien-
tation of SDI to a system of Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (GPALS)--indicating that it would be space, ground, and
sea-based. The initial objective of GPALS would be protection
against accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic mis-
sile strikes. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the
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United States notes that with adequate funding, GPALS could pro-
tect troops in the field by the mid-1990s and the U.S. itself by
the turn of the century. The system shoyd be only half the size
of the Phase I plan associated with SDI. In September 1991, the
President once again raised the issue of strategic defenses--this
time in the context of a limited deployment in cooperation with
the USSR. It is likely that strategic defenses will at least
continue as an R&D program.
An obvious area that demands clarification is the increased
nuclear role for naval and air forces replacing ground-based
weapons withdrawn from Europe. GEN Powell stated in both speech-
es in December 1990 that the U.S. remains committed to a triad of
offensive forces, but that we would probably increase reliance on
sea-based systems. In addition, he stated in the AFCEA speech
that ". . .we must make sure that our residual Strategic Forces
are second to none."
The Atlantic Force
The conventional military forces of the U.S. appear to be
headed for both reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic Force
will include residual forces in Europe, those forward-deployed to
Europe, and the continental U.S. (CONUS)-based reinforcing force
(including heavy ground forces). The Atlantic Force would contain
a significant reserve component. This force would be responsible
for Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, recognizing that
in the future the Middle East threat is on a par with that to Eu-
rope, thus demanding the same type of response. That this force
is not called the European Force indicates both the shift in
emphasis of the new national security strategy and the apparent
desire to alter the concept for employment, and perhaps command,
of the forces normally assigned to the Atlantic, European, and
Middle Eastern theaters.
GEN Powell stated in his December 1990 RUSI speech that the
residual Atlantic Force retained in Europe would consist of a
heavy Army component (defined as perhaps at Corps strength) with
supporting air forces. In his testimony to Congress, in February
1991, GEN Powell stated that the European forward-based Atlantic
Force would consist of mechanized and armored ground forces.
In his March 1991 testimony to Congress, ADM Jeremiah gave
the first unclassified breakdown of exactly what was destined for
the Atlantic and other Forces. The U.S. will retain in Europe:
two Army divisions and about three Air Force TFWs. In his Sep-
tember 1991 Congressional testimony, Powell used a 150,000-level
to describe the residual level.
In his December 19q0 AFCEA remarks, GEN Powell further
stated that forward preser.ze for the Atlantic Force means Marines
in the Mediterranean and strong maritime forces. In his testimo-
ny to Congress, in February 1991, GEN Powell stated that the
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European forward-based Atlantic Force amphibious forces should be
capable of forced entry operations. According to ADM Jeremiah,
in March 1991, the residual maritime forces in Europe will be one
carrier battle group (CVBG) and an amphibious ready group (ARG).
The JMNA refers to an Atlantic Force with one CVBG and one
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed continuously in the
Mediterranean Sea or eastern Atlantic Ocean. The notional force
size of a MEU is 2,500 personnel with fifteen days combat sus-
tainment. This is hardly a residual European-based capability
for significant forced entry.
In his AFCEA remarks, GEN Powell stated that forward
presence for the Atlantic Force means access in the Middle East,
Allied interoperability and flexible command, control, and commu-
nications systems, and military assistance programs. All spokes-
men have told Congress that there will also be some residual
presence in the Middle East. In his September 1991 testimony to
Congress, GEN Powell defined our residual presence as one CVBG,
an ARG, and prepositioned material.
Atlantic Force forward presence will be backed by a powerful
and rapid reinforcement capability. In his AFCEA address, GEN
Powell stated that Atlantic Force reinforcement and sustaining
forces capability would consist of a mix of active and reserve
heavy Army divisions and tactical fighter aircraft. In March and
August 1991, ADM Jeremiah identified that capability as consist-
ing of 4 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre reserve Army divisions,
2 active and 11 reserve Air Force TFWs, 5 Navy CVBGs, 2 MEBs, and
the Marine Corps reserve component. Each MEB has a notional force
size of 16,000 personnel with thirty days combat sustainment.
GEN Powell told Congress in September 1991 that the Army
active duty reinforcement contribution will be 3 heavy divisions
that include roundout (third) brigades from the reserves compo-
nent. He also said that the Marine Corps contribution to the
Atlantic Force had been redefined as a MEF - notional Marine
Corps force size of 48,000 personnel with sixty days sustainment.
Powell also adjusted the Navy reinforcement capability to 4
CVBGs, obviously due to the assignment of 1 CVBG to Southwest
Asia. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, the new Army Chief of Staff,
stated, in an interview published in the October 1991 Armed
Forces Journal International, that the Army's "III Corps, will be
generally designated for Central Europe, although it could go to
Southwest Asia."'
The Atlantic Force will be the backbone of America's future
conventional deterrence for an area of the world that has domi-
nated defense thinking for fifty years. Although there is no
specific reference to dual-committing forces from one theater to
another, it should be noted that Japan-based U.S. forces partic-
ipated in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It should
be obvious that if we reduce our residual force in Europe to
those outlined above, it would strain them to be dual-committed
to the Contingency Force. However, GEN Powell told Congress, in
September 1991, that the concept of "strategic agility" applied
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to force structure means that European-based U.S. forces will
continue to be available for crises outside of the Continent.
The Pacific Force
In September 1990, LTG Butler stated ". . .that the U.S.
could undertake a prudent, phased series of steps to reduce
modestly our force presence in Korea, as well as Japan and else-
where." GEN Powell told Congress, in February 1991, that
. . .we can initiate a gradual transition toward a partnership
in which ROK [Republic of Korea] forces assume the leading role
on the Peninsula. However, should deterrence fail, in-place and
reinforcing US forces would still be required to blunt, reverse
and defeat the type of short-warning attack that North Korea is
still clearly capable of mounting."
The Pacific Force will include a modest and chiefly maritime
residual forward-based and forward-deployed force in Korea, Japan
and elsewhere in the theater, and reinforcing forces located in
CONUS. ADM Jeremiah outlined that modest force in his March 1991
testimony. In Korea, we will initially retain 1 Army division
and 1-2 Air Force TFWs; in Japan, 1-2 Air Force TFWs and 1 home-
based Navy CVBG. A MEU will operate in the Western Pacific for
most of each year. GEN Sullivan stated in an October 1991 pub-
lished interview that the Army's I Corps will be earmarked for
the Pacific theater.2 0
GEN Powell stated in his December 1990 RUSI speech that "the
bulk of American Army and Air Force power in the Pacific would be
as reinforcements . . using Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental
United States as springboards." ADM Jeremiah defined that rein-
forcement in Hawaii and Alaska as a light Army divisi-n (probably
the 25th Infantry Division), an Air Force TFW, and a MEB. He
stated that in CONUS, there would be an additional MEB and 5 Navy
CVBGs and that the modest reserve components in Alaska and Hawaii
would be allocated to the Pacific Force. In his Congressional
testimony in September 1991, GEN Powell stated that the Army
contribution might eventually be 2 divisions, but that this
subject depended upon how the Alaskan and Hawaiian reserve compo-
nent was organized.
The fate of the Marines on Okinawa also remains unclear.
Powell said that the overall Marine Corps contributions to the
Pacific Force included a MEF--adding, however, that it would be
forward-deployed. The Marine Corps does not even currently
forward-deploy a MEF in the Pacific. Perhaps the Chairman meant
that a MEF would be assigned to the Pacific Force and that a MEB
would be forward-deployed.
In his AFCEA address, GEN Powell stated that "In short, the
Pacific Force would continue our very successful economy of force
operation in this critical region." It is unlikely that the
modest-sized Army and Air Force Pacific Force assets would have a
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dual-commitment to the European theater in a revitalized "swing
strategy" but it is clear that any substantial land war in Asia
would require "borrowing" forces from elsewhere.
Is there a need to retain expensive overseas bases in the
Philippines, and elsewhere, under the new strategic concept? If
the Cold War was our original justification for the presence of
large forces in the Pacific, and Af the Cold War is over, then it
is ended in the Pacific as well.2  If forces and bases are to be
permanently retained overseas, it should be for other reasons,
and those reasons should be clearly articulated and debated in
Congress. The Congress and American public may well ask why the
U.S. should remain unilaterally committed to defend nations which
are not obligated to assist the U.S. in its own defense. If the
U.S. significantly reduces its forces in Japan, there is a possi-
bility that effective arguments will be provided to increase the
size and/or capability of the Japanese Armed Forces. Any such
possibility will be watched very carefully by China and many
other Western Pacific nations.
The Contingency Force
Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's
recommended force structure is idea of a Contingency Force based
in CONUS. 2 2  For the present, each existing CinC will still
retain his own forward-stationed and deployed forces for immedi-
ate contingency response. CONUS-based contingency forces will be
available, as a quick-response force, to assist CinCs as well as
to provide significant conventional capabilities for those areas
of the world not covered by the Atlantic or Pacific FFces; i.e.
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and island nations.
CONUS-based contingency response forces are not a new idea.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the JCS and the military services
experimented with a series of similar schemes, eventually aban-
doned by the Kennedy Administration. A U.S. Strike Command
existed from October 1961 - December 1971 as a Unified Command.
Similar arrangements involved varying commands have, from time to
time, been responsible for the Middle East and South Asia.
Once the U.S. Army created a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC)
consisting of two divisions. Air Force Tactical Air Command
(TAC) as well as Navy and Marine Corps units, not otherwise
allocated to other CinCs, were assigned to the U.S. Strike Com-
mand. Similarly, the old Rapid-Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) was another precursor to the proposed Contingency Force.
U.S. planning for contingencies should also benefit from the
experiences of France's Force d'Action Rapide (FAR)--formed as an
additional component to the French Army in 1983--with a mission
similar to the proposed Contingency Force.
The Contingency Force will have a very small Reserve compo-
nent; primarily of airlift and supporting forces - not combat
capability. According to General Powell's Congressional testimo-
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ny in 2 eptember 1991, the Army and Air Force will commit 5 divi-
sions and 7 TFWs to the Contingency Force. General Sullivan
said in an October 1991 published interview that the Army's
"XVIII Airborne Corps would be a worldwide contingency
force." According to the Army Posture Statement, contingency
response divisions will be structured to sustain deployments for
about thirty days without augmentation by reserve components.
The Air Force will overhaul its internal structure to be
more responsive to regional threats. A new "Air Combat Command"
will take the place of the existing Tactical Air Command and
Strategic Air Command. A new "Air Mobility Command" will replace
the Military Airlift Command.
2 5
A MEF, most of the rapid response sealift and intertheater
airlift will be available to the Contingency Force. The Navy will
apparently provide dual-committed forces from the Atlantic and
Pacific. Special Operations Forces appear to have a role both
with the Contingency Force and the CinCs. The JMNA additionally
included the following in their definition of the Contingency
Force: Army airborne, air assault, light, and highly mobile heavy
divisions, Air Force long-range conventional bombers, and Navy
attack submarines.
LTG Butler provided the following detailed description of
how the Contingency Force would function. The first stage of a
Contingency Force to be used in what he termed a "graduated
deterrence response," and, for program planning purposes, would
consist of: Army light & airborne divisions MEBs, Special Opera-
tions Forces, and selected Air Force units. k
According to LTG Butler, this initial component of the
Contingency Force would be buttressed as necessary by: carrier
and amphibious forces. Normally the Navy prefers to promote the
frequent call on carrier forces for immediate crisis response,
and listing these forces in the second component of the Contin-
gency Force probably reflects the land orientation of the con-
cept. It would be wholly illogical to assume that the U.S. will
require fewer responses by carrier battle groups in the future -
indeed, a solid case can be made that we will send the fleet more
often in the future.
The listing of amphibious forces in the second tier seems
appropriate, reflects recent employment of the Marine Corps, and
is consistent with the ormer Commandant's statement on maneuver
warfighting doctrine2  and shift in identification of Fleet
Marine Forces from "Amphibious" to "Expeditionary." Amphibious
capabilities must be retained by the U.S. but in the context of
tactical or operational-level regional contingency operations
rather than a major strategic-level assault on Europe--GEN Pow-
ell's statement regarding the forced entry amphibious capability
for the Atlantic Force notwithstanding. If another D-Day type
invasion were ever required of American forces, amphibious forces
would be among the forces reconstituted and built, as during
World War II.
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The third tier of the Contingency Force appears to be
heavier forces, with the capability for long-term sustainability.
Again, we have seen this application in Operation DESERT SHIELD.
On April 16, 1991, Major General Fred E. Elam, USA, Army Assist-
ant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, testified before the
HASC Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materi-
als ". . . that evolving national strategies require that the
Army have a capability to simultaneously deploy two armored
divisions 2nywhere in the world from the US within approximately
30 days."2
ADM Frank Kelso, USN, told Congress, in February 1991, that
a Base Force, 451-ship Navy, deploying about 30 percent of the
available fleet, could provide an immediate response to a crisis
anywhere in the world within seven days. It would comprise one
Amphibious Strike Task Force, consisting of one CVBG and an ARG
with an embarked MEU. A second CVBG could be available with
fifteen days. A full MEB could arrive within thirty days.
Hence, the most the sea services could deliver to a crisis area
under this plan is a token force within a week, and a force about
the size of one Army light division with an additional few squad-
rons of aircraft within a month.
It would take the sea services a 40 percent deployment rate
to respond to a regional conflict with a more robust combat
capability: three CVBGs and a full MEF. With the costs of
providing such a high deployment rate, it is unlikely that the
Navy will recommend such a posture - given its desires to replace
aging hardware. Deployment rates in excess of 40 percent are
necessary for the sea services to simultaneously respond with
three CVBGs and a MEF in one location and another carrier else-
where.
Although the sea services logically could have been consid-
ered the core of the new Contingency Force, the Army and Air
Force can argue that they can provide faster airpower and combat
capability anywhere in the world. Indeed, there have been arcane
informal suggestions by Air Force personnel that their new com-
posite wings can be expressed in terms of CVBG equivalents!
Assuming that the U.S. will involve itself in overseas contingen-
cy operations only with the cooperation of host nations, and with
the support of coalitions, then the Air Force/Army response may
appear more cost-effective.
The clue to understanding the new crisis response portion of
the new national security strategy is that it is not keyed to
one service, or even to the active component having a unilateral
capability. Future crisis response appears to be a joint respon-
sibility with a mix of active and selected reserve units.
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Transportation
According to GEN Powell, transportation is one of the major
supporting components to the new national security strategy.
Mobility programs proposed by the SECDEF in his annual report
included the ability to return to Europe with 4 Army divisions,
30 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, 1 MEB, and their associ-
ated support within 10 days. Additional forces would be provided
within 2-3 months. DoD will continue to build toward preposi-
tioned equipment in Europe for 6 Army divisions and their associ-
ated support elements.
For contingencies outside Europe, the goal is to provide 5
Army divisions, together with associated air and naval forces in
about 6 weeks. Ground units would fly to a future crisis, much
as forces assigned to Operation DESERT SHIELD did to Saudi Ara-
bia. Personnel will then either be married with prepositioned
equipment or with equipment that arrives via sealift.
Prepositioning for ground and air forces is part of the
complete package that must include intertheater lift. The equip-
ment that must be prepositioned for even a light Army division,
essentially a duplicate set, will probably make prepositioning a
less attractive alternative to the Army than fast sealift. When
addressing fast sealift, the military must make a tradeoff be-
tween speed and tonnage.
The U.S. is obligated to retain sufficient lift to support
immediate contingency operations by either the Atlantic or the
Contingency Forces. Lift requirements for the Pacific Force are
less clear. Initial lift requirement will probably include the
capability to continue concurrent but staggered operations but it
is unlikely that funding will be provided for simultaneous
crises, given the years of failure to provide lift for a 1 war
strategy. The March 1991 JMNA states that the U.S. can deploy
forces in all program scenarios except: (1), when two regional
contingencies occur sequentially or concurrently; and (2), in the
early weeks of a short-warning war in Southwest Asia.
Lift capability disclosed during Operation DESERT SHIELD
will be studied and may result in new requirements and possibly
additional assets. The U.S. already has special lift assets and
a robust prepositioning program, but may learn from recent expe-
rience that modest increments of additional lift or prepositioned
equipment are required.
Lift will probably include a modest government-owned capa-
bility in a caretaker status and civilian air and sea transporta-
tion assets engaged in normal peacetime trade. The U.S. general-
ly met its lift requirements for Operation DESERT SHIELD with a
combination of existing assets, those taken from trade, and
charters of foreign vessels. The new national security strategy
will probably make similar assumptions.
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Air and sealift for a major NATO war in Europe is in the
category of forces that could be reconstituted during the two
years' warning that future program planning now assumes is avail-
able. Reconstitution of lift should include: that provided by
allies, charters from foreign non-aligned sources, and the acti-
vation of assets in storage. It will be hard to justify the
retention of older, World War II-era ships, as a part of a re-
structured National Defense Reserve Fleet.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Unilateral Capability?
Among the more interesting questions regarding the CONUS-
based Contingency Force, and potential crisis intervention by the
Atlantic or Pacific Forces, is whether the planning assumptions
include the ability for the U.S. to operate unilaterally. Are
the force reductions envisaged by the new strategy so deep as to
make the participation of host nations and allies a prerequisite
for U.S. military action? Although Secretary Cheney told the
House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, in February 1991, that
the U.S. "will retain the ability to act alone," the March 1991
JMNA assumes that host nation support and sufficient infrastruc-
ture is available for any major regional contingency. At the end
of April 1991, GEN Powell told the Defense Base Closure Commis-
sion that: "Frequently, access ashore rw7ill be contested or unob-
tainable, requiring employment of sea-based forces."
"Acting alone" must be viewed in terms of the level of
warfare being discussed--strategic (a major war such as World War
II), operational (campaign sized similar to Operations DESERT
SHIELD or DESERT STORM), or tactical (similar to the invasion of
Grenada or Panama); and whether such operations are essentially
nuclear, maritime, or air/land warfare. The U.S. will probably
reserve the right, and maintain the capability, to take unilater-
al conventional forces military actions at the tactical-level,
but probably not at the strategic or operational levels of
air/land warfare. In other words, the strategy only calls for a
modest unilateral tactical capability, about that provided by an
Amphibious Strike Task Force or Maritime Prepositioning Force
(MPF) MEB. If the U.S. remains committed to maritime superiori-
ty, then it could still mount a unilateral theater campaign at
sea.
However, it should be assumed that the U.S. could not uni-
laterally mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign such
as DESERT SHILLD with the Base Force. Further, one could argue,
that the U.S. probably does not have this operational level
capability today. Both the SECDEF and the CJCS were careful, in
their testimony to the SASC, in February 1991, to project that
the Base Force could handle an Operation DESERT SHIELD or DESERT
STORM but that it might have taken longer before the forces were
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prepared to go on the offensive. This answer assumes, however,
that such operations are coalition-based--and not unilateral.
The U.S. long has assumed that a major war (at the strategic
level) would be pursued only as a part of alliances, such as NATO
- hence there is no real change at this level of warfare. In-
deed, continued good working relations with allies is a specific
goal of the new national security strategy and a vital building
block for the reconstitution of a substantial U.S. military
presence in Europe. Similarly, the U.S. has always maintained a
unilateral capability at the tactical level of warfare and there
is no reason to assume that it will not do so in the future.
The Administration amplified its views on this issue, in the
August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States,
presumably after the military pointed out the significantly
different force structure required for the varying assumptions.
The White House document states that the U.S. must be prepared
for "differing levels of support from host nations." This in-
cludes the necessity to ". . .deploy substantial forces and
sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioning of equip-
ment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be
available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a less
developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our
forces once they have arrived. Our strategy demands we be able
to move men and material to the scene of a crisis at a pace and
in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force."
If the U.S. desires a unilateral capability to intervene in
the world without host nation support, on the order of an Opera-
tion DESERT SHIELD, then the current force structure will remain
high--perhaps too high to absorb the imminent budget reductions.
If the budget drives the problem, we are less likely to field a
force that can intervene without the assumption of host nation
and coalition support. This issue will probably be a major focus
of discussion during the next budget year.
DoD Organization
If changes of this magnitude occur, it is obvious that the
DoD is about to undergo another soul-wrenching reappraisal of
military service roles-and-missions. From a reading of this
year's Service Secretary's and Chiefs of Staff posture state-
ments, it is obvious that the Army was more attuned to the new
strategy and Base Force than were the other services. The ab-
sence of serious discussion of the new national security strategy
by the other services in their posture statements is, frankly,
remarkable - given the fact that the Aspen speech occurred almost
six months earlier.
No matter how painful, the review of roles and missions will
occur, implicitly through budget decisions or explicitly if we
dare. Should new services be created - such as space or special
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operations forces - or do we instead field the recommended four
new force packages, made up of multiple but existing services
operating under joint military strategies for the benefit of the
existing CinCs?
Although the U.S. Air Force has always had strong analytic
support, they are only beginnix, to study the implications of the
new national security strategy3 - instead preferring to address
strategy and force structure, to date, in terms of their pre-
Aspen speech White Paper, "The Air Force and U.S. National Secu-
rity: Global Reach - Global Power. '" 32 Since the Air Campaign was
so successful in Operation DESERT STORM, can we finally bury the
recurring suggestion to revisit a separate Air Force?
Even more interesting is the question of should the bulk of
the Marine Corps remain as a part of the Department of the Navy;
or, since it is dedicating forces to CONUS-based land warfare-
oriented Contingency Force and playing a significant role in the
Army-heavy Atlantic Force, move most of its assets to the De-
partment of the Army? Some argue that the Navy/Marine Corps team
is already an existin9 contingency response force - implying why
do we need another?3 3 The new strategy assumes that we need a
unilateral but modest tactical amphibious warfare capability,
which we already have with our Amphibious Strike Task Forces.
If the Marine Corps casts its lot with the Army, it might be
able to successfully shift the bulk of its fighting potential
without loss of its special identification. Other armies have
amphibious troops and the U.S Army already has five Tmphibious
assault ships and is building 35 assault landing craft . A very
small independent Naval or Marine Infantry might be retained
under the Navy for at-sea duties such as: evacuation of non-
combatants, piracy suppression, the at-sea recovery of maritime
assets, drug interdiction, and guard duties.
On the other hand, staying with the Navy Department means
that planned programs and personnel actions will not undergo the
scrutiny associated with a shift to a new military department. On
the whole, although one can make a case that the bulk of the
Marine Corps could and even should shift to the Army, it is
doubtful that neither the Administration nor the JCS will tackle
this issue in the near term. Hence the Marine Corps should not
oppose the new strategy and Base Force - they should assume that
under it, no one will question their "right" to exist.
The CJCS told an Amerjcan Defense Preparedness Association
audience and Army Times," in April 1991, that the new four
military forces do not necessarily represent new CinCs. On the
other hand, it has been reported that GEN Powell wag6 indeed con-
sidering changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP). According
to a more recent report, ambitious plans to reorganize the UCP
was "scaled back as senior officials realized the difficulty of
pushing through such a major reorganization in the face of possi-
ble opposition from the CINCs, the services, Congress and
others."
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In an August 1991 interview, ADM Jeremiah suggested that it
might be too soon for substantive changes bvt hinted that future
command reorganization is not precluded. The same line was
followed by GEN Powell the next month, in his Congressional
testimony. Powell emphatically denied that any changes would
take place soon but that cuts in headquarters would have to occur
in the future. Two days after Powell testified to Congress, the
President announced on nationwide television that, with the
concurrence of the SECDEF and the JCS, all operational strategic
nuclear forces in the U.S. would be reorganized under a new
Strategic Command.
Probably more than any other issue associated with the new
national security strategy and Base Force, the review of the UCP,
dividing the world into CinC areas of responsibility, has more
flag and general officer's attention than any other item.39  The
new national security strategy and Base Force suggest that we
revisit the existing wartime command and control structure for
theater and functional CinCs.40 Do we need warfighting CinCs for
the entire world? With asymmetrical reductions in force struc-
ture should come a loss of organizational influence. 4 1  Such
changes will obviously affect all joint military and intelligence
organizations.
Jointness
A parallel, but closely related, debate is ongoing over the
degree of future jointness that the Navy is willing to accept.
The current active-duty Navy leadership appears to have internal-
ized the Jldwater-Nichols Act and agree that "jointness is here
to stay." Problems with the quality of DoD strategic planning
should have been solved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and two
administrations committed to implement this legislation. The
fundamental review of national military strategy will severely
test this assumption. The low level of inter-service infighting
made public over Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM indi-
cates that there has been success in this area.
One strategy to deal with the jointness issue is to not jus
"embrace it, but capture it, take it over and run with it.1#4 3
This recommendation attempts to use jointness as a vehicle to
perform traditional maritime missions with traditional forces.
Another strategy is to accept jointness, accede to nationally-
mandated roles and missions, and modify the Navy's traditional
self-image as the victor in the Pacific theater in World War II.
This approach would necessitate refuting the retired flag officer
community's criticism of the new national security strategy and
Base Force.
44
Commands, however, will obviously not be allocated on a
basis where the Navy has the majority. The Pacific theater has
been declared a maritime one and the assumption is that it will
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retain a Navy CinC. If there is no serious maritime opposition
to Navy forces at sea in the Pacific area of responsibility, is
this assumption valid? Regarding the new Strategic Command,
although a majority of strategic nuclear warheads may be sea-
based in the future at best, command will rotate between the Air
Force and the Navy.4 5
The Army and Air Force have already indicated they would
dedicate serious assets to contingency response, making them the
current leading candidates for command of a CONUS-based Joint
Contingency Force. This alone should cause the Marine Corps to
seriously consider consolidating existing flag officer billets in
order to 4%ain one new four star general who would be a
contender. 4  If the Navy dedicated standing forces to a future
Contingency Force, it would logically lead to a full rotational
command policy.
Perhaps the most serious debate will occur over the proposed
Atlantic Force. By dedicating most U.S. Army heavy assets to
this force, one could conclude that the Army sees the Atlantic
Force as a land-oriented command with seapower as a significant
but supporting element. The Navy will probably focus on the word
"Atlantic" and argue that it should obviously retain its maritime
character and command. The Navy might even be willing to surren-
der cognizance over the Caribbean and South American waters in
order to retain the Atlantic command. Major fleet elements of
the U.S. Navy operated under the command of Army generals during
World War II and have routinely done so in the Mediterranean
since then.
If the Atlantic Force is in fact primarily focused on re-
gional response power projection in Europe and the Middle
East/Southwest Asia, then perhaps the major peacetime commander
should be oriented toward ground warfare with air Ana " ritime
commanders playing a subordinate role. After all, is there any
serious threat to our maritime forces in this area of the world?
If the Soviet (or some other) threat returns, it will be rela-
tively easy to split the Atlantic Force into its land and sea-
based components as a part of our reconstitution for a major
global war originating in Europe.
On the other hand, in the new era of jointness, it can be
argued that all the CinC positions could be filled by the best
candidate from any service with no one single service having a
lock on any specific job. Even if this would mean, in reality,
rotation, the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act may be more
fully realized than if we retain current practices.
Under the President's new national security strategy, we are
clearly marching to a drumbeat that will probably mean the end of
unilateral naval intervention overseas. Naval and Marine Corps
forces are viewed under the new national security strategy and
Base Force as being a part of a larger package - they are not
going to be able to advertise themselves only as the Navy/Marine
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Corps Team. The new team is a leaner but more powerful U.S.
Armed Forces.
The Industrial and Manpower Base
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The most demanding, critical factor in the success of the
President's new national security strategy is the ability of
private industry to deliver during the "reconstitution" process.
What is visualized is not industrial mobilization from a "warm"
start: rather, industry will be asked to deliver military equip-
ment and supplies from a "cold" start - assuming that many of our
current defense industries shift to the non-defense sector.
The Bush Administration is attempting to both save our
defense industrial base under very trying conditions, and simul-
taneously reduce defense spending - a dubious prospect, when it
seems reluctant even to address the need for a national industri-
al policy.48 Reconstitution of U.S. industrial capabilities is
an insufficient goal--international reconstitution will be
necessrv for overseas suppliers of finished goods and raw mate-
rials. Major changes are required in the way we do business,
to retain both our technological position in the world and the
personnel necessary to meet newly defined defense needs.
Reconstitution. Reconstitution has three essential sub-
components: mobilization, military force reconstitution, and
industrial reconstitution. Mobilization will provide the ability
to respond to crises with an active duty and reserve force mix.
Much more attention should be paid to ensuring that the reserves
can respond, then return to their disrupted civilian occupations
without loss of families, homes, and jobs. Existing legislation
should be reviewed now that we have completed Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
Military force and industrial reconstitution, however, are
areas in which the U.S. has not had active interests for many
years. Reconstitution must provide, primarily in the European
theater - but not only there, additional forces and military
hardware for a major war, assuming that no major combat takes
place for two years. Reconstitution time goals can be somewhat
vague; since what is required is that we need only convince the
Soviet Union, and European nations, that we can: "reconstitute a
credible [deterrence/] defense faster than58ny potential opponent
can generate an overwhelming offense.",5  Reconstitution in
Europe is possible only with a continued alliance structure such
as NATO.
According to ADM Jeremiah's March 1991 Congressional testi-
mony, the new Army cadre reserve divisions will reach combat-
ready status in 12-18 months. The Army is now stating that the
time involved may be as short as 15 months. In peacetime, a
cadre division might consist of a skeleton organization of some
3,000 officers and noncommissioned officers (vice over J0,000 in
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an active division).5 1 The individual ready reserve or conscrip-
tion are low cost methods of managing tie necessary manpower pool
required for reconstitution.
Marine Corps reserve divisions have not been included in
this new cadre status. Additional goals for reconstitution will
be provided as staffs become familiar with the concept - but some
initial areas to investigate might include: sealift and inter-
theater airlift, strategic air and missile defenses, and short-
range and naval nuclear weapons.
Some of the military capability that America and its allies
must retain should be contained in existing active duty and ready
reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies are needed for
those ready forces, while some should be stockpiled and preposi-
tioned. Maritime prepositioning offers great flexibility, re-
cently demonstrated in the Middle East. However, not all the
materials for all types of war need be readily available.
Implicit in the President's new national security strategy
is the capability of tooling-up for wartime production within two
years for a major war in Europe and less than that for lengthy
contingency operations. GEN Powell stated, in December 1990,
that this ability to reconstitute was one of the critical under-
lying support capabilities of the new national security strategy.
This capability will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills,
and tools to respond within the time limits specified. This
concept is not new. We should review the 1930s hi tory of plan-
ning assumptions and industry's ability to respond. 2
Dr. Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy),
was a proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrip
responses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime.
Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the
deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adequate govern-
mental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a
series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those used in
the military, which would trigger specific actions. These would
be less threatening because they would not immediately increase
military capability.
A "graduated deterrence response," the term used by LTG
Butler in his September 1990 talk at the National Press Club,
could well involve a "graduated industrial response." This is
not the same type of response that the government ordered in 1987
under the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept--that
program being used to support national mobilization for crises
and war with existing forces and strategies. GMR remains a high
priority program to support regional contingency response. There
is no reason contracts cannot be let ahead of time for both a
response to a major war and for contingencies.
Although we speak abstractly about devising plans and pass-
ing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help
government ascertain how much money would be required to recon-
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stitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for
other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking
sufficient governmental short-term money which can be quickly
diverted to defense--if the GMR and reconstitution part of the
new national security strategy is to have teeth.
Industry and government should decide on a basic strategy
consonant with our ability to support a defense industrial base
and invest in new technologies; and both must be comfortable with
their new, nonconfrontational, roles. Government should ensure
that industry is capable of retooling and delivering military
products within two years or less.
The government record of abandoning major production pro-
grams is a travesty, and it is likely that - unless consciously
addressed - we will permit the destruction of most capability.
Notable examples include the APOLLO and SATURN V programs, where
facilities, equipment, hardware, stores, instrumentation, data
files, test stands, etc. were destroyed and all technical teams
were dispersed.
Many military contractors have been provided government-
owned equipment, or have charged the development of facilities
and equipment to military contracts. If the federal government
wants these facilities retained, mothballed, or perhaps even
improved, then it should provide incentives. Ownership of gov-
ernment equipment can be transferred to industry, or management
of facilities can be turned over to government. If retained by
industry, federal, state, and local tax laws must be revised to
reduce or eliminate taxes on idle property and land.
Industry will work, meanwhile, on projects that have no
direct defense application and simultaneously be asked to main-
tain the expertise necessary to produce military equipment within
specified time limits. Keeping this expertise will require
innovative measures--perhaps even joint government and private
repositories of knowledge at taxpayers expense. This, in turn,
requires new and innovative approaches to intellectual property
rights. The DoD has allowed defense contractors to retain title
rights for inventions while reserving the right of license-free
use. If we mix federal and private sector research, we may have
to allow federal employees to benefit from royalties for work
that is produced while on government time.
Making the two year response time a reality may require
abandoning military design specifications (MILSPEC) in many
areas. We may have to acknowledge that, to meet deadlines,
available commercial products may be substituted. For areas that
clearly require specifications, the old system should be re-
tained.
The reconstitution of industrial capability appears the
single most demanding element of the new national security
strategy. The March 1991 JMNA states that "it would likely be 6
to 24 months before industrial base mobilization or surge produc-
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tion could begin to deliver critical items. . by the end-FY
1997, it is estimated that it would take 2 to 4 years to restore
production capability to 1990 levels for items whose lines have
gone 'cold'." Fortunately, the Soviet Union is accorded the same
capability. Clearly, the U.S. will have to monitor the ability to
meet reconstitution targets, to test capabilities, to enhance the
credibility of our response and to monitor the Soviet ability to
do the same.
Reconstitution is fundamentally oriented toward the U.S.
contribution to the defense of Europe in the face of a regenerat-
ed Soviet conventional threat. The U.S. need not reconstitute
the 1990-era conventional force it had forward-deployed to Eu-
rope. New technologies, especially in air breathing systems, may
offer the same or even increased combat potential with fewer
ground troops. Nuclear weapons, especially those based at sea,
and maritime forces, offer the U.S. an ability to fully meet its
military commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty without the
extensive deployment of any ground or air forces on European
soil.
The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the as-
sumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to
the homeland, that a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-
like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Urals, that the
Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused, and that NATO and its
members intelligence services are functioning. After events in
the Soviet Union during the Winter of 1990-91, Secretary Cheney
adopted a more cautious note on expected Soviet behavior. The
failed Soviet coup of August 1991 certainly suggests further
caution, until the USSR (or whatever becomes of it) achieves
greater political stability. 54 However, if national military
forces leave newly independent border republics, and if these
republics do not field large offensive national guards, and if
strategic nuclear forces are reduced to minimal deterrent levels,
then the 1990 Soviet threat envisaged by the framers of the new
national security strategy will be excessive and obsolete for
U.S. planning purposes.
Investment StrateQy and Conversion. The major implication of
the two-year big war warning of a Europe-centered global war with
the USSR is that American programming strategy will shift its
focus to the more immediate threats presented in other areas of
the world. Until now, the unstated relationship of the threat to
programmed forces was, generally, that U.S. forces would meet the
challenge of the most demanding threat, the USSR, and assume that
they could also cope with lesser contingencies. That basic
assumption was not entirely true and now will be essentially
reversed: forces will be acquired to meet the challenges of the
more likely, less demanding, threats assuming that they are also
useful against the more unlikely but greater threat posed by a
Soviet Union that decides to rearm.
This will be a new planning assumption for America, new for
its allies, and somewhat impractical for the near term - or until
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we see substantial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force
structure to match what we know for certain are reductions in the
ground and air forces. The intelligence community is tasked to
advise Western governments when their strategic nuclear and
maritime postures can be relaxed. Can it meet the challenge?
There will be a fundamental restructuring of the near-term
programming already contracted, and there may be extraordinarily
high penalties incurred as industries move from the defense area
to others. There will be last-ditch attempts to salvage certain
programs, arguments that previously programmed forces are needed
in the new Base Force, and bids to simply keep people employed
and legislative districts satisfied. This will be a great chal-
lenge to the new Congress--which should play its larger role
instead of responding only to narrow constituent interests.
An obvious next step for the DoD is to provide incentives
for the services to stop rejustifying old programs under the new
national security strategy and instead, to actually perform a
zero-based needs assessment. An obvious second step is to plan
for the divestiture of unnecessary forces, equipment and indus-
trial capability. There will be a great temptation to tie the
reduction in capability to arms control - both for reasons of
merit and to delay, or perhaps derail, reductions.
Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new national
security strategy is the retention of capability to produce
equipment and supplies that have not been maintained. Not all
firms must convert, nor should they be allowed to convert to the
civilian non-defense sector. Government could regulate the
decline but appears prepared to allow the market to determine
survivors. Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Atwood told a group
on May 1, 1991, that:
I believe the free economic system is the system which
should determine who wins, who loses, who merges. I believe
in the free marketplace. I don't think we, the Department
of Defense surely, have the capability to try to plan any
kind of industrial policy. Quite the contrary. The free
marketplace has to determine. Our role is to sponsor re-
search and development and our role is to make sure people
know what we're going t buy. And let the marketplace deter-
mine those in between.
Some firms will manage to convert to the civilian sector.
The assisted conversion of defense businesses to the civilian
sector is a highly charged process. If a firm can produce tanks
and another automobiles, why subsidize the uninitiated to do what
there are competent firms already doing? Conversion assistance
schemes abound, with proposals to use independent R&D funds for
everything from non-military ventures to fully-funded programs.
For those firms which can convert, with or without assist-
ance, there will be significant cultural adjustments. Government
contractors often have the customer providing capital for spe-
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cialized facilities and equipment. This is not normal procedure
in the commercial market. In the defense industrial world, re-
quirements often advance the state of the art whereas in the
commercial market, state of the art is limited by costs and
competition. The two environments have drastically different
financial structures and supporting infrastructures capable of
preparing proposals.
Defense contractors are often organized along narrow com-
partmentalized, functional lines with little awareness of the
overall program. Many firms do business in both worlds but there
is little interconnection of personnel. Government and civilian
contractors both agree that there is a significant problem con-
verting personnel from one culture into successes in the other.
It is also likely that management cannot make the transition.
After Vietnam War production ended, a downsizing of the
defense industry was followed by massive displacements of pro-
fessional and technical specialists. Conversion efforts then
consisted largely of acquiring non-defense firms and attempting
to expand into new markets. Most conversions failed, but pri-
marily at the plant level. The cultural shock was either too
great or the technologies offered by the defense firms were not
needed.
The wholesale demobilization of military personnel into the
civilian job market has taken place several times in the U.S.,
with mixed results. Appropriate temporary programs are needed to
ensure that we manage the transition smoothly to support new
national industrial and business goals.
Some industrial and military facilities inevitably will be
idled, even made obsolete, by the new national security strategy.
We can anticipate massive environmental cleanups at particularly
dirty facilities, such as industrial sites used for the manufac-
ture of weapons grade plutonium. The staggering costs of these
efforts will make them economically unattractive for private
peaceful use. Clearly, the government will have to assume these
costs.
Research & Development. A fundamental restructuring of the
defense procurement processes is long overdue. Industry often
sought, or took the leading role in exploring, technological
opportunities and charged that research to overhead for major
programs. With the major programs likely to be severely reduced,
a new mechanism is required for basic research and initial devel-
opment. To change the leading role in military R&D, governments
may be compelled to reverse a major downward spiral in this
category of spending.5  Indeed, GEN Powell stated, in his Decem-
ber 1990 speeches, that defense R&D is one of the four underlying
support capabilities of the new national security strategy.
Another possibility is to set up major government design
bureaus, and internalize R&D responsibility itself--perhaps
specializing in areas devoid of normal civilian spin-offs. The
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Navy did this in the 1930s, when its Naval Aircraft Factory did
prototyping, and both the Aircraft Factory and shipyards provided
"yardsticks" by which to measure contractor performance. An
alternative strategy is to continue those operations in the
private sector and provide nourishing government subsidies. Per-
haps state and local governments can be persuaded to invest in
R&D as well. The objective is to retain technology capability in
numerous areas and the production capabilities in a few.
In any case, the output cannot be a family of senescent
designs, curing on the shelf, but rather fully operational proto-
types which normally never enter full scale development. In jome
cases, limited production runs may be necessary to ensure that
production experience is maintained. In most cases, product
improvement programs should be included in the prototype program.
Prototyping generally results in three major options: (1) buying
the system, (2) buying major components, or (3), rolling over the
technology to the next generation. This third option is current-
ly being looked at by the staff of the HASC Policy Committee.
A prototypes development program should ensure that both the
capability of assembly and a dynamic R&D program continue.
The Soviets also have worried about the same issues as they
convert former military industries to civilian production. RADM
Yu M. Khaliulin, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, told
Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev at a November 13, 1990
meeting with military people's deputies, that a naval ship should
be built every year or two at newU "converted" shipyards, just
to retain the capability to do so.
Such a shift in USSR defense procurement will offer new
challenges to our intelligence community. How do we classify
evidence of new hardware when we cannot predict whether it will
be followed by a procurement program? Keeping multiple products
on the shelf is also a good competitive strategy that will force
an enemy to match all possible threats, instead of just a few.
This, of course, works both ways and may prove justification for
otherwise unwanted armaments. This shift to worrying about
possible "breakout" is not altogether new, but will alter the
emphasis of our collection efforts.
The new programming environment will reflect a new under-
standing of the partnership between government and industry. It
will require major changes in the charters of many R&D and pro-
gramming agencies to allow easier adaptation of commercial tech-
nologies into the defense sector, and the continued flow of de-
fense technologies into the civilian world. It is also likely to
require changing defense regulations to allow profits on R&D and
prototypes.
CONCLUSIONS
There appear to be four main problem areas in which solu-
tions portend success for the President's dream. The first is
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that everything depends upon the responsible, good behavior of
the Soviet Union. The second critical area demands that the
intelligence community be able to surmount the new challenges.
The third area that can undermine a successful transition to this
new world will be the international behavior of allies and the
U.S. Congress. The final and most demanding, critical factor in
the success of President Bush's new national security strategy is
the capability to reconstitute the defense industrial base.
By withdrawing forces from overseas and promising to recon-
stitute within two years and return, the U.S. will have fundamen-
tally changed its international politico-military posture. If
after internal investigation, we cannot fulfill this promise,
then the U.S. government should keep this conclusion under
wraps, endure the open-source critical debate and criticism it
will face, and keep this declaratory strategy operational.
The President's new national security strategy is a program-
ming concept that supports the continued reliance on deterrence
of war as the cornerstone of American security. There are those
who doubted that the U.S. would ever use centrally-based nuclear
weapons for the defense of Europe--perhaps a President never
would have decided to actually do that. Deterrence strategies
are influenced greatly by perceptions; under the new national
security strategy, it will be important to maintain the percep-
tion of our ability to reconstitute. Just as in the past, evi-
dence of programs, deployments, exercises, and literature must
be provided to support deterrence.
The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numer-
ous, complex, and require discussion. This book-length report
responds to the obvious questions, and perhaps suggests what else
might be included. In his Aspen speech, the President opened the
door to a total reexamination of America's role in the world and
overall U.S. military capabilities. The historical parallel is
the British reorientation in the first decade of the 20th Century
from strategic focus on colonies to Europe. It is very likely
that as a result of this new national security strategy, the U.S.
will start down the path toward splendid isolationism.'
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U.S. Intelligence and the New National Security Strategy
by
Thomas B. Grassey1
The U.S. intelligence community is at another crossroad.
The end of the Cold War concluded four decades of fear that the
Soviet Union would initiate a major war in Europe. Just as the
post-war defense and intelligence establishments were created
simultaneously by the National Security Act of 1947, a new vision
of American armed forces--indeed, of the entire "world
order"--was heralded at Aspen. What effects may this new nation-
al security strategy have on U.S. intelligence? What effects
should it have?
The latter question is where policy-makers ought to begin.
However, that question raises four more basic issues. First, what
intelligence requirements remain the same despite this reduction
in military threat? Second, what new demands on intelligence
arise because of the reduction? Third, what changes in U.S.
intelligence activities are required by world trends at the close
of the century, irrespective of the reduced Soviet military
threat? Finally, what effects will adjustments in U.S. military
capabilities have on intelligence?
WHAT HAS NOT CHANGED
Pearl Harbor dominates American thinking on intelligence.
Despite the extraordinary insights into an adversary's intentions
which code-breaking allowed, the U.S. suffered a painful surprise
attack. Strategists argue that, should the nation be similarly
surprised in the nuclear age, recovery would be impossible and
defeat inevitable. Better intelligence and an invulnerable
retaliatory force have been proposed as complementary measures to
discourage a massive surprise nuclear attack on the USs
That intelligence requirement has not diminished, nor will
it so long as such an attack is possible. Despite the dramatic
changes in European theater force levels and significant politi-
cal and military re-arrangements, the Soviet Union's strategic
forces--intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers,
cruise missiles, and submarine-launched nuclear missiles--remain
formidable, are being improved, and constitute the major military
threat to the U.S. for the foreseeable future. U.S. intelligence
must devote ceaseless attention to the threat of a massive Soviet
nuclear strike. Even deep reductions in strategic forces
achieved through arms control negotiations will not ease this
responsibility; for, as levels are reduced, the deterrent value
of each weapon increases and the demand for warning of an attack
grows greater.2
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What also has not changed, despite the end of the Cold War,
is the requirement of U.S. forces for intelligence to conduct
operations having little or no counter-Soviet dimension. Whether
in Lebanon or Grenada, Panama or Iraq, U.S. military forces have
fought, and Americans have died, in need of better intelligence.
Equally, threatened or actual introduction of U.S. forces during
international crises will be used by American governments to
support policies. In this fashion, or on future battlegrounds,
superior U.S. i-itelligence capabilities are essential. Since so
few of these siLations involve the Soviet Union, the reduced
threat ofE a masor war against the Soviets is inconsequential to
these other requirements on U.S. intelligence capabilities.
WHAT NEW DEMANDS ON INTELLIGENCE WILL ARISE?
For intelligence, ending the Cold War increases demands to
comprehend many nations and subnational organizitions on their
own terms rather than as "superpower clients." Intelligence
questions will cost more to answer because so little can be
carried over from an understanding of superpower interests and
policies in a region. If an old U.S. intelligence fallacy lay in
over-estimating Soviet control, the new difficulty stems from the
virtual absence of Soviet suasion. Syria must be understood as
Syria, Egypt as Egypt. Replacing the tidy, albeit oversimpli-
fied, East-West division, intelligence analysts must consider an
array of more than 160 nations and scores of independent groups
(e.g., the Palestine Liberation Organization). "New World Order"
suggests an unconscious verbal reaction to the chaos of a shat-
tered Cold War world.
A second major new demand on U.S. intelligence is treaty
verification. The U.S. and USSR have been cooperating since 1960
on treaties limiting weapons. But, until recently, the pace of
cooperation has been glacial and the verification requirements
clearly satisfiable. The ability of each side to monitor the
other's compliance through its own intelligence collection capa-
bilities determined how far each treaty's provisions extended.
Intelligence organizations grumbled about how their budgets were
consumed by verification duties, and critics of arms control
complained about the ascendance of treaty-monitoring over war-
fighting capabilities in U.S. intelligence; yet the stipulations
of treaties could be confirmed without severe strains.
That may no longer be true. A host of arms-control
treaties, bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviet Union or
multilaterally among many nations, on topics as varied as strate-
gic weapons, chemical warfare, and conventional force levels in
Europe, appears ready to overwhelm the verification assets of
intelligence organizations. Additionally, intrusive measures
like visits to production facilities and military bases are
manpower-intensive, leading to the creation of the On-Site In-
spection Agency which draws personnel primarily from U.S. intel-
ligence organizations to satisfy its extensive requirements.
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Further, the numerous semi-permanent Soviet monitoring teams
located in the U.S. could engage in collateral espionage. The
glasnost-inspired openness in scholarly, cultural, and commercial
exchanges adds to this difficulty. So, beyond the expanding
tasks of ,'erification, U.S. intelligence organizations face
heavier counter-intelligence challenges. On balance, the demands
on U.S. intelligence appear to be growing--directly from treaty-
verification assignments, indirectly from counter-intelligence
concerns.
A third new requirement on U.S. intelligence is long lead-
time warning. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and
other administration officials, have stated that the U.S. would
have two years' strategic warning of a major Soviet conventional
attack against. NATO. Henceforth, instead of scrutinizing Warsaw
Pact tank armies, air bases, and military communications nets,
U.S. intelligence must monitor Soviet military and industrial
mobilization capabilities, munitions and critical resources
stockpiling, and similar long-term preparations for war.
Presumably, an upsurge in these activities will warrant alerting
U.S. (and other Western) leaders of a heightened Soviet military
threat.
Certainly, U.S. intelligence has attempted for decades to
understand and evaluate the Soviet Union's scientific and techno-
logical capabilities, along with its capacity to sustain the
military, industrial, economic, political, and social strains
that a major modern war would impose. The new aspect is that
these appraisals will now be treated as war-warning indicators;
President George Bush's proposed national security strategy
relies on these "large category" intelligence assessments to
signal the need to activate U.S. (and Western) defensive prepara-
tions.
Fourth, a nation's fate in the next century may be decided
more by its economic competitiveness than by the strength of its
armed forces.6 Discussion of the role U.S. intelligence agencies
might play in the economic competition among industrialized
nations has become a "hot potato." Whereas some leading allies
coordinate a trade policy which links the corporate sector's
research efforts with government-conducted espionage against
foreign technological and commercial developments, the U.S. is
not culturally attuned to a close relationship (formally recog-
nized) between government and business. Apparently, national as
well as military intelligence organizations are balking at sug-
gestions they might anticipate greater involvement in this eco-
nomic competition.
Fifth of new demands on intelligence is the urgent require-
ment to understand the internal affairs of the new Soviet Union
or whatever replaces it. Until Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika,
the USSR was viewed as a monolith by most U.S. intelligence
analysts. With perestroika sinking into razval, disintegration,
no analyst can ignore the centrifugal strains in that nation.
Consequently, predictions of Soviet actions and positions that
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formerly were derived by studying the views of a handful of key
Kremlin officials now must consider: non-Communist republic
leaders, the attitudes of miners in the Kuznetsk Basin, national-
ists in the Ukraine, and insurrectionists in Azerbaijan. U.S.
intelligence organizations lack sufficient linguists even to keep
adequate appraisals of internal events in the polyglot Soviet
Union; higher-order analyses must be tenuous. At stake for U.S.
intelligence are the future actions of a state with the world's
greatest area, the third largest population, and (inter alia) the
second largest nuclear weapons arsenal.
The U.S. intelligence community must also assess additional
non-Soviet-related threats to U.S. interests: weapons prolifera-
tion, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, ecological hazards and
disasters, the social unrest and struggle for resources caused by
population growth, and intra-national conflict based on group
identity.
U.S. intelligence agencies can anticipate heightened respon-
sibilities monitoring world resources and assessing social insta-
bility in areas of importance to the United States. The much-
discussed "North-South gap," the world's continuing population
explosion (especially in lesser-developed states), the accelerat-
ing information-age's impact of electronic images ... these
"megatrends" increasingly will concern national leaders. Their
questions will be directed to many organizations and agencies,
within and outside the government; and the unique sources which
the intelligence community taps should provide answers to some of
these questions.
While traditional reporting from the U.S. embassy and con-
sulates usually provides a good overview of issues, events, and
personalities, such open collection must be supplemented by
clandestine contacts, secret agents, and in-place networks. From
this combination of diplomatic observations and espionage, U.S.
intelligence can appraise a nation's internal affairs. Iran is
the classic lesson of what can happen if clandestine contacts
with opposition groups are restricted, development of secret
agents is pgohibited, and establishment of "stay-behind" networks
is ignored.
Considering the importance to the U.S. of so many nations,
and the diverse social tensions at work, a robust overt and
covert monitoring effort is mandatory. Concomitantly, it will be
challenging, for historically the U.S. has been indisposed to
such monitoring; Americans have been ethnocentric, averse to
"spying," and poorly suited to long-term development of a reli-
able covert agent network.
HOW WILL A CHANGING U.S. MILITARY AFFECT U.S. INTELLIGENCE?
The planned 25 percent reduction in U.S. armed forces has a
disquieting consequence: in most situations, there will be less
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American military power available. The responsibility for ap-
praising the threats that a smallez U.S. military must be config-
ured to fight falls on the intelligence community. Nor should it
be forgotten that smaller U.S. armed forces also suggest a dimin-
ished military intelligence capability, particularly in collec-
tion (e.g., budgetary pressures led the Air Force to withdraw the
SR-71 from service) but also in analysis, production, and dissem-
ination.
Reflecting on the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence
establishment, there is a broader concern: while its forte is
military assessment, particularly order of battle (OOB) collec-
tion and indications and warning (I&W), the historical record
admonishes the wise not to rely exclusively on short-term intel-
ligence reports. While American intelligence capabilities are
technically impressive, those capabilities are not always timely
or precise, they can be foiled, and they are often inadequate for
military operations.
Recent events in Iraq illustrate the limitations of U.S.
intelligence even in its best areas: accurate intelligence warn-
ings were ignor-d; the enemy OOB estimate was inflated; and
battlefield requirements for timely and precise information
exceeded the collective capabilities of surveillance systems.
Moreover, the DESERT STORM war approximated the ideal scenario
for employing the intelligence tools developed to watch the
Soviet Union. Their successes ought not to delude us into imag-
ining that future military operations will duplicate those in
Iraq-Kuwait.
To the contrary, future commitments of U.S. forces almost
certainly will require information which the intelligence commu-
nity is currently ill-prepared to provide. The organizations
created to warn of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S.,
or of a Warsaw Pact assault on NATO forces in Western Europe,
must shift their efforts toward other kinds of contingencies:
assistance to counter-insurgency (or to pro-insurgency) forces,
non-combatant evacuation missions, anti-terrorist intervention,
drug interdiction operations, and peace-keeping presence. These
military operations need different forms of intelligence than is
obtained through KH-11 imagery, U-2 synthetic aperture radar, or
RC-135 radio intercepts. Thus, many of the assets in which the
three major intelligence organizations take pride are of limited
value in probable scenarios involving U.S. military forces.
Some future military operations are likely to be directed
against specific "high-value targets." Whether for political
purposes (the rescue of American hostages, the capture of a drug
kingpin) or military necessity (destruction of a chemical muni-
tions plant, tracking of a nuclear-armed mobile ballistic mis-
sile), U.S. intelligence will be expected to provide precise
information on individual objects or persons. Whereas the "law
of large numbers" allows accurate statistical estimations of the
probability of kinds of events or activities, predicting an
individual event is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible.
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(Thus, a McDonald's restaurant can reliably estimate how many
hamburgers, cheeseburgers, and so on it will sell on any given
day; yet not even the customers know beforehand what they will
order.) National leaders must understand that ambitious opera-
tional objectives aimed at eliminating specific targets may not
be supportable by any feasible intelligence capability.
American intelligence often has been dismayingly obtuse
about imminent--sometimes patent--requirements. Flying in a
show-of-force to support President Corazon Aquino of the Philip-
pines during the latest recent attempted military coup, U.S. Air
Force pilots had no adequate charts of downtown Manila. Seven
months to the day after President Ronald Reagan made a national-
ly-televised address and pointed to an SR-71 photograph of the
Point Salines airfield, American forces landed in Grenada ...
with utterly inadequate maps and charts. During 1983, Marine
units were introduced and withdrawn, reintroduced, and then
assigned in Leba Ion with too few French, Italian, Hebrew, or
Arabic linguists. One can only surmise, from these past defi-
ciencies, how poor intelligence contributions in future "contin-
gency operations" will be unless strenuous remedial efforts are
undertaken. "In low-intensity conflict as in real estate," a
senior U.S. diplomat has been quoted, "there are only three
things that matter. In real estate these are location, location,
and location; in low-intensity conflict they are intelligence,
intelligence, and intelligence."'1 0
The U.S. will withdraw from many of its remaining forward
bases because of the end of the Cold War, the new national secu-
rity strategy's reduction of U.S. forces, Congressional attitudes
toward overseas bases, and host nations' reluctance to allow a
permanent foreign military presence. The elimination of overseas
bases will affect intelligence in various ways, ranging from the
closure of purposely-built collection facilities to the loss of
anonymity amidst so many other American operations. (If a U.S.
Navy EP-3 on an electronic intelligence collection mission lands
at a foreign airfield, it will be more prominent when it is the
only U.S. plane at that field than when it was one among dozens.)
Because overseas bases offer "cover" for intelligence personnel,
equipment, and activities, the elimination of many of those bases
will complicate U.S. intelligence operations.
WHAT WILL DETERMINE THE ACTUAL CHANGES?
From the reduced threat of a major war with the Soviet
Union, future U.S. intelligence requirements can be deduced by
considering what tasks have not changed and what new demands have
arisen (either as an immediate consequence of events in the USSR,
as a corollary of the reduction in U.S. military capability, or
as a result of world trends irrespective of the superpower rival-
ry). The actual U.S. .intelligence community adjustments.-to the
new situation will be influenced by other factors: organizational




The U.S. intelligence establishment is, like the culture
which spawned it, fundamentally competitive. The Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) vie with one another and with the
intelligence branches of the military services, the State Depart-
ment, and the departments of Energy, Treasury, and Justice.
Moreover, the "official" intelligence community must compete with
individual staffs, foreign intelligence services, and open-source
organizations (e.g., Cable News Network).
Competition sometimes occurs in collecting intelligence
information, but usually thrives in analyzing and appraising the
data, or in disseminating conclusions. Intelligence analysts are
proud people, confined to a life of anonymity; their only avenue
for recognition lies in discerning what other analysts have not
detected, or in beating everyone else in reporting what any good
analyst can see. Both organizationally and individually, then,
the U.S. intelligence community is marked by competition. Peri-
odically one hears calls for even greater emphasis on competition
and accountability; the "Team B" episode of the 1970s was just
one upshot of this popular criticism.11
The new national security strategy portends reduction in the
size of the defense and intelligence establishments, elimination
of redundant functions, and a sharp focus on efficient use of
limited assets. No longer will analysts at DIA, CIA, and the
Army Intelligence Agency compete in analyzing the newest Soviet
tank; there will not be enough people (even if all three organi-
zations survive) for this kind of overlapping effort. The
drawback to this desired efficiency is, plainly, its lack of
competitiveness. While logic might suggest a perfectly coordi-
nated (hence maximally efficient) intelligence structure, strong
forces will oppose this management demand, for several reasons.
First, for tasks more challenging than "bean-counting" or
simple mensuration, intelligence assessments which enjoy unani-
mous concurrence usually are wrong. Almost all the hard ques-
tions have numerous attractive but incompatible answers, so
seasoned intelligence officials believe that the truth is more
likely to be discovered through John Stuart Mill's "collision of
adverse opinions."
Second, historical studies of intelligence organizations
suggest that there is no perfect structure, and the wisest ap-
proach is to employ opposed arrangements (even though this ap-
pears inefficient). For instance, if analysts of the Soviet
cruise missile program are placed in the "Soviet Area" shop, they
are likely to have too little contact with the engineers in the
"Cruise Missile" shop, and miss the clues which suggest the
Soviet program is vigorously pursuing a direction only hinted at
in the newest French technology innovations. On the other hand,
if those analysts are located in the "Cruise Missile" shop, they
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are likely to have too little contact with the experts on the
Soviet military budget, and miss the clues which disclose greatly
heightened Kremlin interest in accelerating the cruise missile
program. While it may seem inefficient to allow two sets of
analysts to work on the same question (one group based in one
organizational design, the other in a different one), that may be
necessary and prudent.
Third, competition serves to counteract tendencies toward
"groupthink" and servility toward policy preferences ("cooking
the intelligence"). One large, concentrated, "efficient" intel-
ligence organization, or a "highly coordinated constellation," is
more prone to canonical uniformity; it also is tempted to provide
estimates agreeable to policy-makers, and to attempt to influence
policy.13 Separate, competing organizations studying the same
phenomenon are more likely to keep one another intellectually
honest. Post-event analyses of the 1983 Korean airliner (KAL
-007) shootdown found the Air Force intelligence staff had cor-
rectly assessed what had happened, while the larger agencies
(CIA, DIA, NSA) were wrong--and wrong in a way pleasing to the
administration. The KAL-007 analysis debacle should serve as a
warning to those who want an "efficient" U.S. intelligence organ-
ization.
Fourth, regardless of what an elected or appointed leader-
ship considers optimally efficient, subordinate organizations
will retain their own traditions and focused expertise. The DIA
was established in 1961 to "bring the military intelligence
organizations within the Department of Defense into full conso-
nance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of
1958.,,14 It had no such effect. On the contrary, the Services
successfully resisted Robert S. McNamara's plan to have the DIA
subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. To offset the new
entity, they enlarged and strengthened their own intelligence
organizations, guaranteeing prime consideration of service-spe-
cific needs. Through control of officers assigned to DIA, they
ensured that service loyalties were not forgotten.
So the new national security strategy will likely try to
accommodate significant reductions in the size of the national
intelligence community (including elimination of many intelli-
gence units and commands) with measures to increase coordination
among (the remaining) organizations. Congress appears inclined
to want "unification" even more than "coordination," and a Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, with authority over all U.S. intel-
ligence (including CIA, DIA, NSA and other organizations), is
again being mentioned. This reduction and restructuring will be
problematic.
Concerns
In man-years, dollar-expenditures, numbers of organizations,
prestige, or any other likely measure of gauging what the U.S.
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intelligence establishment considers its most important responsi-
bility, there is little doubt that military threats to Americp
interests dominate the attention of the intelligence community."
Consequently, the equipment, tasking, personnel, and expertise
are committed primarily to studying those dangers.
The threats envisioned by the new national security strate-
gy, in contrast, suggest a shift to other concerns which require
different skills and capabilities. By deliberately eliminating
the readiness to engage the Soviet Union in a European-centered
global war, the new strategy presumes its intelligence establish-
ment can provide two years' prior warning that such a war seems
likely; based on that warning, the U.S. could then reconstitute
(create ex nihilo) adequate forces to deter or, if necessary, to
fight and win that war.
Much thought has been devoted to "the I&W problem" because
of the traumatic effect Pearl Harbor has had in shaping American
consciousness. But virtually all that methodology is attuned to
short-term changes in existing military forces. However, indica-
tors to trip alarms more than several months in advance of hos-
tilities are very hard to find, or have a dubious confidence-
level. For instance, an agent serving on the Politburo staff
might report that the Soviet Union was planning to attack NATO in
twelve months. While the source would be extremely valuable, his
protection would (or should) compel extraordinary measures to
hide his identity. Yet dramatic warnings backed by deliberately
vague sources ("a highly-placed agent") are hard to accept.
Moreover, to act upon such a warning would lead to two
foreseeable consequences: the enemy--seeing NATO's heightened
readiness--would defer the attack, since it was postulated on
surprise (which, ex hypothesi, no longer exists); and he would
investigate how his plans had been disclosed, perhaps terminating
the agent. Deep-penetration sources about enemy intentions are
extraordinarily valuable--and vulnerable--when they are used as
I&W indicators.
Perversely, judging historically, they seldom are believed.
For example, Richard Sorge evidently had three sources in Germa-
ny's Tokyo embassy who provided information which enabled him to
radio warnings to Moscow about Operation BARBAROSSA; Stalin
discounted them. And Colonel Hans Oster, deputy chief of German
counter-intelligence, steadily apprised his friend, the Dutch
military attache, of Hitler's plans to invade Holland; the HagV9
did not believe so high an official could be a reliable source.
These illustrate one intelligence insider's observation, "Nobody
has ever believed a piece of HUMINT [intelligence from a foreign
human source], no matter its pedigree, unless he found it compat-
ible with his personal predisposition.
1
'
Conversely, a deliberately planned major war requires prepa-
rations extending many months before its onset, and most of those
preparations are detectable. The creation of trained armies,
production of combat aircraft, construction of naval vessels, and
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the psychological-political preparation of a society for war
cannot be hidden. U.S. intelligence can provide the American
government with a reasonable appreciation of an adversary's
capability to initiate a planned major war.
A number of relevant issues are important. One is that
capabilities do not necessarily signify intentions. Only rarely
during the Cold War did the U.S. or the Soviet Union actually
fear that the other intended an imminent attack, although some
measure of capability to do so always was available. Contrarily,
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was understood by U.S. intelligence as
an Iraqi capability weeks, if not months, before the attack; most
of the community ld not recognize it as an intention until a few
hours beforehand.
Another potential problem is that major wars sometimes are
not planned; they "just happen." Historians hold that Adolf
Hitler did not expect the Nazi invasion of Poland to trigger
World War II; he evidently believed that the British and French
would recognize their strategic inability to aid the Poles, and
that the democracies were politically unprepared for war in any
event. 19 Simil ly, the U.S. erred about Chinese intervention in
the Korean War.
A third possible fallacy in the new strategy's expectation
of "two years' warning" is that one side's ability to attain war-
readiness may be faster or easier than the other's ability to
respond. Totalitarian regimes generally can act more quickly
than democracies; and even a smaller economy might be ruthlessly
focused on war preparation while a larger economy could have
difficulty transitioning from consumer-society production. Until
its invasion of Russia, the Third Reich displayed a superior
recovery from the worldwide depression in preparing its economy
for war than did the British and French with their notably larger
and less affected economies (even though German jpdustry was
lazily committed to war production as late as 1943).
The analogical danger would be for the new Soviet Union, or
whatever replaces it, to decide on, and vigorously prepare for,
major war against the West; even if reliable intelligence immedi-
ately alerted the U.S. and its allies of this threat, conceivably
the required political, industrial, and military countermeasures
could not be completed in time to prevent or, worse, win that
war.
Finally, the best warning is of little value unless it is
heeded. What are labeled "intelligence failures" often were
"decision failures": all the information and danger signals were
provided in a timely way to leaders duly alerted to the threat,
but they disregarded the reported danger. In every age, in all
forms of government, this problem has existed; as human beings,
decision-makers err. A constitutional democracy especially must
be mindful of the indecision and delays its elected officials
experience in considering whether, or how, to react to reported
threats. The firmest intelligence community alarm of a Soviet
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(or Russian) long-term buildup toward war may not be sufficient
to prompt Congress and the Administration to pay the political
price required to fully counter the danger.
Such concerns suggest that intelligence estimates of capa-
bilities are distinct from, and may not satisfactorily serve as,
I&W alerts. The new national security strategy proposes to treat
capabilities assessments as adequate warning indicators to initi-
ate the reconstitution of American military forces; this may not
work. Increased enemy military capabilities may be disregarded
because they are not perceived to be accompanied by hostile
intentions. Or war could begin as a minor dispute and grow into
a major conflict not by design, so there would be no warning that
the enemy was planning such a war. Or an enemy regime might
achieve a war-winning capability before the U.S. could recognize
and respond to such preparations. Or, finally, the nation's
leaders may ignore intelligence warnings until it is too late to
avert the disaster of war.
Concurrently, other difficulties are likely to arise. The
U.S. intelligence community has responsibilities which extend
beyond warning of, and preparation for, military operations.
Future intelligence requirements also will stem from American
grand strategy--the full and varied political, economic, and
cultural interactions with other nations by which U.S. interests
are advanced. While the American intelligence establishment will
be challenged to support the new national security strategy, it
also must significantly upgrade capabilities required by a U.S.
grand strategy appropriate for the Twenty-first Century.
Language skills, foreign area expertise, knowledge of reli-
gious and political views, agricultural and economic appraisals,
industrial and technology assessment, cross-cultural understand-
ing ... these have never been strengths of American intelligence.
Yet such capabilities can be developed. Doing so will require
organizational wisdom, substantial investments of time and money,
and (most importantly) continual recognition that these tradi-
tional forms of intelligence capabilities are every bit as vital
as those which newer systems provide. These improvements will be
hard to accomplish, however, if there is a serious reduction in
the intelligence community.
Stress Points
Although subtle, the principal adjustment the U.S. intelli-
gence community must make is in its thinking. Old questions,
phrases, and even words now often have completely different
meanings. "How much warning time will we have of a Russian
attack in Europe?" used to be posed in a cultural setting which
no longer exists.
One danger of continuing to use an obsolete vocabulary in a
transformed situation is that crucial new issues may be lost in
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deceptively familiar expressions. "How much warning time will we
have of a Russian attack in Europe?" now should raise the follow-
ing questions: If the Soviet Union were forcibly to intervene in
Poland or Rumania, and pitched battles ensued, accompanied by
pleas from the Poles or Rumanians for Western military assist-
ance, would that be "a Russian attack in Europe"? What if this
were to occur in the newly independent Baltic Republics? Soviet
armies must advance--probably fight--hundreds of miles westward
before encountering NATO ground forces. This has enormous rami-
fications for Soviet and NATO military strategies, and for intel-
ligence requirements.
A second stress point is that while many familiar require-
ments persist as obligations on U.S. intelligence, reductions in
the intelligence budget are looming. The Soviet Union's capabil-
ity to inflict incalculable destruction in a massive nuclear
attack on the U.S. demands the continuation, and modernization,
of intelligence systems and programs whose cost is enormous.
Although some upgrades can be postponed, the imperative to main-
tain vigilance against Armageddon is inescapable. No significant
savings can be realized in intelligence programs here.
The proliferation of deadly weaponry (ballistic missiles,
chemical and nuclear warheads, etc.) and the disappearance of
"the Red threat" means that the world arms trade is more commer-
cial, less curtailed by ideological inhibitions. U.S. forces
will face enemies armed with sophisticated weapons from many
suppliers. Intelligence must prepare those forces against a much
wider variety of tactics, weapons, and capabilities--the threat
problem has exploded.
The final stress point on the U.S. intelligence community is
the overwhelming volume of material that pours in daily. With
the revolution in computers and communications, analysts face a
mind-numbing torrent of data. Even helped by elaborate filter-
ing, archiving, retrieval, and interpretation programs, human
analysts (after learning how to use their sophisticated expert-
systems) must survey mountains of information during a normal
workday. The reports, studies, estimates, analyses, intercepts,
articles, books, and broadcasts available on any important
topic--no matter how narrowly defined--stagger the researcher.
The ability of the intelligence community to serve future deci-
sion-makers depends on the maturation of artificial intelligence
systems.
The Problems of Adjustment
Former CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner titled one
part of Secrecy and Democracy, "Managing the Octopus."22  No one
should underestimate the inertia in the activities in the scores
of organizations, with many thousands of individuals, who com-
prise "the U.S. intelligence community." Moreover, given their
competitive nature and the secretive character of their work,
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these organizations and people are structured to resist external
direction. They are, finally, genuinely concerned with the
national welfare, about which they have considerable information
and tested convictions. Therefore, organizational "rice bowls"
will be protected and personal agendas defended from outside
pressures.
At the organization level, for example, the NSA clearly will
advocate improvements to its signals intelligence collection and
analysis capabilities, its cryptographic techniques, and its
information security skills. Since it is a Defense Department
organization, with a three-star military officer director and a
budget drawn out of DoD funding, NSA must be apprehensive about
reductions in the defense budget. The CIA's budget is much
smaller than NSA's, but hidden among many government programs in
the federal budget; as across-the-board cuts are imposed, the CIA
will either be squeezed or irritate the comptrollers of their
"host" programs.
Organizations can change more easily than individuals, for
the latter have built careers around specific skills. Just as
President Gorbachev is finding that programs to eliminate the
apparatchiki's influence cannot easily be accomplished through
the apparat itself, anyone who plans to re-direct the effort of
U.S. intelligence organizations should consider the power of
people in those organizations to impede such changes. James
Schlesinger and Stansfield Turner are remembered with bitterness
for their modest reductions in CIA staffing.2 3 Shifting American
intelligence from the Soviet threat toward other nations, and
from military targets to heightened interest in economic competi-
tors, will undercut the careers of many persons who may find it
difficult or impossible to acquire new skills.
The likelihood of future "covert action" operations by U.S.
intelligence organizations is unclear. Some observers feel that
the decline in Soviet-American rivalry will obviate the need to
"engage" every presumed enemy with propaganda, harassments, and
"dirty tricks." Others predict that future leaders, lacking
"Soviet imperialism" as a justification for injecting American
military power, will rely on less obvious means of suasion, so
covert action by intelligence operatives may be more, rather than
less, necessary. If so, the special requirements for effective
covert actions (distinct from simple espionage) will augment the
importance of the CIA, particularly its Directorate of Opera-
tions.
Setting up and running the clandestine assets of each covert
action will be very complicated, involving a Presidential "find-
ing," Congressional notification and oversight, the fielding of
qualified operators, establishment of necessary secret and
"front" organizations, and serious reflection on the consequences
of discovery (consider the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the mining of
Nicaraguan ports by CIA agents, or the "Irangate" episode). Some
observers question whether any U.S. covert action can be kept
secret; others doubt the utility of such operations; and the U.S.
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intelligence community is of a mixed mind about the extent to
which "coy(rt action" properly should be an intelligence respon-
sibility." The direction administrations take on covert action
will renew this argument and affect the prominence of the CIA in
the intelligence community.
The esprit de corps of an intelligence service, and individ-
ual morale within its organizations, matter greatly in effective
intelligence operations. Transitioning to meet the requirements
of the 1990s and beyond will demand exceptional leadership to
maintain the strength that survived the post-Vietnam, post-Water-
gate 1975 Church Committee hearings on intelligence, the nadir in
American Cold War intelligence self-esteem. Prospects for suc-
cess are not aided by Senator Daniel Moynihan's call for aboli-
tion of the CIA, or others' suggestions that the intelligence
budget should be sharply scaled back.2 5  Honorable severance
arrangements, recruitment of new talent, realignment of organiza-
tional responsibilities, and resolution of fundamental questions
about intelligence are aspects of the leadership ch~llenge ahead.
Of course, the primary task of the American intelligence communi-
ty's leadership will be to demonstrate what has sometimes seemed
uncertain: that a free society can conduct secret activities
without destroying itself.
CONCLUSIONS
From General George Washington's Revolutionary War espionage
nets through Herbert Yardley's Black Chamber to William Donovan's
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), American intelligence organi-
zations seldom have survived long beyond the wars that gave them
birth. This American pattern, visible again in the Church and
Pike committees of the 1970s and the Iran-Contra probe of the
1980s, reflects a deep aversion to clandestine power. Today's
intelligence commiunity came into existence because of the Cold
War, and may too pass into history.
For the intelligence community to survive, it must be trans-
formed to meet threats which are judged clearly more dangerous
than those latent in a powerful secret government organization.
This ancient problem was recognized by Plato: "We must have the
guardians gentle to their fellow citizens and fierce to their
enemies. If we cannot do that, they will prevent the qemy from
destroying the city by destroying it first themselves."' o Artic-
ulating the requirements for the intelligence community's surviv-
al, and convincing the American people that its operations can be
regulated, will be the foremost challenge of the intelligence
community's leaders.
One of the key points those leaders must make is that while
intelligence is related to military requirements, it is a dis-
tinct national activity. Hence, although the end of the Cold War
has eliminated one form of military threat as a concern, the
total demands on the U.S. intelligence community have not eased.
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To the contrary, in many respects they have increased, and will
continue to do so.
Intelligence for the 1990s must make the new national secu-
rity strategy viable by supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrence
retaliatory force, providing timely information for conventional
military operations, verifying treaty compliance, detecting long
lead-time changes in Soviet warfighting capabilities, and under-
standing the historic changes taking place in the USSR. It must
also keep track of weapons proliferation, espionage, terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, ecological hazards and disasters, the
struggle for resources and social unrest due to population growth
and intra-national conflicts, as wall as economic competition
among industrialized states. Many of these are unfamiliar to
U.S. intelligence, which will have to meet these requirements by
adding skills, personnel, and new modes of analytic monitoring.
Many signs point to reductions in U.S. intelligence funding,
when the opposite should occur. The new national security
strategy requires intelligence bolstered in resources and leader-
ship vision. A notably smaller U.S. military demands heightened
concern for intelligence superiority; and the Twenty-first Cen-
tury will find the U.S. challenged in ways the Cold War intelli-
gence community could not have imagined.
The end of the Cold War is not "the end of history"; Ameri-
cans should forsake--albeit carefully--their tradition of viewing
each war's end as the inauguration of the millennium. Beyond a
structure to provide military intelligence during an era of
widespread lethal weaponry, the intelligence community must shape
itself to reflect the character and help satisfy the aspirations
of the American people. Leadership based on knowledge of the
past, understanding of the present, and vision for the future is
most needed by the U.S. intelligence community now that the Cold
War has ended and a New World Order is being created.
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Riding on the Storm: The Influence of War on Strategy
by
Michael N. Pocalyko1
President George Bush's speech at Aspen included a last-
minute insert. His address on August 2, 1990 had been about
eight months in the making, carefully structured and written. In
that time, the President's personal involvement had been evident,
along with that of his trio of principal advisors in national
defense and security: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, National
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General Colin L. Powell, USA. During the
architecture and construction of the address, his Presidential
advisors and National Security Council (NSC) staff members2 had
sometimes found it useful to think in terms of headlines: What
New York Times and WashinQton Post headlines would be written
over the story of this speech by the President?
Clearly, they should announce the weighty subject of the
address, the outright chartering of a new national security
strategy, a significant event in the history of the republic
during the late Twentieth Century. But then events out of the
control even of the President intervened. The next day's head-
lines were not about the new national security strategy; in fact,
they weren't about strategy at all. They were about the winds of
war in the Persian Gulf. Iraqi forces continued their sweep
across Kuwait even while the President was speaking in Aspen,
Colorado.
The insert in the President's speech referring to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait was a last-minute refinement: "The brutal
aggression launched last night against Kuwait illustrates my
central thesis." These words are the coincidental intersection
between the two important events--the war and the strategy--dated
August 2, 1990 that will drive the U.S. military into the next
American Century. The President was defining what would become
an understated yet direct public policy description of Operation
DESERT SHIELD and its later active mode, Operation DESERT STORM.
The new national security strategy he was articulating would
quickly have its first, unplanned operational test by the harsh
reality of international crisis. This early test was going to
happen as the strategy was first evolving--a circumstance unique
in American history, and certainly an unusual factor in the most
unique war the U.S. has ever fought.
The new national security strategy is actually not "strate-
gy" at all, in the strictest sense. One sense of strategy is
that it is a design for the implementation of polity. Sometimes
it is a rigid design. The Aspen address and the fleshing in of
its precepts are most correctly strategic policy, broadly-gauged
conceptual strategy that does not implement polity. It is poli-
ty. Because strategists are theologists of a sort, the most
appropriate metaphor for the new national security strategy may
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be a religious one: The strategy is rather like the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity (strategic policy), instead of a pre-
scriptive catechism (strategy). The catechism will follow in
political and military incarnations. It will be appropriately
accompanied by challenging heresies, reformations, competing
orthodoxies and heterodoxies, and evangelism.
This strategic policy, this design architecture, will likely
stand even through succeeding administrations of either political
party. Just as 45 years of Cold War strategy was embodied in the
Truman Doctrine's simplicity, this new national security strategy
.s both the touchitone and the defining event for all the strate-
yy which follows. Its gestation period has been initialized and
launched by the events of the Persian Gulf War in all of that
war's uniqueness, unpredictability, and brilliant successes.
The central question addressed in this chapter is a simple
one. It will not be answered completely until the historical
verdicts are read well into the next century. How did the Per-
sian Gulf War affect the new national security strategy? I will
first outline five important areas of the new national security
strategy which appear to have been affected by the Persian Gulf
war: a shift to a regional focus, the unpredictability of future
events, escalation, military challenges, and American leadership.
I will then look at the four official pillars of the strategy and
review them, including our crisis expectations, through the prism
of the Gulf war. Finally, I will conclude with the overall
influence of the war on strategy.
HOW THE WAR CHANGED THE STRATEGY
There are five key areas which represent how the strategy
has changed because of the war occurring in its defining moment.
First, we see an emphasis on regional conflict almost to the
exclusion of any continuing Soviet threat. A continued adver-
sarial relationship, also vastly changed, remains, although its
central characteristic is uncertainty. With the sudden onset of
the Persian Gulf War, the unprecedented cooperation of the Soviet
Union with U.S. efforts in the United Nations, and the apparent
de-unionization of the USSR, the Soviet threat has begun to seem
very remote, almost archaic. The general perception inculcated
by the war is that the strategy will have to deal with regional
threats--and that even our global problems will emanate from the
wellspring of regional problems rather than from the Soviet or
Russian axis. The proximate danger here, of course, is that
perceiving the Soviets after the Cold War like Germany or Japan
after World War II both negates formidable Soviet or Russian
military strength and presumes, amid the greatest political
uncertainty, future Soviet disposition just like in the Persian
Gulf War.
4
Second, we have an expectation of future crises arising
unpredictably. Because of the nature and the success of the new
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national security strategy in its first outing, there is already
an expectation that the next crisis (or the next war, depending
on degree) will be as unpredictable and as unforeseen as the
last. Generals and Admirals are not the only professionals to
view military involvement in the terms of reference for the last
war. Political leaders also form their expectations concerning
the nature of crises using the template of national experience in
previous military ventures.
The vociferous congressional debate about the enablement for
the use of U.S. military force after January 15, 1991 carried the
heavy political baggage of the Vietnam War. The next debate on
the use of force will no doubt carry the weight of the Persian
Gulf War. As Vietnam framed our cautions in the Gulf, so will
the Gulf frame our premonitions for future crisis involvement in
a strategy that greatly emphasizes regional responses. We will
expect that the next crisis will erupt in much the same way that
this one did--as a tactical surprise.
Expecting unprcdictability will be a consequence of the
Persian Gulf War. It may be gainful to design a national force
structure for an unpredictable world, but it is of much graver
consequence when U.S. strategic planning embraces uncertainty.
High levels of uncertainty are generally bad for strategic plan-
ning, especially when resources are tight and international
political futures are uncertain. One of classic strategy's best
means of deterring an adversary is to introduce high degrees of
uncertainty into his planning. If the adversary cannot reckon
the degree of gain for a contemplated political or military
action because of inherent uncertainties, he would be foolish to
undertake that action. Expecting uncertainty for one's own
planning becomes, therefore, "self-deterring." By contrast, the
best military planning judges that certain crises are pretty
likely, and takes steps to handle them if they happen. This is a
core assumption of the U.S. joint military planning process.5
Third, we have embraced a possible predisposition to escala-
tion and the use of military force. If one of the enduring
legacies of Vietnam in the years 1975-1990 was a general reluc-
tance to resort to military force (or its threat), one of the
first legacies of the Persian Gulf War may be exactly the oppo-
site. We were brilliantly successful under tough circumstances.
We prevailed against a capable and formidable enemy using Soviet
weapons, tactics, and training. In domestic political terms,
objections to the use of force in the debate before the war
gained no political capital at all for the opponents. In con-
trast to the post-Vietnam period, the new national security
strategy is decidedly one of direct international engagement.
The strategy quite subtly (perhaps unintentionally) enables
and embraces an easier motivation and justification for the
future use of force. A U.S. freed from Soviet confrontation--or
elements of that confrontation complicating regional crises-- has
far less to fear, far less to risk. With an increased emphasis
on coalition pressure politically and coalition operations mili-
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tarily, the collective use of force centered on American strength
could be more attractive now than ever.
Fourth, the alteration of general purpose military forces
under the new national security strategy, in aggregate, means a
change in some U.S. military roles and missions. Naval forces
(particularly aircraft carriers and Marine amphibious forces for
forcible entry), have long been the principal national expedi-
tionary means for dealing with crises. In most Cold War crises,
naval forces were often the only military power brought to bear
on developing international situations. Naval forces were and
are seen as particularly good for intervention. They draw on no
other nation's sovereignty, land area, or airspace besides the
adversary's.
But in the Persian Gulf War, naval forces were supporting
forces. They played nowhere near the predominant role that they
did in the Pacific theater in World War II, or even during Viet-
nam. Naval forces were enabling forces, where the Maritime
Interdiction Force and early Marine Maritime Prepositioning Force
(MPF) Brigades insertion made possible both the air war and the
lightning-quick ground assault of February 1991. The primacy of
land forces and land-based air forces during the Persian Gulf War
could significantly alter the future application of the new
national security strategy. With the experience of a war, unique
as it was, that decisively validated these types of forces, we
will likely call on them again.
The Base Force gives increased expeditionary and power-
projection roles to land forces and to land-based air forces.
This is a very new development for the U.S., given our inherent
political-cultural bias against the introduction and continuation
of garrison forces overseas, a development present from the first
public introduction of the strategy. At Aspen, the President
used phrases that are shorthand-descriptive of Army airmobile
forces (". ..we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in Panama...") and land-based air forces ("We need
forces that give us global reach"). 6
A reliance upon land forces and land-based air forces as
principal expeditionary and power-projection elements of U.S.
strategy means that we will likely view regional geopolitical
challenges as military challenges. Historically, the introduc-
tion of land forces and land-based air forces has been perceived
in international politics as a much weightier matter than the
mustering of a naval force off shore at the location of a crisis.
Moving land forces into place raises issues of sovereignty,
raises the question of which nation ultimately controls military
action, and invariably raises the stakes of political confronta-
tion.
Sometimes crises can begin to look like military opportuni-
ties--especially the intractable, insoluble ones that may come to
dominate the post-Cold War world. When land forces and land-
based air forces take over a primary national expeditionary role,
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those opportunities can become politically self-complicating (if
not militarily self-escalating) due to the immediate range of
military response available. But with naval forces in the expe-
ditionary mainstay role, the same general range of military power
is available, with nowhere near the same expenditure of political
capital or complication/escalation potential. After a crisis is
resolved, ships will still come and go in international waters,
but the extraction of land forces is one of the most difficult
feats in international politics--as our 1991 experience in Iraqi
Kurdistan bore out.
With land forces and land-based air forces at the center of
U.S. expeditionary capabilities, the range of our response means
taking a very big step, as we did in Operation DESERT SHIELD,
rather than the gradations of force engendered by naval power, as
we used in the Cold War. Additionally, with a reliance of any
sort on land-based air forces stationed in the continental U.S.
(CONUS), we could remove the ability to respond militarily with
force or credible threats of force at levels less than conven-
tional strategic bombing--such as the introduction of amphibious
forces or the mere proximity of aircraft carrier battle groups
(CVBGs).
Finally, we have made a determination to provide U.S. lead-
ership in future crises, and to define U.S. interests in specific
detail. President Harry S. Truman empowered the Cold War. Bush
empowered the Persian Gulf War. America's global leadership role
was the centerpiece of each empowerment. The U.S. provided a new
level and character of global leadership in the Persian Gulf War,
especially within the context of the United Nations Security
Council, and defined that this nation's vital interests were
indeed at stake in the Gulf. We were also quite specific about
what our goals actually were (in intentional contrast to Vietnam-
era strategic policy). If the "superpower shingle" hangs over
only one door7 in the world today, while "the U.S. tends to avoid
taking unilateral military action and prefers to work with al-
lies,"'8 then our willingness to provide international leadership
must be the defining factor in future uses of the new national
security strategy.
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR'S EFFECT ON KEY ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY
In order to examine the substantive changes in the new
national security strategy because of the war (and any warning
flags raised by the application of the war to the evolving
strategy) each of the four "pillars" of the strategy can be
looked at in turn through the lens of Operation DESERT STORM.
Strategic DeLeLrence
In the new national security strategy, strategic deterrence
means above all strategic nuclear deterrence--a distinction that
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continues from the Cold War. The strategy is quite clear about
the continuation of our strategic nuclear arsenal, Single Inte-
grated Operational Plan (SIOP), and non-SIOP options. But has it
been affected by the war? The answer is a qualified yes. The
main factor which changed is the war's influence on how we per-
ceive strategic defense, particularly ballistic missile defense.
The character of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star
Wars," debate was greatly altered by Iraq's use of the SS-lC SCUD
B missile in the Persian Gulf War.
The focus of SDI is no longer "Star Wars," it is now GPALS,
or "Global Protection Against Limited Strikes," a program less
than half the size of the previous SDI phase I architecture. The
timing and presentation of the GPALS refocus is important. At
the immediate moment it was brought forth, in mid-February 1991,
the most consequential development in the war was Iraq's use of
the SCUD attack to terrorize the populations of Saudi Arabia and
Israel. Iraq's well-recognized attempt by these attacks was to
draw Israel into the war in order to fragment the Arab-U.S. link
in the coalition. But the SCUDs only aggravated and galvanized
the populations of the target nations, much as England rallied in
the fall of 1944 during the V-2 rocket attacks late in World War
II. SCUDs did not achieve a Douhet-style capitulation. Their
principal effect was not operational or political, it was psycho-
logical. It also shifted the strategic defense debate into a
theater emphasis. That emphasis certainly affects the evolution
of U.S. strategy.
The Soviet interest in arms control measures should also be
heightened in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War because of
another weapon: the TOMAHAWK Land-Attack Missile (TLAM). The
high-explosive unitary conventional warhead (TLAM-C) and bomblet
(TLAM-D) versions of TOMAHAWK were, of course, used to great
advantage in the Persian Gulf War. The validation of the TLAM
weapon during Operation DESERT STORM will help to drive future
Soviet strategy, behavior toward the U.S. in crises, and even the
Soviet perspective on arms control agreements. Since the war,
TOMAHAWK has become part of the final START agreement--not within
the treaty proper, but as a politically binding codicil.
Forward Presence
On December 3, 1989, at the end of the "Revolution of 1989"
experienced in eastern Europe, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met
at Malta. There, the Soviet president spread a map on the ship's
table. It was a line-drawn Mercator-projection map of the world
centered on the Soviet Union. It illustrated the Soviet percep-
tion of American forward defense, labeled "US Military Bases and
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As a totem of the Cold War, the map is an especially compel-
ling depiction of U.S. forces from the Soviet perspective. Our
land forces and bases are poised around the Soviet rimland,
bristling and arrayed in depth across the European theater, the
southern flank, and throughout the Pacific. President Bush
referred to this map in his Aspen address, saying that it showed,
in Gorbachev's view, "American encirclement of the Soviet Union."
It is hard to imagine a more distinctive geographic repre-
sentation of our "policy of containment, designed to confront the
Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they
show signs of e Pcroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and
stable world." The strategic policy of containment was an
effort to manage Soviet perceptions (the key to deterrence) in
order to respond to the Soviet threat as we understood it during
the Cold War. Creating and then managing a deterrent perception
in our strategic adversary was the centerpiece of Cold War
strategy.
Creating and managing a deterrent perception was also of
absolute critical consequence in the early phases of Operation
DESERT SHIELD, where the rapid movement of land, air, and naval
forces were easily understood to be necessary in order to "con-
tain" Iraqi forces from moving further south, beyond Kuwait and
into the Nojd and Ahsa regions of eastern Saudi Arabia. The
difference between Gorbachev's map and a notional (very empty)
corresponding map of the Arabian peninsula on, say, July 31, 1990
is illustrative of the most significant change in American
strategy after the Cold War: the move from the Cold War's
"forward defense" (principally of Europe and the Pacific) to the
new national security strategy's "forward presence" (globally,
but less).
Out of our experience Kuwait and Iraq, there is one
overriding validating princi Df forward presence which can be
gleaned from our experience: When forward presence is reduced,
logistics and mobility beco. the key currencies of strategy.
The forward presence of a scaled-back, restructured U.S. military
in the fulfillment of the new national security strategy is very
much like our forward presence in the Persian Gulf region before
Operation DESERT SHIELD began.
When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990,
there was effectively no American or coalition "forward defense"
in the Persian Gulf or on the Arabian peninsula. But there was a
moderate naval force and there was a most significant military
surge-capable infrastructure; in short, there was "forward
presence." In this way, the region was representative of the
future of American forward military presence. Our rapid deploy-
ment to the area, and more importantly, our bringing quickly to
bear a collection of joint and combined power projection forces,
were critical to the defense of Saudi Arabia. What is noteworthy
here is not the character of our crisis resnonse, but our ex-
tremely low yet temperate, credible, visible 1orward presence.
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It enabled an appropriate military action when one became neces-
sary, despite next to no strategic warning.
Unlike the forward defense of Europe and the Pacific Rim
during the Cold War, this region enjoyed only a minimist American
military disposition punctuated by augmented force levels in
crises. It also enjoyed the construction of the most exhaustive-
ly complete indigenous infrastructure, especially for land-based
air forces and port offload, anywhere in the world. Some kind of
infrastructure (not necessarily to this degree) is central in the
new national security strategy's forward presence, if we expect
to remain, as President Bush stated in Aspen, "a strong and
engaged America," with "forces able to respond to threats in
whatever corner of the globe they may occur." This
factor--logistics pre-planned within a reasonable infrastructure
--is essential to achieve if the strategy is to succeed at all
levels of warfare.
However, the reality in the 1990s is that we are withdrawing
from our extensive structure of overseas basing grounded in the
threat-determined requirements of the Cold War. Therefore, in
areas of the world where there is less available surge infra-
structure, and where we have a compelling geostrategic interest,
we must necessarily accept and carefully manage more risk. We
have to do so on multiple levels of policy, diplomacy, peacetime
military operations supporting forward presence, and in burgeon-
ing crises.
To accomplish these ends during peacetime, the second factor
affecting forward presence enters: mobility, which, like some
forward infrastructure is also present in the President's Aspen
address: "No amount of political change will alter the geograph-
ic fact that we are separated from many of our most important
allies by thousands of miles of water." Mobility--by sea and
air--is probably more critical to strategic success and credibil-
ity than overseas infrastructure.
For obvious fiscal reasons (and because of some very real
isolationist sentiment rumbling around on our political right and
left edges), we will be parsimonious with our overseas spending
well into the new century. So what Aspen implies through the
lens of the Persian Gulf War is that mobility writ large--for
naval forces, tactical air forces, and light ground forces--is
the sine qua non of peacetime forward presence. Without mobili-
ty, reduced, restructured levels of military forces cannot be
credible in regional deterrence or as a stepping-stone for crisis
response.
There is, however, a cautionary side to the Persian Gulf
War's logistics and mobility influence on forward presence. The
greatest early successes of Operation DESERT SHIELD--the landing
of the Marine Corps's First and Second MPF Brigades and the early
insertion of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division--were made possi-
ble not only by American investment, but also because of Saudi
Arabian development of airfields and piers that exist in nowhere
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near as comprehensive a form anywhere in the world. If the U.S.
cannot (and should not) invest to this extent in overseas infra-
structure, and if most developing nations are not capable of
matching wealthy Saudi Arabia's feat, then what are the alterna-
tives that can fuel stability and security?
If mobility is going to be a credentializing determinant for
American global presence, there are some alternatives. First,
emphasize naval presence, accepting tradeoffs both in deployments
removed from "traditional" fleet hubs and in resource allocations
with relatively heavier weight to the naval services (especially
to CVBG strike forces and to Marine Corps amphibious brigades),
moving away by design from the Cold War's "normal" one third/one-
third/one-third dollar split among the services.
Second, invest some of our scaled-back defense resources in
the homeless children of strategic programmatics, fast sealift
for heavy, armored ground forces (like the extremely successful
24th Infantry Division), more roll-on/roll-off ships, and further
development of prepositioning: upgrading Maritime Prepositioning
Squadrons for the Navy and Maritime Prepositioning Ship sets for
the Marine Corps, and greatly improving Afloat Prepositioning
Ship sets for the Army and Air Force.
Finally, structure our Army, Navy, and Air Force airpower
programs principally around rapidly deployable, stealthy, sus-
tainable tactical strike forces capable of a wide range of de-
ployments, responses, subtleties of force, and missions-- while
supporting but giving much less relative weight to bomber air-
craft which, while at greater expense and less strategic value,
can undoubtedly provide rapid reach to any location on the globe.
Crisis Response
Under the new national security strategy, crisis response
and presence are the focus of strategy and the engines of de-
fense programming. What the Persian Gulf War means overall for
this pillar of the new national security strategy is the enfran-
chisement of certain expectations for crisis response in the new
world order. There are eight post-Persian Gulf War expectations
for future crisis response, and they will directly impact upon
the new national security strategy when it is next employed.
The first expectation is a quick resolution. The entire
Persian Gulf War--from the invasion of Kuwait to its liberation
--lasted only 214 days. Operation DESERT SHIELD, the deterrent
build-up and mustering of offensive forces, took 167 days; Opera-
tion DESERT STORM's air war was 43 days long; and the ground war
lasted only 100 hours. What the Persian Gulf War has done,
following the blazingly quick end of the Cold War, is to give the
American body politic a taste for the quick resolution of crises.
This expectation means a compression of political decisionmaking,
and possibly a smaller scope of available military options. It
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can especially contribute to negating long-term options like
naval and air embargoes, and economic sanctions. In the most
cynical expression of this expectation, our next war had better
end in forty-three days, or it begins then to become a domestic
and international political problem.
Second, a build-up period for a crisis response is expected
under the new national security strategy. In Southwest Asia, we
had the ability to mount Operation DESERT SHIELD, the largest and
most comprehensive force deployment in almost a half-century.
This build-up meant not only that we could defend Saudi Arabia
and deter further aggression; it also enabled us to emplace, then
use an airpower- and land force-prominent ofiense to liberate
Kuwait. The lesson that future Saddams will likely take from
this experience is not to give the U.S. time for massive force
movement. At least here, the Operation DESERT SHIELD model is
not really a model at all. Expecting this kind of time to plan
and move is only an invitation to refight the Persian Gulf War.
Time for a six-month build-up is the most prominent non-lesson of
the conflict; we should not expect it.
Third, the new strategy expects coalition support for future
crisis response. Perhaps the most unprecedented American
achievement in facing up to the crisis of August 1990 was our
ability to muster a coalition that held together throughout the
next six months, including the six weeks of offensive operations.
In crises of another nature--where our interests do not coincide
so forcefully with those of our allies, perhaps, or where terror-
ism begets an amorphous threat--our ability to mount this kind of
coalition may well be diminished, if it exists at all in the
first place. The degree to which it will diminish depends, of
course, on what the crisis is.
Regions of the world other than the Middle East will present
their own problems and challenges for bringing together coali-
tions as well. Secretary Cheney recognized this expectation when
he noted that "the requirements of deterrence and defense dictate
that we not reduce forces to a level that would leave ourselves
overly vulnerable."11  In other words, American unilateralism in
strategy is demonstrably bad, but some unilateral capability in
force structure can only be prudential.
Fourth, the new strategy expects host nation support. The
Persian Gulf War has given us this disposition, and it is also a
legacy of the Cold War, where host western Europe was threatened
by the Warsaw Pact. But Saudi Arabia, even under threat of
imminent Iraqi attack, required convincing through the presenta-
tion of military intelligence and lots of high-level diplomacy
before that nation would acquie5ce to American land force deploy-
ment on the Arabian peninsula. It is reasonable to assume that
future crises would have neither as clear-cut a threat, as outra-
geous a provocation, nor as clearly despotic an enemy.
Fifth, domestic political cohesion is expected for any
future crisis response. In the Persian Gulf War, we really have
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Saddam Hussein to thank for our domestic political purpose and
resolve. In another major regional crisis, domestic political
cohesion may not, and probably will not, be as easily attained.
Furthermore, our early success in the Operation DESERT STORM air
war factored greatly in public support for this war, as did its
brevity, intensity, and low coalition casualties. Not all future
crises will have as sharp definition for the Congress and for the
American public. When these elements line up as they did before
the Persian Gulf War, solidified by the Saddam-qua-Hitler under-
standing well nurtured in press and government, the political
effect can be unbelievably potent. It should not, however, be
relied upon.
Force sufficiency is a sixth expectation for future crisis
response under the new strategy. Some commentator in years to
come will no doubt remark on the "inevitability" of the Persian
Gulf War, given that it came at a moment in history when the U.S.
had just completed its largest peacetime military force building
ever. That commentator will be wrong, but he or she will have
raised a good point. The success of the Persian Gulf War as a
crisis response was made possible by the military power we had
available at the moment it was needed.
In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, one of the most fre-
quently-asked questions from the Congress is "Can this be done in
1995?" The answer is always conditional--on threat, warning
time, place, scenario, geopolitics, intensity of conflict, like-
lihood of occurrence, and a 1?t of undeterminable trends in the
future strategic environment. What is clear from Aspen is that
we will respond to crises in the future with a leaner, restruc-
tured force. Its sufficiency is a good expectation, one to which
the American public has a right. But its overwhelming triumph as
in the Persian Gulf War could be dangerous to expect, especially
during military planning and in constructing foreign policy
responses in crises.
The seventh expectation, under the new strategy for future
crisis response is a technological advantage. We expect, and in
all likelihood will attain, a distinct technological advantage
over any strategic adversary. But this expectation must be
hedged, as the defense establishment is already doing in planning
for crises to come.
Reliance on technological advantage is an expectation that
we should embrace, but one which the Persian Gulf War must not
cause us to take for granted. This expectation is a corollary to
force sufficiency. With the war's heavy reliance on Ligh tech-
nology to enable a ground incursion, there will be a tendency for
the body politic to take our technological margin for granted.
This expectation is also part of our ethnocentric psyche: Ameri-
can technology is best, we ardently believe, and shall prevail.
The cautionary note needed to be sounded with this expectation is
not that it exists, but that we could believe it to be perpetual
and therefore take it for granted.
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In the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, it was
clear that Secretary Cheney was not about to allow that position.
His requested budget authority for research was, after accounting
for inflation, ten percent above the previous year's, with tech-
nology base funding also increasing even as "force reductions
were beg n" and "defense continues to take a smaller and smaller
portion"''  of our national fiscal resources. In order to prevail
in coming major regional crises, our technological advantage is
crucial. It is useful for Operation DESERT STORM to have focused
us on it.
The final major crisis expectation bequeathed by the Persian
Gulf War on the new national security strategy is a geopolitical
one. We now expect that the Soviets' behavior during the war
will presage Soviet action in future crises. This is perhaps the
most optimistic expectation we could have. This expectation
belongs to the national leadership. The general public, however,
is not as sanguine about continued good Soviet behavior.1 5 The
question raised by this expectation is whether or not it is
reasonable to believe that future crises will be like the Persian
Gulf War-- with Soviet acquiescence, if not alliance-- or whether
they will have a Soviet adversarial component. And given the
dramatic events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union, the real
question may be which Soviet--or Russian--leaders will partici-
pate in future crises. With uncertainty as the hallmark of
Soviet politics, and "Soviet Union" now a seeming oxymoron,
American prudence and fortitude were never more necessary.
Reconstitution
Among the four pillars of the new national security strate-
gy, force reconstitution is the one least overtly affected by the
Persian Gulf War. The operations in Kuwait and Iraq were obvi-
ously not the types of operations for which reconstitution is
intended. But in at least two areas--lift and the reserves--the
experience of the Persian Gulf War will gauge some of our ap-
proaches to issues of reconstitution.
There were significant challenges for sealift in the Persian
Gulf War, and it is the focus these challenges bring that will
affect both the debate on the new national security strategy and
its implementation. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, of
airlift--which played the key mobility role in moving land forces
quickly into Saudi Arabia early in August 1990. What the war
did, more than any mere policy pronouncements could have, was
alert us to this most critical element of logistics strategy. It
is at the heart of the concept of reconstitution (and also cru-
cial to peacetime forward presence and crisis response).
With the first call-up of reservists for combat duty since
the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War bequeathed a particular
legacy on the new national security strategy. It was the first
real demonstration of the policy of maximizing military capabili-
7 5
ty through the optimum mix of active and reserve forces, often
called the Total Force Policy. Reserve policy is the most visi-
ble immediate feedback of how the war influenced the strategy
outright. This element of reconstitution--greatly supported by
the Congress--will be the war's indelible mark for the foresee-
able future.
THE INFLUENCE OF WAR ON STRATEGY
In one sense, the public perception of the Persian Gulf War
and its relation to the new national security strategy is that we
announced a strategy, then tried it out during the wcr. In
reality, the strategy was only entering its gestation period when
the war was thrust upon it. In 1990 and 1991, the U.S. experi-
enced an interesting inversion of the normal relationship between
strategy and war. In this case--unique in this country's histo-
ry--the war has altered our long-term strategy.
Our military forces are now in the process of building down
to their 1995 floor. By that year we will attain the lowest
defense outlays as a share of gross national product in over 50
years. Our strategy has been announced in general geopolitical
terms, but i strategy, as in economics or in legislation, the
devil is in t'e details. For the new national security strategy,
those details xist in defense budgeting and programmatics, and
the Persian Gu War will demonstrably influence them. As Presi-
dent Bush statN in Aspen, we are restructuring "with an orderly
reduction, not a fire sale." We are meeting "emerging chal-
lenges." And we are still coping with the end of the Cold War;
we have continuing uncertainty about and mistrust for the Sovi-
ets, even as they experience some of the most rapid and dramatic
national change in world history.
The Soviets have certainly taken notice of the Persian Gulf
War--and of the new national security strategy. Army General M.
A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff
before his removal in the aftermath of the failed August 1991
coup, noted with approval the success of the United States' joint
operations in southwest Asia, saying that "the war in the Persian
Gulf confirmed yet again the importance of the infrastructure in
achieving the effectiveness 9E the operations of both the air and
the ground troop groupings."' He was almost admiring.
In the end analysis, the influence of this war on this
strategy has yet to be understood fully. The reason is simple:
We do not yet fully understand the war. Early lessons are incom-
ing all the time, but they seem for the most part to be selec-
tive, and supportive of whatever disparate viewpoint the commen-
tator holds and wishes to "prove" as a consequence of something
that happened in the war. For that reason alone, the new nation-
al security strategy is a good and sufficient American strategic
policy. The strategy is grounded in the reality of geopolitics
independent of Iraq's aggression of 1990 or any parochial lessons
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to be gleaned from our response. The Persian Gulf War has not
really changed any of the basics of the strategy. It has subtly
altered the gestation of strategic policy, and it will be the
cornerstone of future force structure. Like the insert to the
President's speech, its intrusion can lead the way for everything
which follows. Our challenge is to manage that intrusion for the
most gainful effects America can have on the new world order.
NOTES
(1) The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the
author alone and should not be interpreted as representing the
official policies of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S.
Navy.
(2) The Aspen address presenting the new national security
strategy was developed at the National Security Council staff by
two Directors for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Colonel Mi-
chael V. Hayden, USAF, and Rear Admiral (then Captain [CAPT]
Donald L. Pilling, USN. The National Security Advisor, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Secretary of Defense were
intimately involved. The public policy presentation was framed
and the Aspen Institute venue was chosen by David F. Demarest,
Jr., Assistant to the President for Communications, and Sig
Rogich, Assistant to the President for Public Events and Initia-
tives. The speechwriter who crafted the actual text with Presi-
dent Bush was Special Assistant to the President Dan McGroarty.
Development of the strategy originated in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense under the direction of Paul D. Wolfowitz,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; it is Wolfowitz, in fact,
who can most correctly be called the intellectual "Godfather" of
the strategy.
(3) The Truman Doctrine--"to support free people who are resist-
ing attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures"--was also "strategic policy," not "strategy."
(4) In the JCS 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) (Wash-
ington, DC: March 1991), p. 1-1, changes in the Soviet Union are
likened "to a monumental shift in the tectonic plates, unleashing
a host of forces that are irrevocably changiny the strategic
landscape," with "enormous implications for US national security
policy" in the "astounding advent of a second 'Russian Revolu-
tion' in this century."
(5) See, for example, "Conventional Contingency Response," Chap-
ter 9 in the JMNA, where contingencies by geographic area and
specific threat are considered.
(6) "Global Reach--Global Power" is widely understood in the
defense establishment to be a service-specific U.S. Air Force
strategy envisioning airpower as the principal means of dealing
with the 21st Century's security environment. This was the
subtitle of an Air Force White Paper, "The Air Force and U.S.
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National Security: Global Reach--Global Power" (Washington, DC:
Department of the Air Force, June 1990).
(7) The phrase is General Colin Powell's.
(8) Lewis Libby, "Remarks on Shaping US Defence Strategy: Per-
sistent Challenges and Enduring Strengths" in America's Role in a
Changing World, Adelphi Paper No. 257 (London, UK: IISS/Bras-
sey's, 1990), p. 71.
(9) "X" [George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1947, p. 581.
(10) There are, of course, many more validating principles that
will emerge (for all facets of strategy) from detailed analysis
of the war ongoing at the time of this writing (Summer 1991).
The principal United States Government effort was published as
Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to
Congress Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental
Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-
25) (Washington: DoD, July 1991). I was the Navy Departmrnt's
staff officer for the production of this report by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. The final report is due to the Con-
gress on January 15, 1992 in both classified and unclassified
versions.
(11) "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney before
the Senate Armed Services Committee in Connection with the FY
1992-1993 Budget for the Department of Defense, February 21,
1991" [distribution text of prepared testimony statement for the
record], p. 14.
(12) See Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster, 1991), pp. 241-273 passim.
(13) See JMNA, "Risk Assessment, Crisis Response," pp. 12-4 to
12-6.
(14) Dick Cheney, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to
the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, January 1991), p. ix. It is appropriate to
disclose here my role as the Navy Department's staff officer for
the production of this report by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The principal staff officer who developed Part I for
Secretary Cheney was CAPT Martin Spolarich, USN, in the Office of
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy and
Resources).
(15) In a comprehensive Gallup Poll taken during the Persian Gulf
War (while the Soviets were cooperating with us at the U.N. at
every turn), 64 percent of adult Americans agreed that "the Cold
War is not really over and you cannot really trust the Russians."
Seventy-three percent of the national leadership disagreed with
that statement. The poll, commissioned by the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations and published on February 11, 1991, was con-
ducted between October 23 and November 15, 1990 by the Gallup
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January both before and after" offensive operations began in the
Persian Gulf War.
(16) "General Staff's Moiseyev on Military Reform," Moscow Kras-
nava Zvezda in Russian, June 12, 1991, First Edition, pp. 1-2,







The most immediate hurdle confronting the new national
4ecurity strategy lies on Capitol Hill. That strategy calls for
a revolution in defense spending, not only by incorporating sharp
cuts in the military budget, but also by reordering future de-
fense priorities. However, the President can only propose such
changes. Congress legislates the defense budget, often in con-
flict with the President's recommendations. And it is Congress
that will decide whether, and how, to transform the new national
security strategy from rhetoric into budgetary reality.
Congress has not taken an up or down vote on the strategy
was a whole and is unlikely to ever do so. Instead, the funding
changes needed to implement that strategy will dealt with piece-
meal through the annual budget process. To what extent will
those particular budget decisions be guided by broader congres-
sional concerns over the need to recast U.S. defense policy?
Under what circumstances will Congress attempt to shape that
overall policy? How might such congressional activism affect the
fate of the new national security strategy?
This chapter argues that in early 1990, months before the
President George Bush a iounced his new strategy, the perceived
failure of the Administration to respond to the end of the Cold
War encouraged Congress to step into the breach and press for a
thorough revision of U.S. defense policy. Bush recaptured the
initiative with the new national security strategy, which (al-
though the product of the Administration's own policy review) co-
opted many of the policy changes Congress was already advocating.
That co-option may avert future congressional challenges to the
strategy. However, if President Bush fails to respond to further
shifts in the security environment, Congress remains poised to
recast U.S. defense policy on its own, particularly if it can
seize on new rationales to slash military spending.
Even if Congress does accept the broad principles of the new
national security strategy, conflicts over the implementation of
those principles will persist. Congress is already battling the
President over how to transform the need for a new strategy into
actual changes in weapons and personnel spending. Some congres-
sional activism is driven by the desire to protect constituent
interests. However, the new strategy is vague in its implica-
tions for some key weapons programs, encouraging members of
Congress to disagree with Administration funding requests on
grounds of policy rather than pork. Because the fate of the
strategy will ultimately be determined by decisions on particular
programs, this opportunity for congressional activism will con-
tinue to give the legislative branch a decisive role in the
future.
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Part one of the chapter examines the immediate response of
Congress to the new national security strategy, the congressional
context in which that strategy emerged, and the implications for
the new national security strategy. Part two analyzes the spe-
cific ways in which Congress is likely to revise the strategy.
Part three describes the roles that Congress must play in sus-
taining that stratcgy, and evaluates those roles in light of
emerging patterns of congressional policymaking.
CONGRESS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW STRATEGY
When President Bush submitted his budget request for Fiscal
Year (FY)-l991 in January, 1990, that request barely hinted at
the policy revolution he wuuld propose eight months later. Bush
said that his FY-91 request was intended to be "a defense budges
that begins the transition to a restructured military .... "1
However, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney testified in
support of that request on Capitol Hill, he noted that the budget
was largely a continuation of past policies. Cheney told Con-
gress that despite the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, Soviet military power remained formidable.3  Furthermore,
in the face of uncertainty surrounding the decline of the Cold
War, Cheney testified that this was "the worst possible time to
contemplate changes in defense strategy."'4
Cheney's stance provoked sharp criticism on Capitol Hill.
Almost immediately, members began calling for a thorough revision
of U.S. defense policy--and specifying what they thought the new
U.S. military strategy should be. Prominent among these members
was Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee (SASC). Nunn gave a series of speeches on the
Senate floor in early 1990 in which he assessed future U.S.
security r~quirements and proposed "major changes in our military
strategy." Other Armed Services Committee members soon began
offering their own visions of future U.S. strategy. Even Republi-
can members such as John McCain (R-AZ) and William Cohen (R-ME)
called for drastic revisions of Administration policy, and issued
defense bedget proposals to carry out their reassessment of U.S.
strategy.
This congressional drive for a new defense strategy quickly
moved beyond rhetoric. After attacking the testimony of Cheney
and other defense officials in a series of defense policy hear-
ings, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and SASC began in
the Spring of 1990 to draft their own versions of the defense
budget. Under the leadership of Senator Nunn and Representative
Les Aspin (D-WI), chairman of the HASC, the committee "marks"
that began to emerge reflected a very different sense of defense
priorities (and much lower spending levels) than those proposed
by the President.
Members of Congress were not alone pressing for change.
Despite Cheney's public dismissal of the need to rethink U.S.
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defense strategy, a number of officials in the Administration and
Defense Department were already carrying out such a reappraisal
in early 1990. The internal Administration disagreement over the
need for policy change became public in March, 1990 when Central
Intelligence Agency Director William Webster eclared that the
decline of the Soviet threat was irreversible. The appearance
of Executive Branch dissension, however, only encouraged members
of Congress to press for change, particularly as Cheney continued
to defend the FY-91 budget request.
One immediate impetus for this congressional activism was
the belief that, despite Webster's assessment, the Administration
continued to underestimate the decline of the Soviet threat.
Nunn told his colleagues on March 22, 1990 that the Administra-
tion's understanding of the threat was "rooted in the past," and
that "the development of a new military strategy t,%at responds to
the changes in the threat has not yet occurred." Congressman
Aspin considered the Administration's threat assessment so un-
realistic that he commissioned one of his own, conducted by a
special panel of the HASC. That report found the threat in rapid
decline, and concluded that the "Bush Administration has been
overly cautious, even grudging, in its appreciation of how the
Soviet threat is changing."
Congressional interest in the declining threat was closely
tied to another Hill concern: that of reducing defense expendi-
tures. The President's FY-91 budget request submitted in Janu-
ary, 1990 called for $295 billion in defense spending. Although
that figure represented a two percent real decrease from the FY-
90 Department of Defense (DoD) budget, Cheney emphasized that n
further cuts could be made without endangering U.S. security.lu
That stand was immediately attacked by Nunn, Aspin and Senate
Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser (D-TN), who joined in argu-
ing that the decline of the Soviet threat permitted much deeper
cuts in U. i defense spending--as much as ten percent, according
to Sasser. Moreover, it was not just Democratic opponents of
the President who pushed for a lower defense budget. Republicans
like Senators McCain, Cohen, and John Warner (R-VA) also added
their support for sharper reductions.
However, cuts of that magnitude would have profound policy
implications. With the congressional desire for such reductions,
and for responding to the decline of the Soviet threat, Aspin and
Nunn were rankled by the Administration's refusal to propose a
policy revolution in the FY-91 request. Of course, the Defense
Department's planning, programming and budgeting system is a
complex and time-consuming process. Even if Administration
officials had wanted to totally recast the FY-91 request in
response to the Eastern European upheavals of late 1990, they
would have encountered serious difficulties in doing so. But
Cheney's testimony that it was the "worst possible time" to
consider dramatic policy changes provoked congressional outrage.
Senator Nunn attacked that attitude as incomprehensible, and
charged that the Administration's defense policy was riddled with
"big blanks." Aspin reached a similar conclusion, arguing that
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"there are new realities in the world, but no new thinking at
home to match them. 1 2 From the perspective of Capitol Hill, the
Bush Administration had created a policy vacuum by failing to
respond to the end of the Cold War.
That failure created both the opportunity and the impetus
for Congress to step into the breech. According to Representa-
tive Norman Dicks (D-WA), "Congress abhors a vacuum;" the failure
of the executive branch to set overall policy encourages Congress
to do so in its stead.13 But why is that so? After all, accord-
ing to analysts who argue that Congress is disinterested in
policy, congressmen lack the incentive to address such issuq
because doing so is usually irrelevant to getting re-elected.
The need to get re-elected cannot account for the push by Nunn
and Aspin in 1900 to revolutionize U.S. defense policy. Both
have "safe" seats; therefore, regardless of whether their con-
stituents care about defense policy, neither were at sufficient
risk of defeat to be motivated by electoral concerns alone.
However, members have other incentives that encourage them
to address policy issues--incentives that could lead to future
congressional scrutiny of the new national security strategy.
James Lindsay argues that members of Congress address policy
issue because they believe doing so is simply part of their
job.1 Members of Congress cited that motivation in justifying
their policy initiatives in early 1990. Republicans and Demo-
crats alike argued that because of the absence of long-range
policy guidance from the President, it was becoming difficult for
them to fulfil 6 their legislative responsibility to draft the
defense budget. Someone had to step into the policy breach and
provide the necessary guidance. Senator Nunn told his colleagues
that his committee woul d exercise leadership in the absence of
administration decisions17
Political incentives can also encourage attention to policy
matters. Although the need to get re-elected may not drive much
congressional interest in policy, members have other political
goals. Congressmen and Senators may believe that addressing
policy issues makes them appear more "statesmanlike," and thereby
improves their chances of winning hi her office or of gaining (or
preserving) power within Congress. I  Both incentives may have
contributed to congressional activism in early 1990. Speculation
arose that Senator Nunn was positioning himself to run for presi-
dent, and was highlighting defense policy issues to raise his
national profile. Aspin has faced the more immediate concern of
maintaining his power within Congress. During the 1980s, House
liberals twice attempted to oust him from the Committee chairman-
ship. With the end of the Cold War, and the clamor of House
Democrats for a peace dividend, Aspin's push for a defense policy
revolution helped cement his leadership position.
The desire for a peace dividend highlights another key
motivation for Congress. Despite the assumption that defense
policy issues are usually irrelevant to getting re-elected, such
issues can sometimes attract enough public support to encourage
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congressional action, as in the nuclear freeze movement. Public
support for major shifts in the defense budget can gain particu-
lar attention on Capitol Hill. In the early 1980s, when public
support was strong for increased defense spending, members of
Congress were quick to follow President Ronald Reagan's lead in
boosting such spending. However, after the fall of the Berlin
wall, public opinion polls by early 19? showed unprecedented
support for slashing the defense budget. President Bush's FY-
91 request ran counter to this opinion surge, and created a juicy
political opportunity for congressional Republicans and Democrats
to propose much deeper military cuts.
Implications for the New National Security Strategy
Some of the incentives that drove congressional activism in
early 1990 will persist, and encourage Congress to critique the
new national security strategy. For example, to the degree that
members view policy oversight as an inherent part of their job,
Administration efforts to push the new national security strategy
on Capitol Hill are bound to attract congressional attention.
That attention has already begun. At the opening hearings of the
HASC and SASC on the FY-92 budget, when Secretary Cheney and
other officials described the new strategy, members questioned
whether that strategy went far enough (or perhaps too far) in
restructuring U.S. defense policy.
However, questions at hearings and subcommittee investiga-
tions do not necessarily lead to congressional action. While
Congress demonstrated in early 1990 that it could push for a
policy revolution, two of the key factors that encouraged this
activism are likely to decline. The first is defense budget-
cutting. Before his Aspen speech, President Bush helped make it
politically attractive for Congress to focus on defense policy,
because his defense budget proposal was so contrary to public
opinion trends. That political opportunity for Congress has
shrunk. Under the new national security strategy and the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990 (which grew out of the "budget summit" of
that year), the defense budget is slated to plumm t by as much as
20 percent in real terms between FY-91 and FY-95. v
Members of Congress could, however, attempt to break the
agreement and impose deeper cuts. Under what circumstances might
they have the opportunity and incentives to do so? One possibil-
ity is that members of Congress could attack the Administration
for not spending enough on defense. Republicans such as Senator
Ted Stevens of Alaska have already raised concerns about the
steepness of the cuts. More significantly, Democrats such as
Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) have joined that criticism, propos-
ing that the Administration consider postponing its five-year
plan to cut active duty force levels.2 1 It is conceivable that
if the Bush Administration continues to press for deep military
reductions, Democrats will recognize a political opportunity to
attack the President for being weak on defense, Just as Senators
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John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson did during the Eisenhower Admin-
istration.
However, Kennedy and Johnson could point to the Soviet Union
as an obvious security threat (though one that was overstated in
the case of Democratic allegations of a missile gap). The ab-
sence of an immediate threat today has not only made the new
national security strategy possible, but also more difficult to
criticize. Not even the Gulf War could lead Congress to recon-
sider the budget cuts agreed to by the Administration. Despite
efforts by Army Secretary Michael Stone and other Pentagon offi-
cials to use the DESERT STORM victory to argue for a slowdown in
force reductions, leading conservatives on the Hill were reluc-
tant to push such efforts. "Let there be no mistake," said
William Dickinson (R-AL), the ranking member of the HASC.
"DESERT STORM is bhind us, and the defense drawdown train has
left the station."
More probable is that Congress will attack President Bush
for not cutting defense enough, and impose reductions far beyond
those envisioned under the new national security strategy. The
underlying impetus for further reductions lies in the congres-
sional desire for a peace dividend (to free up resources for
domestic needs or to cut the deficit). However, even liberal
members of Congress such as Leon Panetta (D-CA) have expressed a
reluctance to unravel the budget agreement negotiated with such
difficulty in late 1990.
Congress is most likely to impose drastic new defense cuts
if two events were to recreate the conditions that spurred con-
gressional activism in early 1990. The first would be a sharp
decline in the perceived threat to the U.S., as happened after
the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. The second would be the apparent
failure of President Bush to respond to that declining threat,
which would give Congress the opportunity to step into the policy
breach with its own agenda for defense cutbacks.
The aftermath of the Soviet coup attempt of August, 1991
could create these conditions. As in early 1990, a conflict
emerged between members of Congress and the Administration as to
how much the Soviet threat had declined. Some in Congress argued
that with the failure of the coup, the Soviet threat had dropped
far below its previous level, and that further reductions in the
U.S. defense budget were warranted. Secretary Cheney argued that
it was far too soon to make such a judgent and that the Presi-
dent's budget request out to be upheld.
Nevertheless, this disagreement may not provide as strong a
basis for congressional activism as in 1990. Although a mile-
stone in the evolution of the Soviet Union, the coup also raised
uncertainties over the ultimate fate of that nation and its
military forces. In contrast, the tearing down of the Berlin
Wall had far clearer implications for the Soviet threat, and
provided a much more dramatic impetus for Congress to push for
change in U.S. defense policy.
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Moreover, in presenting the new national security strategy,
Administration officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have
stressed that the new national security strategy satisfies the
past objections of Congress. No longer can congressional leaders
accuse the Administration of ignoring the changes in the Soviet
Union. Administration officials and the JCS have adopted a
sharply reduced assessment of the Soviet thre , and recognized
the "total, absolute demise of the Cold War." They have also
highlighted their claim that this strategy represents a "total
rethinking" of U.S. defense policy.
Moreover, at least for the short term, the Administration
has diffused potential criticism of the new strategy by appearing
to incorporate many of the policy changes recommended by Con-
gress. Senator Nunn stated in September 1990 that: "The Defense
Department.. .had just come up with their new strategy the day
that Saddam Hussein hit Iraq. And I would say that their strate-
gy was very similar to some of the things I was talking about
earlier this spring."
2 5
This co-option of Congress will not protect the new national
security strategy from all criticism. Although Nunn and other
congressional leaders initially believed that the new national
security strategy incorporated their recommendations, key ele-
ments of the strategy--including the concept of
reconstitution--were created by the Administration. Pride of
congressional authorship will not shield those new national
security strategy components from scrutiny on the Hill.
Even if Congress accepted the general precepts of the new
strategy, gaps and controversies in specific defense policy
issues are likely to persist. The future of naval aviation is a
prime example. Under the strategy, carrier-borne aircraft will
play a key role in providing the U.S. with mobile, flexible
striking power. However, because of cost overruns, mismanagement
and other problems, the service's top four aircraft programs were
axed in 1990 and 1991. As Representative Dicks has warned, the
failure of the executive branch to exercise better leadership i
naval aviation will spur Congress to dictate policy on its own.
Nevertheless, the sort of large-scale policy vacuum that
encouraged congressional activism in early 1990 has been filled.
The future of naval aviation is an important issue, but offers
far less dramatic appeal than the disintegration of the Warsaw
Pact. While members of Congress may still hope to pursue higher
office or gain other political goals by addressing policy issues,
their opportunities will rarely be as inviting as when President
Bush appeared to ignore the end of the Cold War. Other incen-
tives must emerge if anything beyond a sense of duty is to impel
Congress to scrutinize the new national security strategy.
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PORK AND POLICY
According to many analysts of Congress, the desire to serve
narrow constituent interests provides just such an incentive.
According to Barry Blechman members of Congress tend to overlook
large scale policy issues because other concerns--especially that
of providing "pork" for their constituents--offers more immediate
political benefits. Congress has been "sacrificing overall
consistency and coherence of national policy for narrow interests
and short-term objectives. This is a natural consequence of the
political calculus that inevitably dominates congressional deci-
sionmakjg:" i.e., the need to "protect the interests of constit-
uents."'"
Not all studies agree that constituent interests are so
decisive in shaping congressional behavior, especially in the
case of strategic weapons (where the policy views of members
offer a more reliable predictor of their voting behavior).28  It
is clear, however, that Congress will have ample opportunity to
undermine and distort the new national security strategy through
pork-driven activism.
The President's budget request for FY-92 calls for cutbacks
in two especially visible areas. In personnel, the budget would
reduce active duty forces by 19 percent and National Guard and
reserve forces by 23 percent by the end of FY-95. In weapons
development and procurement, the President has proposed canceling
11 major rograms, including the V-22 OSPREY tilt-rotor
aircraft .
Both categories of reductions are bound to stir up the pork
instincts of Congress. Personnel cuts, particularly when aimed
at locally-based reserves such as National Guard units, have a
direct economic impact on congressional districts. The cancella-
tion of weapons programs have the same effect. Indeed, because
of the harm that such cancellations can inflict on constituents
(and the electoral prospects of members), many analysts argue
that C~ngress is fundamentally incapable of halting weapon pro-
grams. The result could be that Congress will refuse to make
the force reductions necessary to implement the new strategy.
From this perspective, the danger is not that Congress will pay
too little attention to the new national security strategy, but
all too much.
Congressional Parochialism and the FY-92 Budget
Congressional action on the FY-92 budget provided some
indications as to the future effect of pork on the new national
security strategy. Shortly after the House of Representatives
rejected the Administration's proposed defense budget, and enact-
ed its own version of the FY-92 defense authorization bill,
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President Bush denounced that bill as riddled by parochial inter-
ests and called for a budget that "defends people, not pork. '"
Bush and Secretary Cheney cited the House decisions on
reserve forces as being especially porrine. The Administration
proposed cutting the reserves by 107,000 in FY-92. According to
Secretary Cheney, those cuts were needed not only to reduce
overall spending, but because reserve forces will not play as
prominent a role under the new national security strategy. That
strategy emphasized the need for U.S. forces to respond quickly
to regional conflicts. Cheney argued that reserves and National
Guard units are unsuitable for such operations, and that the Gulf
War underscored the need to diminish the combat roles assigned to
reserves in the future.
The House rejected this proposal. In the FY-92 defense
authorization bill approved by the House on May 22, members
agreed to restore two-thirds of he reserve and National Guard
troops Cheney has sought to cut. The defense appropriations
bill passed by the House on June 7 went a step further, eliminat-
ing the Administration's proposed cutbacks and addi*ng $645 mil-
lion for 1,065 new members of the reserve and Guard. 4 Moreover,
while the Administration is continuing to fight for cuts, the
motives of congressional opponents suggest that this fight will
remain difficult.
Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS) took the lead
in protecting the reserves and Guard in the House authorization
bill. Justifying his position, Montgomery argued that "the best
way to spread around defense spending is to have National Guard
and reserve units in our different communities, where those
reservists can receive additional income, educational benefits
and serve his or her country." Advocates of reserve cuts (and
military base closings) also recognize the power of those politi-
cal considerations. According to Senator Inouye, "cutbacks
translate into loss of jobs and loss of economic base, and polit-
ically, that is of considerable concern to most, if not all,
members because it affects constituents. And the people scream-
ing the loudest are the ones wh are quick to cut the defense
budget, but not in my back yard."
Nevertheless, opponents of reserve and National Guard reduc-
tions cited more than pork considerations in their defense. They
also argued that it was good defense policy to maintain current
force levels. Montgomery and other Congressmen disagreed with
Cheney's claim that reserves had performed poorly in the Gulf
war, and cited earlier statements by him on the effective contri-
bution such forces had made. Congressional opponents also argued
that with cuts in the defense budget under the new U.S. defense
strategy, it was more important than ever to maintain reserve and
National Guard forces, because such forces offered a relatively
cheap way for the U.S. to maintain a pool of trained military
personnel.36
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This overlap between pork and policy considerations is
particularly strong in the case of the V-22 OSPREY tilt-rotor
transport aircraft. Every year since 1989, Secretary Cheney has
attempted to eliminate the V-22's funding, arguing that the $33
billion program simply cannot be afforded within the shrinking
defense budget. However, Congress has consistently rejected that
recommendation and voted to continue funding the V-22. The FY-92
defense appropriations bill p5sed by the House would provide
$625 million for this aircraft.
This money would just happen to be spent in the districts of
leading congressional advocates of the OSPREY. For example,
Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), a key supporter of the pro-
gram, represents a district that is home to Boeing Helicopter, a
V-22 prime contractor." Another leader is Representative Peter
Green, (D-TX), whose Fort Worth district currently benefits from
500 V-22 jobs at Bell Helicopter Textron (another prime contrac-
tor), and could ain up to 5,000 jobs if the aircraft goes into
full production.
However, V-22 spending is heavily concentrated in Texas and
Penns-ylvania. The program offers few jobs or related benefits for
congressional districts in other states. 40  Some members of
Congress including Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) back the program
because they believe it would lead to civil aviation spinoffs
important to their states. Nevertheless, far more members of
Congress support the V-22 than have explicit, pork-related incen-
tives to do so. If members voted only for those weapons that
provided them with immediate constituent benefits, the V-22 would
have been defeated long ago. What accounts for the aircraft's
survival on Capitol Hill?
One possibility is that pork-based logrolling keeps the V-22
funded. In exchange for supporting the V-22, members from states
other than Pennsylvania and Texas may get support for their own
programs. Another possibility is that when Les Aspin crafts the
"Chairman's mark," which represents his alternative to the Admin-
istration's defense budget proposal, the need to win support from
large state delegations (including Texas and Pennsylvania) drives
him to incorporate and promote their pork requests. Again,
however, in contrast to the reserve force issue, where a large
number of members have an immediate constituent interest in
reserve spending, the V-22 has garnered broad House support where
few direct pork incentives exist.
Policy considerations have played a key role in winning that
support. The leaders of the V-22 fight have been able to con-
vince members that with the end of the Cold bar, and the growing
need for highly mobile forces, this transport aircraft is far
more important than has been recognized by the Administration.
That policy argument has also received quiet support from the
Marine Corps. As a result, according to Representative Curt
Weldon (a Pennsylvania Republican whose district is home to Bell
Helicopter), "We've won the battle not because of pork, but
because it has solid, deep support in Congress, and in the Penta-
90
gon from the standpoint of service leaders."'4 1 Indeed, by making
need for mobility all the more apparent, the new national securi-
ty strategy may have reduced the importance of pork in shaping
such congressional activism.
Policy considerations also appear crucial in the case of
sealift cargo ships for transporting tanks and other combat
equipment. The Administration declined to include money in its
proposed FY-92 budget for sealift and had refused to spend funds
Congress appropriated for that purpose for the previous two
years. Cheney's rationale was that fast transport ships were not
worth the money, in part because the U.S. would be able F prepo-
sition military hardware in potential areas of conflict.
The House -ejected that reasoning and voted to appropriate
$1.3 billion for the sealift fleet. Of course, some congression-
al districts would gain jobs from building that fleet. As with
the V-22, however, the vast majority of congressmen lack such
direct constituent interests, making policy considerations more
visible. Sealift advocates were able to justify their program by
citing the need for greater mobility in the post Cold-War era,
and criticizing the assumption that the U.S. would be able to
know in advance where prepositioned arms would be needed. Again,
the new national security strategy gave sealift backers a strong-
er policy basis on which to argue their case. As with the V-22,
sealift advocates claimed at least tacit support from U.S. mili-
tary officers, as when Les Aspin quoted DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM Central Command Commander-in-Chief General (GEN) Norman
Schwarzkopf, USA, as stating that "I've been advocating more
sealift for a very, very long time."'4 3
However, there is another basis for rejecting the hypothesis
that pork alone will drive (and distort) the congressional re-
sponse to the new national security strategy. Although President
Bush accused the House of parochialism in refusing to cut pro-
grams such as the V-22, he also berated Congress for refusing to
spend as much as the Administration requested on programs such as
the 11-2 bomber and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). If
pork was as dominant a force as Bush suggests, the B-2 and SDI
would be guaranteed strong support on the Hill. Both programs
would provide billions of dollars worth of jobs for constituents.
Yet, as the President complained, the House voted to slash spend-
ing on both programs. What accounts for this behavior?
Policy considerations overcame pork. With the end of the
Cold War and the decline of the Soviet threat, members such as
Asin, concluded that less money should be spent on strategic
programs such as the B-2 and SDI, originally designed to counter
the Soviet arsenal. While Administration officials scrambled to
justify both programs in terms of future non-Soviet threats, the
effort failed. The Administration's budget was designed to boost
development of "Cold War" items, according to Aspin; he argued
that the House nccdcd to cut Such prog;a,.z, and fund alternatives
"that could give us the right defense for the future.... ,,4
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Pork and the Future
The new national security strategy is vulnerable to pork-
driven congressional action. To implement that strategy, Cold
War-oriented programs must be cut to free resources for more
urgent initiatives. These cuts will inevitably threaten local
economic interests. When many congressional districts share such
an interest, such as maintaining reserve and National Guard
spending, the desire to protect the local economy can lead Con-
gress to oppose the reductions recommended by the Administration.
However, for programs that provide economic benefits in
relatively few districts, pork motives alone may be inadequate to
build a winning congressional coalition to block spending cuts.
Pork incentives can even fail to halt reductions in enormous,
job-bonanza programs such as the B-2. Policy considerations, and
not pork alone, play a crucial role in shaping congressional
action on such programs.
The fact that Congress is driven, however, by more than pork
does not necessarily augur well for the Administration's plans to
implement the new national security strategy. If Congress ac-
cepted those plans as sound policy, the new strategy would enjoy
smooth sailing. But that is not the case. Although Congress is
in broad agreement with President Bush that the Cold War is over,
and that the U.S. needs smaller, highly mobile forces for the
future, ample room exists for disagreement over which programs
will best meet those needs.
The V-22, sealift and B-2 programs exemplify this opportuni-
ty for policy disagreement--and for congressional intervention in
carrying out the new national security strategy. One of the keys
to the new strategy is to ensure that the contingency force will
be extremely mobile. The V-22 and sealift programs are designed
to provide that mobility. Another key to the new strategy is to
free up resources by cutting non-essential programs, particularly
those tailored to the (former) Soviet threat. The B-2 was tai-
lored precisely that way.
The Administration was not necessarily wrong in taking the
opposite position. Rather, within the broad precepts of the new
national security strategy, disputes are bound to arise between
Congress and the President as to how the strategy should be
transformed from rhetoric into budgetary reality. The good news
is that Congress is driven by policy as well as pork. The bad
news (from the Administration perspective) is that policy con-
cerns will lead Congress to recast the implementation of new
national security strategy, in ways the Administration may abhor.
RECONSTITUTION, THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE, AND CONGRESS
The question of how to carry out the new national security
strategy involves more than near-term budget issues. Assuming
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that some version of the new strategy remains the goal of future
administrations, and that Congress accepts the broad outlines of
that strategy (while often reshaping its actual implementation),
Congress will face one particularly difficult problem over the
longer term: how to preserve the U.S. ability to reconstitute its
military forces.
However, retaining the necessary industrial and technologi-
cal base (to say nothing of highly trained personnel) will become
ever more difficult as the U.S. defense budget shrinks. With
fewer purchases of military hardware, the companies that provide
it will encounter increasing difficulties in surviving. If
enough defense companies fail, or move into non-defense work that
leaves them unprepared to build the necessary weapons, the U.S.
may be incapable of reconstituting large-scale forces when they
are most needed.
The relatively small cuts already made to the defense budget
are already having an impact on the industrial base. Only two
U.S. companies build nuclear-powered submarines: General Dynamic
Corporation's Electric Boat division in Groton, Connecticut and
Tenneco Inc.'s Newport News shipyard in Virginia. Electric Boat
is on record that unless it is awarded the next contract to build
the SSN-21 SEAWOLF submarine, it will not have enough business to
stay open beyond the middle of the decade, leaving the U.S. with
only one source of submarines. Newport News, however, has made a
similar argument concerning its own ability to stay in the subma-
rine business. The problem is that because of budgetary pres-
sures, and the concomitant need to maintain efficient production
schedules, it may simply be impossible to award enougNt construc-
tion contracts to keep both producers in business.4 Similar
problems are emerging for producers of tanks, military aircraft
and other vital weapons, as well as the more prosaic components
that make them work.
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GEN Powell cites this declining defense industrial base as
"the element of greatest concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
According to Powell, "The number of producers and suppliers...of
many of our critical military items is dwindling drastically, and
is shrinking to unacceptably low levels." It is Congress, howev-
er, that ultimately determines how much money will be available
to preserve the industrial base (and how that money should be
spent). Consequently, Powell has Jso asked for "the help of
Congress to turn this trend around."'V
Help is on the way--though not necessarily of the sort
Powell and the Administration would prefer. Three factors en-
courage congressional intervention on the industrial base issue.
First, at the level of overall strategic guidance, a policy
vacuum is emerging of the sort described in Section I of this
paper. Although the industrial base problem strikes at the core
of the new national security strategy, the Administration has yet
to propose how to preserve the industrial base in the face of
continued budget cuts. Although the White House Office of
Science and Technology has identified 22 technologies as essen-
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tial to preserving U.S. military strength, Administration offi-
cials have not described how the governme4rt should change its
methods of supporting their development. While William J.
Perry and other members of the Defense Science Board have sug-
gested a number of proposals to strengthen the industrial base
and improve the weapons acquisitio 0 process, those recommenda-
tions have not yet been accepted.T9 Congress has a wonderful
opportunity to step into the policy breach.
Second, industrial base policy might sometimes come to be
spelled p-o-r-k. Closing the Electric Boat division would mean
the loss of 22,000 jobs at the :mpany and thousands more at its
suppliers andi subcontractors. 12,500 jobs are at stake in
Newport News. Inevitably, leaders in the fight to assure that
the next SEAWOLF production contract goes to Electric Boat are
the legislators from Connecticut, just as the leaders of the
fight on behalf of Newport News represent Virginia. Inevitably,
those opposing legislators are using the defense budget as the
vehicle for defending their respective proposals.
However, this pork is again mixed with policy. When Repre-
sentative Norman Sissisky (D-VA) proposed that the next SEAWOLF
contract be awarded to Newport News, that initiative would have
been of direct benefit to his constituents. Nevertheless, Sis-
sisky may also have been correct in arguing that from a national
security perspective, his effort was essential "to maintain an
adequate submarine construction industrial base." When Sam
Gejdenson (D-CT) attacked that proposal, he was a bit disingenu-
ous in asking his colleagues not to "turn the submarine program
into pork;" his own proposal would have improved Electric Boat's
chances of winning the contract. Nevertheless, there may have
been merit to his argument that the declining defense budget
makes it all the more important to produce SEAWOLF submarines on
the most efficient scale possible (even at the risk of having
only one producer).52
Policy considerations loom still larger for the majority of
Congressmen who lack a direct constituent interest in either
shipyard, but who must ultimately help decide the outcome of this
issue. The same is true of the other disputes that will arise
over protecting the defense industrial base. Whether Congress
-iI be able to resolve such disputes in a way that makes recon-
stitution practical remains to be seen. What is clear is that in
creating the new national security strategy, the President has
created not just the opportunity but the requirement for contin-
ued congressional policymaking, from near-term implementation of
that strategy to laying the foundations of U.S. military power
for the future.
CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between Congress and the new national
security strategy has taken a paradoxical twist. It was Con-
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gress, not the President, who pushed for a revolution in defense
policy after the fall of the Berlin wall. Indeed, Congress moved
so decisively that President Bush was left with the choice of
abandoning his "stand pat" position or being rendered irrelevant
to the budgetary process. However, some members of the Adminis-
tration were already moving on their own accord to reassess U.S.
military strategy. Furthermore, when the President unveiled his
new national security strategy, he co-opted much of the congres-
sional drive for policy revisions. By so doing, he has reduced
the incentives for congressional activism that proved so potent
in early 1990.
This suggests that revisions are needed to the argument that
Congress is disinterested in policy. Members of Congress have
made policy oversight part of their job, in part because powerful
political incentives exist for dealing with such issues. Howev-
er, the strength of those incentives depends on the issues at
stake and how the executive branch deals with them. Members had
a golden opportunity in early 1990 to ride the surge of opinion
in favor of defense budget cuts, and to demonstrate their leader-
ship qualities in the absence of presidential guidance. Those
opportunities, however, have shrunk. By embracing radical de-
fense budget cuts, and offering the new national security strate-
gy, President Bush has demonstrated a fundamental constraint on
congressional policymaking: that is, the ability of a politically
astute president to co-opt and minimize incentives for congres-
sional action.
If no policy vacuum attracts Congress, will members chal-
lenge and attempt to revise the new national security strategy?
Budgetary concerns will continue to attract congressional atten-
tion. Already, some members are attacking the strategy for
cutting forces too deeply, while others are calling for further
reductions in response to the failed coup. As long as the Presi-
dent maintains his position near the center of this spectrum of
opinion, in contrast to his more extreme stand of early 1990,
Congress will make only minor changes to the overall spending
levels proposed under the new national security strategy.
What will happen within those spending levels is a different
matter. According to Blechman and others analysts, members of
Congress tend to overlook large-scale policy issues because other
concerns--particularly that of providing "pork" for
constituents--offer more immediate political benefits. Some
congressional activism is driven by the desire to protect con-
stituent interests. However, the new strategy is vague in its
implications for some key weapons programs, encouraging members
of Congress to disagree with Administration funding requests on
grounds of policy rather than pork. Because the fate of the
strategy will ultimately be determined by decisions on particular
programs, this opportunity for congressional activism will con-
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The Means to Deliver:




Conventional wisdom suggests that pending cuts in the Ameri-
can defense budget will have a lesser impact on the Department of
the Navy (DoN), which includes the both the Navy and the Marine
Corps, than any other military department. Indeed, a significant
reduction in overseas-based land and air forces would appear to
increase the relative importance of naval forces, giving greater
meaning to the long-standing Navy claim to represent America's
first line of defense. The actual impact of the new national
security strategy, however, may be quite different. The purpose
of this chapter is not to argue for an increased reliance on
maritime forces, but to examine the likely impact the President's
new national security strategy would have on the composition and,
ultimately, the employment of the Navy and Marine Corps.
This analysis will take two directions. First, an assess-
ment will be made of how the new strategy would change strategic
vision of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The term strategic
vision encapsulates the DoN's current objectives, strategic
planning assumptions and concepts of its future role in American
foreign policy and defense strategy.
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Second, this chapter will examine how the new strategy would
affect the future programs of the DoN as reflected in public
sources, particularly, the Secretary of the Navy's 1991 Annual
Report to the U.S. Congress (referred to in Pentagon vernacular
as the SECNAV Posture Statement).3 On that basis, an assessment
will be made of the impact of program changes on the operational
level of naval planning.
IS THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY A STRATEGY?
The initial and unavoidable question is whether the force
reductions mandated by the new national security strategy do in
fact represent a new strategic vision or are simply a reaction to
perceived fiscal realities. The opening chapters suggest that a
bold new vision underlies these changes: that of a multipolar
world characterized by greater trust and cooperation between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union. Obviously, this vision is driven by
the promise of a continuation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorba-
chev's policies, Soviet economic and internal political distress,
the formal collapse of the Warsaw Pact, observed Soviet military
dispositions and exercises, and the general perception that the
Cold War ended in a Western victory.
But from a naval planner's perspective, do these elements
significantly change the factors that determine the course of a
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potential naval conflict? Granted, the likelihood of global
warfare with the Soviet Union has greatly declined. Does this
mean a new strategy is in order? Or should we dust off the
Maritime Strategy, mothball a few carrier battle groups (CVBGs)
to match a reduced budget, and remove the name Soviet Union
wherever it appears, replacing it with that of the latest region-
al threat? And what would happen if a renewed Soviet or Russian
military threat emerged?
Official statements concerning the new national security
strategy emphasize the need to conform to fiscal realities creat-
ed by the U.S. government budget deficit. As Secretary Garrett
admitted in his Posture statement, "Fiscal realities have also
made affordability an important factor to be considered in sus-
taining maritime superiority." Inherent in the American defense
planning process, the separation between formulation of strategy
and force structure planning often appears unclear. This empha-
sis on fiscal restraints could easily lead cynics to argue that
the new national security strategy is a budget in search of a
strategy, rather than a strategy shaping a budget. In this view,
the requirement to provide Congress and the public with a peace
dividend is what drives our new strategy full steam ahead.
STRATEGIC DILEMMAS
Part of the dilemma is whether the naval strategy and pos-
ture should respond to Soviet doctrine or to Soviet capabilities.
Secretary Garrett was cautious in discussing Soviet intentions:
"their (Soviet] capabilities.., have not exactly matched their
strategic intentions." Likewise, a stronger note of caution was
issued concerning our capabilities to reconstitute: "We are
continually re-assessing the Soviet Union, and must reserve the
right to rebuild in response to its actions in the future."
This note of caution might strike critics as proof that
naval officials have greater reservations about the new national
security strategy than do other Service counterparts. This
impression is enhanced by negative public commentary by several
retired naval officers.4 Whether or not this perception is true,
at least three factors impose greater caution in the maritime
perspective.
First, the ambiguity of Soviet intentions concerning naval
forces is greater. President Gorbachev had the opportunity to
cancel the enormously expensive Soviet aircraft carrier program
when he announced the down-sizing of Red Army forces, but he did
not. While the threat posed by one, two, or even three fixed-
wing aircraft carriers to an American force of twelve deployable
carrier groups (as proposed in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chair-
man General (GEN) Colin L. Powell's Base Force, the analytical
genesis of the new strategy) may appear strategically insignifi-
cant, the dedication of scarce and important resources to develop
a capability that Moscow long eschewed and frequently denigrated
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is unsettling. Construction of carriers by other nations has
generally been interpreted as a symbolic commitment to continuing
development of ocean-going power projection. The Soviet Union
already possesses considerable open-ocean capability, which it
could choose to deploy in the future. Certainly, sea-based naval
aviation complements this potential.
Second, the current defensive deployment of Soviet naval
forces does not necessarily represent a permanent change in the
Soviet attitude towards out of area operations. In the past,
setbacks in diplomacy and shifts in internal Soviet decision-
making have trequently affected the Soviet approach to naval
deployments. Whereas Soviet troop withdrawals from former
Warsaw Pact members (in conjunction with the formal dissolution
of the Pact) is an unprecedented, breathtaking change in Soviet
military doctrine, a renewed defensive orientation for naval
forces, in light of an on-again, off-again Soviet attitude to-
wards extensive ship deployments, seems much less spectacular.
Third, much of the force that the U.S. Navy built to defeat
the Soviet fleet appears to have--with several notable exceptions
discussed later--the same capabilities appropriate for the major
regional contingencies to which Secretary Cheney alluded. A
prime example of this is the use of CVBGs, marine amphibious
forces and maritime prepositioning supplies--all designed to
counter a Soviet thrust into Southwest Asia--to prevent further
Iraqi incursion into the Gulf Arab states in our first post-Cold
War crisis. While the CVBG concept, designed to defeat the
Soviet navy in open-ocean battle, may appear obsolete, the carri-
ers, AEGIS cruisers and TOMAHAWK-carrying destroyers certainly
are not. The success of American and Allied naval forces, large-
ly designed for the Maritime Strategy, in executing their tasks
in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM provides a certain support for the
facetious planning phrase that "if you can skin the cat, you can
skin the kitten."
These factors, the ambiguity of Soviet naval intentions, and
the apparent success of Cold War naval forces in fulfilling a
significant Third-World crisis mission, constitute the naval
planning dilemma. Based on Secretary Garrett's testimony, it is
obvious that the DoN leadership intends to fully support the
objectives of the new national security strategy. However, from
a uniquely naval perspective, it is open to question whether the
new strategy represents a strategic vision superseding the prem-
ises of the 1980s Maritime Strategy, whether it is a budget plan
that forces a modification of that Strategy, or whether it is a
combination of strategy and budget plan providing mutual justifi-
cation for shifting from the Maritime Strategy to a less demand-
ing posture.
THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AS STRATEGIC VISION
Reaction by the naval leadership to the new national securi-
ty strategy, particularly by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
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Admiral (ADM) Frank Kelso, has been to accept it as a strategic
vision that partially supersedes the assumptions on which the
much-discussed Maritime Strategy was built. To a considerable
extent, the formal Maritime Strategy had already been modified by
mid-1990 to reflect a waning concentration on countering what was
previously considered the prime Soviet naval threat: the Soviet
submarine force.
The modified product, renamed the Naval Policy, attempted to
take into account the revolutionary changes in the Warsaw Pact by
emphasizing the generic principles of seapower and their applica-
tion to crises outside the Cold War context. As explained in
Policy briefing materials, the 1990s represented a period of
dramatic transition requiring a shift in the Navy-Marine Corps
focus: "With the likelihood of global war with the Soviets sig-
nificantly reduced, United States strategic emphasis shifts from
global containment and war-fighting to a global stability strate-
gy with a regional focus."
The most significant change entailed a shift in mission
priorities. "Changing circumstances make possible an increased
emphasis on power projection tied to local sea control." Al-
though power projection was an obvious element of the Maritime
Strategy, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was considered the initial
mission in a global war. Discussing this change, ADM Kelso
stated that "Power projection is the Navy's number one
priority."'6 In his post-Aspen speech posture statement, Secre-
tary Garrett carried this shift into the realm of programming:
"Accordingly, anti-submarine warfare investment can once again
proceed at a more measured pace, with particular emphasis on
research and development."
This shift in priority among naval missions is the most
tangible evidence that the elements of the new national security
strategy have been incorporated into the Navy's newest strategic
vision. Physical impediments and continuing improvements in the
Soviet submarine force were once assumed to require a large
investment in ASW systems. If, however, a war with the Soviet
Union is considered unlikely, there is a lesser incentive for
investment because there are no other potential enemies with
large or sophisticated submarine forces.
If ASW requirements are minimized due to a reduction in the
perceived Soviet threat, does this mean that a significant reor-
ganization is taking place within the U.S. Navy? A partial
answer is that an adjustment is obviously required by the funding
level of the FY 91-95 defense program. However, as noted, many
of the naval forces designed for the Cold War environment have
proven their worth in Third World conflicts and in crises short
of war. While the lessons learned from the war against Iraq will
be discussed in another chapter, it is evident that most fleet
assets played vital roles. Hence, it is likely that naval deci-
sion-makers will opt for a balanced fleet, similar in composition
but downsized from current levels. With emphasis on power pro-
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jection, other supporting mission areas may increase in stature
in both plans and resource allocation.
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES
Although the Administration is committed to a 451-ship Base
Force Navy, there have been questions raised whether that is
merely a number reached on the way down or a true bottom line.
According to recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) research,
the planned resources for the Navy will ultimately lead to a 310
fleet Navy.7  That fleet would have no more than nine aircraft
carriers (equipped with fewer of the most capable aircraft) and
45 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The CBO has con-
cluded that the future of Navy force structure is extremely
sensitive to decisions that will be reached on the SSN-21 SEAWOLF
and replacements and upgrades for naval aviation. A June 1991
book written by a retired naval officer and strategic planner now
at the Center for Naval Analyses, seconds this fear with a warn-
ing that the Navy and Marine Corps are headed toward: 300 ships
in the year 2000; including eight-nine CVBGs, 50 SSNs, 50-60
surface combatants, ten nuclear-powered ballistic missile svbma-
rines (SSBNs), and two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).
From the strategic perspective, the initial campaign envi-
sioned in the Maritime Strategy demanded an emphasis on
ASW--primarily the ASW capabilities of American SSNs and fixed or
towed sensor systems. The first war-fighting goal of the strate-
gy was to "conduct forward operations with attack submarines, as
well as to establish barriers at key world chokepoints using
maritime patrol aircraft, mines, attack submarines, or sonobouys,
to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the open ocean where the
Western Alliance's resupply lines can be threatened."
The prerequisite of a successful ASW campaign before moving
to a power projection phase (i.e., the oft debated move of carri-
er battle forces into the Norwegian and Japan Seas) obviously was
a concentration of resources. Under this demanding strategy, new
construction programs such as the SSN-21 SEAWOLF were required to
maintain U.S. technological superiority against an ever quieter
and faster Soviet SSN force. However, since the planning focus
has shifted to Third World contingencies and forward presence
instead of forward operations, the strategic justification for a
more capable and expensive American SSN force collapses.
Reflecting this, SEAWOLF procurement is now planned at 1
vice 2 units per year--barely enough to keep one nuclear ship-
building yard operating. With an estimated unit cost of $1.2-1.5
billion, the program will probably continue to be an attractive
target for cost cutting. A possible alternative is the procure-
ment of improved versions of the current LOS ANGELES class SSN.
9
Additionally, ADM Kelso informed Congress in his 1991 Posture
Statement, that he ordered a study to "define new, lower cost
options for a successor to the SEAWOLF. '1 0 It is this act that
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appears to provide the programmatic confirmation that the Navy
leadership accepts the new national security strategy as a new
strategic vision for naval planning.
±
The Marine Corps may face a different set of future circum-
stances. The current emphasis on maneuver warfare, evident in
such doctrine as Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1,
WarfiQhtina, appears to position the Corps to assume major
responsibility for both the Pacific and Contingency components of
the proposed new military organization. The Pacific region, in
which the Administration plans to employ chiefly maritime forces
in a reduced level of forward operations, is most suitable for a
sea-borne Marine presence for crisis response since most nations
of interest to the U.S.--whether as potential allies or potential
enemies--are coastal states.
Secretary Garrett outlined his program for amphibious capa-
bilities: maintain enough amphibious ships to lift the assault
echelons of 2 MEBs. The revised plan would require about the
same number of amphibious assault ships as in the current inven-
tory, and the method is to continue to procure new but fewer
amphibious ships. The objective is to maintain two-to-three
Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marines on station as a
forward presence. The Marine Corps is expected to maintain a
total of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, although they will be
smaller.
WarfiQhtinQ and other recent writings on Marine doctrine,
appear to have deemphasized classic amphibious operations. The
military campaign of the Marine Corps in the Kuwaiti Theater of
Operations consisted of effective ground maneuver combined with
sea and land based air support, but did not include a major
combat amphibious assault. Critics will probably be swift to
point out that Marine actions differed from those of the Army
only in the degree of armor involved--thereby challenging the
Marine Corps claim to exclusivity of mission. The probability of
a debate exists, reminiscent of the "Where does the Marine Corps
go from here" challenges of the mid-1970s.13
Since carrier-based tactical aircraft remains the prime
element of naval power projection, CVBGs and assigned airwings
should be least affected by the strategic assumptions of the new
national security strategy. The reality is, of course, that the
desired reductions in the DoN budget can come only with some
reduction in the carrier force, the most expensive element of the
Navy. It is obvious that reliance on carrier-based aircraft as a
deterrent and war-fighting instrument will increase as access to
overseas land bases decreases.14
The threat to the carrier force is bureaucratic: interserv-
ice rivalry with the U.S. Air Force. The probability of a bloody
carriers versus Air Force tactical squadrons battle, reminiscent
of the 1947-49 Air Force-Navy tangle over carriers and unifica-
tion, is increased by Secretary Cheney's decision to terminate
the problem-plagued A-12 Navy strike aircraft program, as well as
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the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter and the Air Force Advanced
Tactical Aircraft.
The Air Force, wrestling with its own budget problems,
appears to have fired the opening salvo in the potential inter-
service conflict by evaluatigg B-2 bomber squadrons in terms of
carrier airwing equivalents. The issue of carriers-vs.-bombers
is likely to turn on the feasibility of deploying and sustaining
forces in light of future base-rights agreements.
Within Navy tactical aviation itself, the demise of all
future aircraft programs poses a quandary: how to begin, again,
preparing for the future. Should its aircraft be designed to be
superior in all respects to Soviet aviation? Or should the Navy
opt for a lower cost carrier-based equivalent of the Air Force A-
10 tank killer, an aircraft designed to recast carriers--floating
unmolested off third world shores--into highly mobile AIRLAND
Battle bases? Under competing pressures, the most likely solu-
tion--destined to please no one--is to retain the remaining
carrier airwings much the same, in essence, the Maritime Strategy
minus the Soviet Union approach.
The role of ships with a considerable capability for strike
warfare, primarily in the forms of land-attack cruise missiles
and heavy caliber gunnery, is of obvious importance in Third
World crisis intervention. As demonstrated, TOMAHAWK missiles
are excellent leading edge tools in an air campaign. Rather than
a substitute for strike aviation, TOMAHAWK has proven a success-
ful adjunct to manned aircraft, attacking fixed air defense and
command and control targets that would otherwise enable the enemy
to conduct a coordinated air defense.
Battleships were the other major surface platforms utilized
with great effect in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, howev-
er, the Navy has apparently already made the decision to return
the remaining battleships to mothballs. With crew levels of
approximately 1500 per battleship, the number of sailors assigned
to the two remaining battleships are roughly equal to the crews
of ten TOMAHAWK-carrying destroyers.
Surface and air ASW forces appear to be other casualties of
the deemphasis of the Soviet submarine threat. The impact on the
most modern units in the surface fleet is minimal because these
vessels are largely designed to be multi-purpose with particular
stress on fleet anti-air warfare defense. Aircraft and anti-ship
cruise missiles are undoubtedly the main naval threat in Third
World crises. Thus, it is unlikely that the surface Navy would
eliminate or substitute lower-cost units for procurement of
AEGIS-system ARLEIGH BURKE destroyers, which also possess open-
ocean ASW capability.
Older ships primarily designed for ASW will be greatly
affected by the shift away from open ocean ASW. In his 1991 Pos-
ture statement, Secretary Garrett unveiled a plan referred to as
the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept, in which reserve crews will
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be trained to provide total wartime manning for inactivated KNOX
frigates. The initial impact of this plan will transfer a sig-
nificant portion of the open ocean ASW combat and convoy capabil-
ity to the reserves.
Sealift is a critical element in the new national security
strategy, and is literally the means by which the U.S. can deliv-
er the forces necessary to win a mechanized land battle overseas.
As American forces are withdrawn from foreign soil, the possibil-
ity of their return in force should a future crisis develop is
obviously dependent on a fast, secure means of delivery. This is
the metaphorical aspect of the idea that "the Navy constitutes
the 'means to deliver' on the American promise to return its
forces to the European theater in event of a renewed Soviet (or
other) threat."
Sealift played a critical role in the logistics build-up
that ensured success in the war to liberate Kuwait. While its
performance was generally good, delays and breakdowns were fre-
quent enough to prompt critics to argue that American sealift
capability is antiquated.' Three options proposed to remedy this
shortfall and provide greater reliability are: (1) construction
of more fast sealift ships, (2) increase in the number of mari-
time prepositioning ships stationed near possible crisis areas,
and (3) a subsidized revitalization of the U.S. merchant marine
fleet, with new ships designed for fast conversion to military
purposes.
Pressure may build to fund additional sealift at the expense
of Navy fleet construction, the logic being that sealift ships
were more critical to DESERT SHIELD/STORM success than many of
the surface combatants in the Persian Gulf area. But if sealift
is to increase the concomitant requirement for naval escort
forces also increases. The irony is that the fewer American
forces stationed in Europe, the greater the potential payoff for
Soviet investment in attack submarines assigned to interdiction.
Investment in sealift alone does little to remedy this potential
hazard.
The new emphasis on Third World crises reveals another
mission area that requires reassessment. Under the division of
labor that evolved between NATO maritime forces, the responsibil-
ity for minesweeping was assigned to those members with small,
coastal defense navies. Experience during the Persian Gulf
Tanker War between Iran and Iraq, and most recently in operations
off Kuwait, has vividly demonstrated the likelihood of encounter-
ing mine defenses in hostile waters. The shift from the Maritime
Strategy appears to demand an independent U.S. counter-mine
capability rapidly deployable to crisis regions where our NATO
allies may not be involved.
With the cutback in ships and aircraft available for deploy-
ments, it is quite likely that the need for deterrence or inter-
vention will lengthen deployments, disrupt the deployment cycles,
and limit the number of units available for surge operations.
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One method of resolving this problem is to change the pattern of
deployments. ADM Kelso confirmed his support for this approach
in testimony to Congress: "Reduced United States-traditional
Soviet tensions will allow greater freedom in deployment patterns
and the shifting of forces among theaters in response to world
events."
Another solution is to change the concept of deployment.
Instead of active, near continuous exercises by forward deployed
fleets, deployed ships might spend long periods at anchor, in
port, or under less demanding training conditions. An alterna-
tive would be to homeport more ships overseas, closer to poten-
tial crisis areas, to maximize the deterrent effect of such
vessels even when not conducting underway operations. Of course,
this poses problems associated with negotiating for suitable
foreign bases.
An additional area for future debate is the implied role of
sea-based platforms in the proposed reorientation of the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative (SDI) to a less-ambitious Global Protec-
tion Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system. The anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) defense system referred to as GPALS has yet to be
fully defined, yet it has been cited as an integral component of
the new national security strategy. A sea-based version of the
PATRIOT could be carried and launched by almost any naval plat-
form. A more sophisticated SDI-type interceptor could be
launched from covert locations out of SSBN launch tubes or SSN
torpedo/cruise missile tubes. Another option would be to resur-
rect previous suggestions to utilize surface ships, primarily
guided-missile destroyers, and carrier aircraft to help defend
the continental U.S. from ballistic missile attack.
A more difficult question may be the disposition of naval
tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed on surface ships,
SSNs, and with land-based naval aviation. How will we manage the
plan for reconstitution of these nuclear weapons and what condi-
tions must be met before we once again deploy them with the
fleet? Although they might have been used to deter potential
Third-World nuclear powers from acquiring or threatening American
forces with weapons of mass destruction, we will now need alter-
native plans for deterrence or direct defense. There are signif-
icant verification issues that need to be addressed as we imple-
ment President Bush's new plans to cut tactical nuclear weapons
at sea.
SEAPOWER AND THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
It is evident that the tenets of the new national security
strategy may have an effect on certain particular naval capabili-
ties. But we return to the central question of its impact on
traditional naval strategy. Does the new strategy reflect a
significant change in the U.S. perception of the nature and
importance of seapower?
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Combining the official statements with the logic of geopoli-
tics, the answer is a definite no. But even that answer is
ambiguous and subject to interpretation. If the Maritime Strate-
gy was considered the epitome of the seapower orientation in
American national strategy, then it can be argued that new na-
tional security strategy reduces our reliance on the Mahanian
concept that maritime supremacy can occur primarily through
decisive fleet versus fleet engagements. The new strategy dis-
counts the possibility of a significant engagement with the
Soviet fleet. Reducing the number of CVBGs does not necessarily
reflect an intellectual rejection of a maritime-oriented strate-
gy. Rather, it reflects what it is--a desire to reduce the
overall defense budget in the light of a perceived receding
global threat posed by the Soviet Union.
Some argue that the new national security strategy actually
represents a greater reliance on seapower. As noted, control of
the sea is vital for alliance protection and crisis intervention,
particularly if overseas ground forces are substantially reduced.
In the Gulf War, the convenience of having a large, armored
ground force in Europe that could be sealifted into Saudi Arabia
greatly facilitated our success. Had Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait several years later, the model of our response might have
been more like that of the British campaign to free the Falk-
lands. In turn, a renewal of the Soviet threat--even in diluted
form--can only be countered by maritime superiority in the Atlan-
tic theater. Otherwise, the mass of supplies and heavy equipment
for air-transportable troops can not be delivered. The promise
to come back would be a mere promise.
At another level, it can be further argued that the American
capability for transoceanic power projection and resupply has
become, under the new national security strategy, the real Ameri-
can strategic deterrent to future global war. The gradual dele-
gitimization of nuclear deterrence enacted through public fears
of nuclear war, arms control treaties, and international efforts
at non-proliferation, may make strategic nuclear deterrence less
credible.' If a collapsing Soviet Union is no longer a threat
to American security, is it reasonable to threaten nuclear de-
struction--with no current strategic defenses to protect Ameri-
cans--to prevent the Soviets from lashing out at our Allies?
Or, are we instead transitioning to a mode in which the
reduction and withdrawal of Soviet ground forces (as a quid pro
quo for reduction of U.S. forces in Europe) means that the prime
deterrent to renewed Soviet militarism is the American capability
to come back? That would represent the realization of the
strategic nature of seapower. As Colin Gray maintains: "US (and
allied) maritime advantage is not just desirable, but literally
essential for the deterrence of war, in that the credible promise
of the US exercise of sea control is a necessary precondition for
the conduct of protracted armed conflict in and about Eurasia-
Africa. '1  At the same time the strategic reach required for
crisis intervention is also based on sea control. Because of
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geography, "the United States cannot be a landpower beyond North
America unless she is a seapower, and seapower has strategic
meaning insofar as it has influence on events on land."'18
However, while seapower will remain crucial under the new
strategy, that strategy also calls for spending cutbacks that
could undermine efforts to reconstitute large-scale U.S. naval
forces in the future. The investment in time to reconstruct
large vessels exceeds the two year strategic warning assumption
upon which the new national security strategy is based. The
diminution in American shipbuilding capabilities, caused by
cancellation of current ship construction, only compounds this
problem. The lead time for naval construction is another of the
"enduring realities that require a strong America," as GEN Powell
described them. And this is where the political imperatives for
fiscal restraint have a decisive (an politically dangerous)
impact on capabilities for reconstitution.
THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE
It is obvious that the new national security strategy will
have a major impact on the size and capabilities of the Navy and
Marine Corps. In terms of mission areas, the following forces
are emphasized by the assumptions and tenets of the new strategy:
carrier aviation and surface strike forces in power projection
roles, amphibious ships and Fleet Marine Forces, particularly in
the Pacific, sealift, counter-mine warfare, and the Innovative
Naval Reserve Concept.
The following mission areas are deemphasized: submarine
warfare, open-ocean anti-submarine warfare, and fleet against
fleet engagements. The new national security strategy represents
a supersession of the Maritime Strategy only in the particulars,
not in its underlying philosophy of Atlantic and Pacific seapow-
er. However, if forces need to be reconstituted in the wake of a
renewed Soviet threat, there is every reason to believe even some
of the particulars would become operative.
Ship construction, preservation of the industrial base, and
the research, development, test & evaluation necessary to retain
technological superiority at sea will become critical issues.
They have been addressed but not resolved in public statements by
defense decision-makers concerning the new national security
strategy.
Maritime power remains a preferred instrument, when re-
quired, of crisis intervention. Even more, it is the absolute
prerequisite for such intervention, the 'means to deliver' both
figuratively and literally. Experience with the war against Iraq
indicates a critical need for sealift. Naval forces are obvious-
ly required to protect sealift and supply the power projection
necessary to land and resupply the forces that will utilize
sealifted equipment. As access to overseas land bases decreases,
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the compelling necessity for sea control increases for any inter-
vention in crisis areas.
The bulk of the American strategic deterrent will be shift-
ing to sea. While the concept of a strategic Triad will undoubt-
edly be retained, offensive forces will be centered on the SSBN.
This may cause a readjustment in the command and organizational
structure of these forces. A final assessment of their relation-
ship to strategic defensive forces awaits the developmert of a
deployable strategic defense. The future role of nuclear SLCM is
unclear, as is the use of sea-based platforms in GPALS.
The possibility that the deterrent effect of the strategic
nuclear arsenal will wane heightens the likelihood that America
will rely on its traditional deterrent: the threat of coming over
there. Geography dictates the ultimate reliance on maritime
forces to make this threat to deploy reconstituted forces credi-
ble.
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Strategic Nuclear Policy in a Time of Fundamental Change
by
Bruce W. MacDonald1
At a time of fundamental change in the U.S. conventional
force posture, U.S. strategic nuclear policy seems--at least on
the surface--to be mired in the past. President George Bush
himself has helped foster this sense of dichotomy. Although the
President has emphasized the need to recast U.S. conventional
forces in response to the end of the Cold War and the changes in
the Soviet Union, he has argued that similarly dramatic shifts
are not yet justified in the strategic realm. Nevertheless, the
new national security strategy and the broader changes associated
with it open the door to drastic nuclear policy revisions. Such
revisions are necessary, inevitable, and (sometimes beneath the
surface of Administration rhetoric) already underway.
This chapter begins by examining how the overall objectives
of U.S. nuclear policy are changing, particularly in the after-
math of the failed Soviet coup of August, 1991. The second
section assesses the impact of the new national security strategy
on the organization and control of U.S. strategic forces. Sec-
tion three analyzes prospective changes in U.S. strategic target-
ing, strategic force levels and modernization plans, and arms
control initiatives. The final section examines some larger
problems in the evolution of U.S. nuclear policy: in particular,
the rush toward unilateral U.S. strategic arms reductions, and
the impact such reductions will have on the future U.S. strategic
posture.
OVERALL OBJECTIVES
The superficial stasis in strategic nuclear policy derives
from the continuity of the broad strategic goals of deterrence
and strategic stability. The Bush Administration has stated
that, unlike U.S. conventional force policy, U.S. strategic goals
will be little changed as a result of the turbulent changes in
the Soviet Union since 1989.2 Despite the radical change that has
taken place in the Soviet Union, according to President Bush's
speech at Aspen, the central reality that continues to drive U.S.
strategic policy is "our number one concern (that) the Soviets
continue to maintain and modernize their arsenal of strategic
nuclear weapons", which requires the U.S. "to maintain an effec-
tive deterrent that ensures that renewed confrontation is not a
feasible option for any Soviet leadership." In Senate testimony,
General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), has called Soviet strategic nuclear power one of
the new era's "important enduring realities . . . notwithstanding
its [UqSR's] evolving ideology and the intentions of its leader-
ship."
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Yet this rhetoric of continuity obscures the fundamental
change that is sweeping the landscape of U.S. strategic nuclear
policy. These changes affect the organization and control of U.S.
nuclear forces, the doctrine governing them, targeting policy,
force structure and modernization, and strategic arms control.
Much of the change has originated within the Executive Branch,
though Congress has had both direct and indirect influence on the
process. With the exception of the attention given to the in-
creased emphasis on strategic defense, this transformation has
generated remarkably little attention.
The revolution now underway in U.S. strategic nuclear policy
was described on May 7, 1991 by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Strategic Air Command (SAC), GEN George Lee Butler, USAF, in his
Senate Appropriations Committee testimony.4  While recognizing
"that U.S. fundamental security objectives largely remain con-
stant," Butler said the changes brought about by the end of the
Cold War "represent a volcanic upset of longstanding strategic
calculations and call for a sweeping reassessment of traditional
views and approaches," requiring a "new military strategy" that
has been developed to deal with the "changing strategic land-
scape." This does not promise full consistency among the many
facets of strategic nuclear policy but suggests that the major
contradictions produced by the Cold War's end have at least been
addressed.
Old Objectives
One factor guiding this review was the persistence of the
Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal. Butler pointed out that
"[E]ven at projected START I levels, these forces will constitute
an undiminished threat in terms of their capacity to destroy the
United States." Soviet modernization of its strategic forces
continues to be cited by Department of Defense (DoD) officials
and others as unabated, though there are continugng reports of
slowdowns in Soviet strategic force modernization. Adding to the
angst over Soviet nuclear capabilities is the unknown degree of
control the Soviets maintain over their nuclear forces in light
of the upheaval in the Soviet republics.
Accordingly, the one constant in strategic policy is the
need to maintain an unambiguous capability to deter a Soviet
nuclear attack against the United States or our allies. However,
greater uncertainty exists about the fate of a second goal of the
past U.S. strategic nuclear policy: extended deterrence, that is,
deterring Soviet conventional attacks on our allies. This goal
has not been officially repudiated, and in fact still remains
part of U.S. doctrine. However, it runs the risk in this post-
Cold War world of being rendered obsolete. We have no security
guarantees with eastern Europe, and western Europe's need for an
American nuclear umbrella is shrinking.
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The decline of the Soviet threat has further complicated
U.S. nuclear planning by discrediting past scenarios of how a
nuclear war might occur. The possibility that the Soviet Union
would launch a "bolt from the blue," though taken into account in
U.S. planning, has long been viewed as extremely unlikely. The
more plausible scenario was that nuclear war would emerge out of
a conventional conflict in Europe. With the Warsaw Pact dis-
solved, East Germany absorbed into a united Germany and thus a de
facto member of NATO, much of the rest of the Warsaw Pact seeking
security assurances from NATO, a democratizing and possibly
disintegrating Soviet Union, and the major cuts in Soviet conven-
tional forces mandated by the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE)
Treaty, this "most likely" scenario for strategic conflict has
all but vanished.
Newer scenarios envision an economically enfeebled Soviet
Union, gripped by political and social chaos, in which hard-
liners of the old school retake control of power and plunge the
world into Cold War II, perhaps even using the Soviet strategic
nuclear arsenal as a means to extort financial assistance from a
terrified West. These latter scenarios fleetingly seemed less
unrealistic during the August 1991 coup attempt, though in the
aftermath of that watershed event, seem less plausible than ever.
In short, the probability of strategic nuclear conflict has
declined to its lowest level in decades, and credible scenarios
for its outbreak are in short supply.
New Objectives
The end of the Cold War is changing some of the focus and
direction of U.S. strategic nuclear objectives. Though too soon
to be sure, the need for these changes is probably magnified by
the August 1991 coup attempt and the resulting dethronement of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As some prime
cold war missions vanish, like deterring a Warsaw Pact conven-
tional attack, other missions are beginning to receive more
attention. These missions have, in most cases, always been
present, though overshadowed by the enormity of the missions that
now are fading.
The uncovered attempts by Iraq to achieve nuclear status,
and the continuing concern over nuclear proliferation, make Third
World deterrence more than just an academic abstraction. The
continuing instability within the USSR makes the deterrence of
subnational nuclear adventurism another plausible mission, at
least during this transitional period in Soviet history.
Operation DESERT STORM has highlighted an often overlooked
aspect of U.S. strategic nuclear policy--its ongoing relevance to
strategic non-nuclear policy. U.S. strategic bomber and tanker
forces have long had a secondary conventional force role that has
always been in the shadow of their larger deterrent role. With
the demise of the Cold War, this conventional mission has grown
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relatively more prominent, as seen by the recent Air Force deci-
sion to c Eeate Composite Air Wings of B-52G bombers and tactical
aircraft. During its Congressional presentations on the B-2, the
Air Force has often placed greater emphasis on its conventional
strategic applications than on its nuclear strategic uses, for
which it was originally designed.
GEN Butler has recognized the growing importance of the
conventional strategic role when he described SAC to the Congress
as having "a foot in two worlds," describing its mission "in
terms of not one, but two TRIADs." The first is the traditional
nuclear triad of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles],
sea-based missiles, and manned bombers, while the second is a
conventional strategic triad consisting of the manned bomber, the
tanker, and strategic reconnaissance forces. While SAC's forces
have always played a limited role in some conventional opera-
tions, Butler envisions an expanded conventional role for SAC's
forces.
ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL
For years, the command of U.S. strategic offensive forces
has been split between the Air Force and Navy. Coordination of
targeting has been accomplished through the Joint Strategic
Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), while force posture and moderniza-
tion issues have been coordinated at the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) level. This decades-old division of responsibility
appears to be on the threshold of change.
The implication of the Base Force for strategic forces is to
merge the nuclear forces of the Air Force and Navy into one
command, a Strategic Command, that would have primary responsi-
bility for strategic doctrine, targeting, force posture, and
force modernization. This would allow the Navy to chair the
resulting new command and JSTPS presumably on a rotating basis
with the Air Force, which it has never done before, despite the
fact that it currently controls about half of U.S. strategic
nuclear warheads. This long-overdue change in command structure
should lead to more coherence in U.S. force structure, moderniza-
tion and arms control policy, as was achieved in targeting policy
years ago with the creation of JSTPS.
TARGETING POLICY
While less visible because of its highly classified nature,
nuclear targeting policy has also been swept by change as a
result of recent events. Previous overall U.S. targeting guid-
ance, as embodied in President Jimmy Carter's Presidential Direc-
tive-59 (PD-59) and President Ronald Reagan's National Security
Decision Directive-13 (NSDD-13), placed heavy emphasis on target-
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ing Soviet military and political control assets, as well as
those economic base targets crucial for Soviet recovery from war.
The major shifts in the political tectonic plates of the
Soviet Union that have been the hallmark of the 1990's, and the
resulting earthquakes in the Soviet political and military power
structure, have outdated previous U.S. targeting guidance and
targeting plans. As a result of these shifts: (1), the U.S. no
longer needs to have the ability to attack approximately 1,000
targets in Eastern Europe; (2), the upheaval that is taking place
in the Baltic republics and other areas of the Soviet Union
affects both target numbers and the war-fighting strategy the
target list is designed to support; (3), the previous emphasis on
targeting CPSU and other leadership targets is changing in view
of the decline in the influence of the Party; (4), the Soviets
have cut and are cutting their conventional forces both to comply
with the CFE Treaty and for fiscal reasons, resulting in fewer
targets; and (5), the Soviets have cut and are cutting their
strategic forces primarily to comply with START, also resulting
in fewer targets.
According to the WashinQton Post, recognition of factors
such as these led the executive branch in 1989 to begin a major
review of U.S. strategic nuclear targeting policy, leading to new
targeting guidance and a jubstantially revised Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP). As a result of this review, SECDEF
Dick Cheney and GEN Powell have significantly modified overall
strategic nuclear targeting policy to provide tighter linkage
between targeting policy guidance and actual target planning.
This guidance is reportedly being implemented by JSTPS. Surpris-
ingly, overall targeting guidance, according to the WashinQton
Post continues to be set by NSDD-13, the three-page directive
signed by President Reagan in 1981, though it reportedly is being
interpreted more broadly than before.
According to the WashinQton Post, the Defense Department's
careful review of targets and targeting policy has resulted in an
updated SIOP that eliminates about 3,000 targets, about a 30
percent reduction from the previous version of the SIOP. The most
massive attack option contained in the new SIOP, according to
this report, would still involve about 5,000 nuclear warheads,
however. Administration officials have made explicit unclassi-
fied references to the removal of targets in Eastern Europe from
the new SIOP. The upcoming reductions in Soviet forces under
START will further reduce the number of targets, and hence weap-
ons needed.
Decisions made by U.S. policymakers on force modernization
and arms control issues will also have implications for targeting
policy as well. For example, a reduced buy of B-2 bombers (see
discussion below), coupled with continued retirement of B-52s
could force reductions in targets or the level of destruction
sought for ther- GEN Butler has implied that a START II goal of
3,000 warheads, an often-discussed objective, will require the
U.S. to consider shifting from war-fighting to assured destruc-
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tion, which would have major targeting implications. Likewise,
targeting policy changes will influence force structure and
modernization decisions.
Despite the substantial targeting changes of the 1989-1991
period, further changes in targeting policy appear necessary,
especially in light of the aftermath of the August 1991 coup
attempt. In addition to unfinished business from the earlier
review, the fall of the CPSU by itself is cause for a targeting
review at least as searching as the previous one. High on the
targeting policy agenda should be a number of issues.
First, a fundamental re-examination of how Soviet republics
are targeted. As republics achieve more autonomy, this will have
important implications for the treatment of targets within their
borders. The question of whether fully independent republics
should be targeted at all must be addressed, though targeting
considerations will clearly depend on the existence of any mili-
tary relationship with the central Soviet government.
Second, overall deterrence requirements for a more democrat-
ic Soviet Union. Logic suggests that fewer warheads are required
to deter a democratically elected government than a dictatorship.
A full Soviet transition to democracy would have major implica-
tions for U.S. targeting policy.
Third, new Presidential guidance on targeting needed to
reflect the changes that have occurred since the late 1980's.
The Reagan-era NSDD-13, with its emphasis on warfighting and
deterring a totalitarian, monolithic USSR, is from another era
and needs to be updated.
Fourth, a re-examination of the requirements for deterrence.
In the past, for example, key targets have often been assigned
several warheads to ensure high confidence in destroying those
targets. In technical terms, this could mean reducing the re-
quired damage expectancy sought for such targets. Fifth, a real-
istic approach toward mobile Soviet targets.
Finally, targeting requirements against possible Third World
states that might acquire nuclear weapons. This would seem a
logical adjunct to the greater concern over Third World ballistic
missiles now evident in the Bush Administration's strategic
policy and challenges traditional deterrence concepts. As former
SAC Commander GEN John T. Chain, USAF noted, "the more varied
threats one faces (in additi n to the Soviet threat] the more
difficult deterrence becomes. ''"
STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE AND MODERNIZATION
9
When President Bush implied in his Aspen speech that strate-
gic policy did not need to be revised as thoroughly as the U.S.
conventional force posture, he placed a special emphasis on the
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need to continue U.S. strategic force modernization. Again,
however, the reality of Administration policy has moved beyond
this earlier assessment. In early 1991, the Bush Administration
proposed the most far-reaching retrenchment of U.S. strategic
force posture and modernization of the nuclear era. This quiet
upheaval in strategic force posture and modernization, which op
conservative observer has likened to "unilateral disarmament,"'1,
has important implications for strategic stability, arms control,
force posture, and the defense industrial base over the next
twenty years. The budgetary implications of these changes are
appreciable, though in comparison to total defense spending they
are relatively modest. It is instructive to examine how each leg
of the strategic triad has been affected.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
In a dramatic turnabout, the Bush Administration has signif-
icantly modified the ICBM leg of the triad in both modernization
and deployments. As GEN Butler told Congress, "nowhere is the
downstream effect of change ... more apparent than in our ICBM
force: some forces are eliminated completely ... a number one
priority yesterday becomes a hedge for tomorrow." In a major
change to the philosophical approach of the Reagan Administra-
tion, it has been observed that not even the nuclear freeze
legislation of the early 1980's would limit the ICBM program as
much as President Bush's 1992 defense budget, e.g., the retire-
ment of the MINUTEMAN II force.
The Bush Administration has now announced that it will not
seek to produce and deploy a Rail Garrison version of the PEACE-
KEEPER (MX) ICBM, a decision that was foreshadowed in the previ-
ous year by reports that the Air Force was losing interest in it.
GEN Chain was the major supporter of Rail Garrison MX in the Air
Force. His June, 1990 retirement helped set the stage for the
demise of Rail Garrison in 1991. Research and development will
continue until completed, but this $7.1 billion research and
development (R&D) program will likely never lead to deployment.
The 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles currently housed in silos will pre-
sumably remain there.
With the demise of the Rail Garrison MX program, the long-
standing question of the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs to Soviet
attack, particularly to Soviet SS-18 ICBMs, remains. This ICBM
vulnerability issue dates back to the Ford Administration and was
once a staple of the defense debate. The end of Rail Garrison
signifies the apparent willingness of the Defense Department to
continue the de facto policy of simply living with ICBM vulnera-
bility rhetoric, is no longer politically useful and has appar-
ently been dropped.
The decisions not to produce and deploy Rail Garrison MX and
to halt PEACEKEEPER missile production are significant in terms
of overall U.S. strategic nuclear policy. These decisions indi-
cate that in the midst of the leanest defense funding environment
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in several decades, the Bush Administration has decided to jetti-
son ideology in favor of practicality. Given that a START II
agreement could ban both PEACEKEEPER and the SS-18, these MX
decisions will save billions of dollars on missiles that may be
banned before the end of the decade and a mobile missile system
of declining utility in the post-Cold War era. These decisions
also suggest that the PEACEKEEPER is no longer important to the
President in terms of negotiating leverage in future arms talks.
One option for dealing with ICBM vulnerability, the Small
ICBM (SICBM), or "Midgetman" is being preserved and pursued.
Funding for research and development on this program has been
accelerated, with the Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 budget seeking a
robust $549 million for it, a significant departure from past
years, when funding for SICBM R&D was slighted in favor of Rail
Garrison MX. Nonetheless, the Bush Administration is quick to
point out that there is no commitment to produce or deploy the
SICBM, and plans now generally envisions deploying the "Midget-
man" in existing silos. The hardened mobile launcher, a costly
basing option that would provide much higher survivability for
the SICBM, is seen only as an option and not as an integral part
of the program.
Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles
In an abrupt reversal of its position when it submitted last
year's defense budget, the Bush Administration decided in its FY-
92 budget to end production of the OHIO class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). This will mean an eventual
SSBN force of no more than 18 boats, well below the 21-24 that
the Administration had said the year before that it wanted. The
decision to end production saves $4-9 billion in ship construc-
tion costs and also avoids a potential conflict between ICBM and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) warheads that would
otherwise occur under START's 4,900 warhead subceiling.1I Termi-
nating OHIO production should also lead to a reduction of 144
from the overall buy for TRIDENT II (D-5) missiles of about 900.
This decision should thus lead to eventual procurement savings of
at least $9 billion.
Another cutback in the modernization of the sea-based leg of
the triad is the cancellation of plans to replace the TRIDENT I
(C-4) missiles with newer TRIDENT II's in the first eight OHIO
class SSBNs when those boats are overhauled as part of their
normal maintenance cycle. While official policy is that this
backfit program has been "deferred past 1997," that is, beyond
the horizon of the FY 92-97 Six Year Defense Plan, it seems
likely that the first eight OHIO SSBNs will never be backfitted.
This suspicion is strengthened by the testimony of Admiral Frank
B. Kelso II, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, before a Senate
panel, who said "we will not backfit the D-5 missile into early
Ohio Class SSBNs. ''12 This gives a new lease on life to the older
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TRIDENT I, which otherwise would have left the inventory before
the end of the decade.
The third cutback in our sea-based strategic forces comes
with the accelerated retirement of the POSEIDON (C-3)-capable
SSBN fleet. During FY-92 seven POSEIDON-capable SSBNs will be
retired, with the remaining fleet to be retired by 1997. While
age and START reduction considerations would have led to the
eventual retirement of the POSEIDON fleet, retiring seven in 1992
represents an appreciable acceleration of the process. By 1993,
the U.S. will have only 23 SSBNs in its strategic fleet, in
contrast to 35 as recently as 1988. This will constitute a reduc-
tion of nearly 2,000 warheads in one year.
Before the end of the decade, all remaining POSEIDON-capable
SSBNs will be retired, leaving a force of only 18 TRIDENT I & II-
capable submarines. This fleet will provide nearly 75 percent of
the ballistic missile warheads allowed under START. Such a
force would, in theory, make the Soviet strategic antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) problem relatively easier, though the Navy is
confident that this portends no problem.
For the future, any further warhead cuts in subsequent START
negotiations will likely require either a new, smaller SSBN or
some way of reducing the warhead loading of 192 on existing OHIO-
class SSBNs--going to fewer than 18 hulls would be unlikely
because of ASW concerns. The smaller submarine, suggested by the
Scowcroft Commission in 1983, seems not to have sparked any
interest in the Navy.
Bombers
Change has also swept the bomber leg of the strategic forces
triad. The 1992 budget reflects the reduction in the planned B-2
buy made by the Major Aircraft Review the previous April from 132
down to 75 planes. In addition, the Bush Administration announced
plans to retire all but about 40 B-52G aircraft from the Air
Force's inventory by 1995, with those remaining aircraft to be
assigned to purely conventional missions.
Thus a total of about 125 B-52G aircraft will be retired
over just a few years. This assumes that Congress will approve
all 75 B-2's that the Administration is seeking, an outcome that
at this writing appears unlikely. If Congress terminates B-2
production below 75, this B-52G retirement decision could be
revisited. The remaining 95 B-52H aircraft are slated to become
pure stand-off cruise missile carriers. All this does not include
the retirement of the 60 FB-lll's from the SAC inventory and the
transfer of some of them to the Tactical Air Command, which had
been planned for several years.
At this writing, the fate of the B-2 is unclear. From a
policy perspective, it is important to note that the debate is
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less strident than past debates on weapons such as the PEACEKEEP-
ER, as the B-2 does not pose a strategic stability threat in the
way that some argue that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
and MX do. For opponents, it is seen mostly as an unwise use of
money. In the same way, B-2 supporters do not, for the most part,
argue that the B-2 is crucial to U.S. survival, and they certain-
ly agree that the cost is high. Accordingly, passions are nowhere
near the levels of the MX debate in the early 1980's. The Air
Force also has said that it will limit the maximum request for
the B-2 it will make in any year tp about $5 billion, which has
the effect of stretching out the B-2 buy. From a political stand-
point, the performance of the F-117 in the Gulf War has improved
the B-2's survival prospects in Congress.
The final resolution of the B-2 debate may well be achieved
the same way it was with the PEACEKEEPER missile in the mid-
1980s: a compromise number will be proposed that both B-2 propo-
nents and opponents dislike but can learn to live with, however
uneasily. It is unclear if 1991 is the year for such a compro-
mise, but it is probably not more than a year or two away at
most. As with MX, this unknown number between 15 and 75 would
then effectively conclude the national debate on the B-2.
A NEW CHAPTER IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSES DEBATE
Since 1972 and the signing of the Antiballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty, strategic defenses have been a minor aspect of U.S.
strategic nuclear policy. Even with President Reagan's announce-
ment of SDI on March 23, 1983, offensive strategic forces have
been the preponderant focus of U.S. policy. The Gulf War and the
role of the PATRIOT missile in defending against Iraq's SCUD
missile attacks appear to have made a significant change in
thinking in some decisionmaking circles on the role of ballistic
missile defense. The end of the Cold War has modified the thrust
and focus of this interest in a direction far different than the
one envisioned in President Reagan's speech.
Previous plans for SDI had focused on a "Phase I" system
capable of intercepting a significant percentage of Soviet war-
heads in an all-out attack. The major element of uncertainty this
would introduce into Soviet attack planning was said to strength-
en deterrence. Since early 1991, SDI's new focus has been
"Global Protection Against Limited Strikes" (GPALS), a defense
against modest accidental or unauthorized Soviet launches or
deliberate launches by Third World states. GPALS echoes, in some-
what modified form, Senator Nunn's call in January, 198814 for
examining the feasibility of an Accidental Launch Protections
System (ALPS). The GPALS system would eventually be less than
half the size of a Phase I system involving about 1,000 BRILLIANT
PEBBLES and about 750 ground based interceptors. The limited
threat it would )e capable of addressing would be up to 200 re-
entry vehicles.1 5
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In a major break with the past, the Senate has called for a
different version of SDI. As expressed in the bill it passed in
August 1991, this version would deploy ground-based interceptors
only at "one or an adequate additional number of [ABM] sites."
The objective would be to provide a thin nationwide defense
against accidental, unauthorized, or Third World missiles, not
too different from the rationale for the Sentinel ABM system
proposed by SECDEF Robert S. McNamara in 1967.
The direction, if not magnitude, of the Senate version of
SDI seems likely to persist in U.S. strategic policy. How far
the U.S. will travel down this road of strategic defense will
depend on three major considerations. First, threat magnitude
and timing. The only Third World Countries with potential ICBM
capability by the turn of the century, based on their space-
launch capabilities, are Israel, India, and Brazil, hardly the
focus of U.S. nuclear nightmares. Concern over unauthorized
Soviet launches, which briefly peaked during the August 1991 coup
attempt, are labeled very low by the Bush Administration itself.
Accidental launches seems worrisome, but credible mechanisms are
difficult to define, given the controls that exist on both sides.
Second, alternate means of attack. The Third World focus of
the Senate plan and GPALS both generally, is on ballistic missile
attack. A variety of non-ballistic missile attack mechanisms
would be unaffected by such missile defenses, including air
attack using presently available civilian aircraft, crude low
technology intercontinental cruise missiles, covert ship-based
delivery, and a welter of smuggling scenarios. Strengthening the
weak U.S. air defense network, not to mention defenses against
covert delivery, would be very costly.
Third, Soviet reaction. The Soviets have traditionally been
hostile to U.S. suggestions for major modifications to the ABM
Treaty. The Soviets have often explicitly linked START and the
ABM Treaty, threatening to abandon START if the Treaty is abro-
gated. In signing START, the Soviets formally noted "[t)his
treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of
compliance with the [ABM] Treaty."
PERSPECTIVES ON THE REVISIONS TO STRATEGIC POLICY
The rise of democracy in the Soviet Union, its spiraling
economic problems, and the unprecedented warming of U.S.-Soviet
relations have revolutionized the strategic nuclear policy envi-
ronment. The continuity of official rhetoric on the need to
maintain a strong nuclear deterrent has masked significant and
ongoing changes in the components of U.S. strategic nuclear
policy. From the review just made, several important characteris-
tics emerge from the changes this policy is undergoing.
One important characteristic is that changes are, in fact,
taking place. While some accuse the White House and Defense
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Department of not realizing the Cold War is over, in fact there
are more strategic policy and program changes taking place than
probably at any time since the early days of the Cold War.
Another theme that resonates throughout is caution. While
the change that has been unleashed in the Soviet Union is proba-
bly irreversible, there is an understandable reluctance to assume
the best about future Soviet behavior when the prospect of the
worst, however remote, remains so dangerous. If U.S.-Soviet
relations ever evolve to a point where they are not unlike U.S.-
British or U.S.-French relations, this caution will probably be
relaxed. Short of this, U.S. strategic policy will probably
demand the retention of a significant nuclear capability as
insurance, if nothing else, against the recrudescence of and
adversarial Soviet government.
In addition, it is clear that as U.S-Soviet relations im-
prove, arms control is no longer the centerpiece of U.S.-Soviet
relations, and thus is assuming a moze subordinate role in
strategic policy. Of all the major components of U.S. strategrc
nuclear policy, the one that has probably been influenced least
by the end of the Cold War and the new national security strategy
is arms control. U.S. policy toward the START talks was little
different in 1991 than it was in 1988, or even before.
START's entry into force will nonetheless have a significant
effect on the strategic nuclear environment. In the area of
strategic stability, one of START's most important features is
its 50 percent reduction in the hard target capable SS-18 ICBMs,
cutting the warhead level from 3,080 to 1,540. Coincidentally,
this is the same level of reduction as the JCS reportedly laid
down as a requirement for Phase I of SDI.
A major and rather startling result of the change in U.S.
strategic policy is the unilateral nature of this change, nowhere
better seen than in the areas of force posture and modernization.
One of the strategic golden rules of the first ten years of the
Reagan-Bush era seemed to be to avoid giving up anything without
getting something for it in Geneva. Many Congressional or grass
roots ideas for strategic force or arms control initiatives were
opposed, usually successfully, by brandishing that argument. That
rule has been quietly, but fully, abandoned with the large number
of unilateral cuts in U.S. force posture and modernization plans.
Whatever the merits of each action, they are individually sur-
prising, and collectively nothing short of a repudiation of
previous declaratory policy.
Strategic modernization will be at a low ebb by historical
standards by the end of the 1990s. SSBN/SLBM modernization will
be completed. B-2 production probably will be completed and
SICBM may be in production in modest numbers. A nagging question
remains unanswered, however. If U.S.-Soviet relations do continue
to improve, what does the future hold for U.S. strategic forces
and policy? We already are seeing the first results in strategic
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modernization, and in the reductions made in alert levels of U.S.
forces.
Future casualties would probably be strategic odernization,
as we would probably retain and patch up our existing forces.
Further major reductions would likely take place, either unilat-
eral on both sides or through negotiations. The end result could
be mod: .t, almost minimum-deterrence levels of a few hundred
strategic nuclear forces. A research base would need to be pre-
served that would allow a buildup in the event that deteriorating
world circumstances dictated. The production capabili'y for
strategic weapons will probably be preserved indirectly, through
comme-cial and conventional force production capability.
A noteworthy feature of the change under way is the consen-
sus that is emerging on the outlines of U.S. strategic nuclear
policy. Most of the shifts can fairly be called centrist in their
political complexion--indeed, their centrist nature is an impor-
tant explanation for the lack of controversy they have engen-
dered, SDI being an important exception. Nonetheless these moves
constitute a virtual revolution in U.S. strategic nuclear policy.
This revolution is still under way, and the outcome will depend
chiefly upon the path of U.S.-Soviet relations in the years
ahead, whose course cannot be foreseen. We are witnessing a
significant shift in strategic priorities toward pragmatism in
modernization, force structure, and targeting policy, and a
subtle shift in emphasis on arms control. These moves point the
way to an emerging consensus on strategic nuclear policy that the
country will need as we navigate the unfamiliar post-Cold War
terrain of the nuclear era.
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A New American Strategy in Asia?
by
Edward A. Olsen1
American national security strategy in Asia is being trans-
formed by larger global trends. American officials, who prudently
rely on the axiom that one must focus on an adversary's armed
capabilities rather than its intentions, now generally conclude
that the dramatic change in the Soviet Union makes it far less
dangerous. The failure of a coup in Moscow by hard-liners in
August 1991, which greatly enhanced domestic reformist tenden-
cies, reinforced reduced American threat perceptions.
This has enormous consequences for U.S.-Asian relations.
Responding to these dramatic geopolitical shifts, the U.S. is
undertaking profound military reassessments. Despite its European
emphasis, the new national security strategy also calls for
preliminary modest changes in the United States' force posture in
the Pacific region's Base Force. It builds upon the Bush adminis-
tration's first incremental reductions in U.S. ground and air
forces in the Western Pacific.
Although many in Europe are apprehensive that the new U.S.
national security strategy, which changes the level of American
forward deployed forces in Europe more than it does in Asia, is a
further step in a U.S. shift toward a Pacific Century-oriented
worldview, there is no evidence to substantiate their fears.
Rather than indicating any new focus on Asia, the relative empha-
sis on the Pacific which is produced by the greater cuts in
Europe reflects two short-term phenomena. First, there is an
unwarranted sense among American military and diplomatic offi-
cials in the Asia-Pacific region that the Cold War's end does not
apply to this region as thoroughly. Despite pockets of Cold War
holdouts in Asia, this is a false overall perception which will
be adjusted as reality sets in. Secondly, and most important for
Europeans to understand, virtually all U.S. decisionmakers are
Atlanticists whose entire working lives have been devoted to
NATO- and European Community (EC)-oriented affairs, focusing on
the Cold War threats from the Soviet Union. They have paid scant
attention to the Asia-Pacific region, treating it as a corollary
of U.S. global policy that can be readily adapted to policy
changes made regarding the European-Soviet region.
In the new U.S. national security strategy Washington has
followed these long-standing priorities again. Actions are being
taken globally that affect the Asia-Pacific area, but not because
of that region. There is no evidence that visions of a "Pacific
Century" motivated any changes in overall U.S. strategy. Only as
the imbalances in the consequent strategy become more evident,
and as more Americans also come to terms with the end of Asia's
Cold War, will the U.S. make adjustments in the Pacific that are
comparable to what already is being done in Europe. This will, of
course, have major consequences for bilateral U.S. security
relations with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines which will
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no longer have a Soviet focus for Americans. Unless a surrogate
threat perception can be discovered, or developed, it seems
unlikely that any of those bilateral relationships can remain
intact.
Once the Soviet threat is removed, or vastly reduced, what
alternative threat remains? No imminent threat looms across the
region in the 1990s, except a common regional perception that
North American and European free trade zones may exclude Asian
products and pose a politico-economic "threat" to Asians. Beyond
that, as the U.S. deals with Asian allies Americans are likely to
discover that there is no external threat to the Philippines,
Koreans see the Japanese as their largest potential foreign
threat, and the Japanese see potential threats from a unified
Korean state and from Russians (as distinct from "Soviets"),
neither of which are dependent upon the existence of the Cold
War.
Many Asian states also are apprehensive about China's long-
term ambitions and wonder about the wisdom of American support
for a stronger China. Similarly, many Asians are concerned about
Japan's long term ability to convert its economic influence into
political and military power and, as a corollary, about the
United States' ability to control that process. Furthermore,
Asians are increasingly concerned about India's strategic ambi-
tions and about signs of intra-Asian arms races. For Americans,
however, the most important point about these security issues is
that they are not part of the Cold War. Nonetheless, rather than
dwell on these post-Cold War circumstances, most Asians prefer to
keep the focus on the remnants of a Russian threat which is
easier to sell to Americans. In this context, any attempt to
perpetuate U.S. bilateral security treaties in the Pacific after
the region's version of the Cold War eventually is put to rest,
will require Americans to face a far more difficult challenge
than they do in Europe as they try to redefine for domestic U.S.
consumption why remaining security commitments should be kept
intact.
ASIAN REACTIONS
Asia has reacted cautiously and prudently to the modest
changes for U.S. forces in the Pacific announced by the Bush
administration in 1990-91. There is no sign that any Asian coun-
try fully appreciates how those changes are linked to the larger
strategic shift being contemplated. There is virtually no indica-
tion that Asian defense specialists are aware that the new U.S.
national security 5trategy has any direct relevance for their
part of the world. It is universally seen as a U.S.-USSR and
NATO-oriented issue. Regular reassurances to Asia by senior U.S.
State and Defense Department officials, that the U.S. wilI remain
a constant and reliable factor in their security system, appar-
ently have been accepted at face value. If there are serious
doubts, and there probably are--given past U.S. inconsistencies
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that alarmed Asians--they are not being expressed. Asians seem to
prefer to let "sleeping (American] dogs lie." Rather than ask
profound questions whose adverse answers they suspect are entire-
ly predictable, and which they do not want to hear, Asians are
not raising the issue.
Compounding this sense of caution and guarded confidence
that the U.S. will not make truly major revisions to its post-
Cold War strategy as it applies to them, Asians tend to see the
U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf War as a clear signal
that Americans will not change their behavior. They are relieved
by the willingness of the U.S., its leaders and masses, to per-
petuate President Kennedy's readiness to "pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to
assure the survival and the success of liberty." This eagerness
to be the leader, even at a high cost, reassures Asians greatly.
It also surprises them greatly because they also see the U.S. as
a superpower with economic feet of clay.
In short, Asians--even as they praise the U.S. and act as
cheerleaders, and sometimes bankers, for the American
cause--wonder how long such disproportionate arrangements can
last. They fear the U.S. will fall victim to the daunting prob-
lems outlined by another Kennedy--Paul Kennedy of Yale.4 So, even
as Asians welcome what the U.S. says and hope that nothing funda-
mental will change in U.S. national security strategy for the
Pacific, they also sense that there will be changes beyond the
ability of Americans to control. Nonetheless, they do not yet
connect this dynamic process to the evolving new U.S. strategy's
relevance for Asia.
Instead, Asians are preoccupied by serious and growing
frictions in U.S.-Asian economic relations. These are prominent
in U.S. relations with Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and--to
a lesser extent--various states in Southeast Asia. They loom far
larger to Asia than contemporary concerns over military affairs.
The best evidence of this is the cool Asian--especially
Japanese--responses to U.S. pressures for coalition assistance
during the Persian Gulf crisis. No prominent leader of a major
state in Asia viewed that crisis from a perspective even approxi-
mating Washington's position. Cooperation was grudging at best.
Japan eventually rallied around the cause, but only under
political duress. South Korea helped out, too, but minimally,
belatedly, and with little enthusiasm. The Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) did virtually nothing to help the DESERT STORM cause,
and its arms sales contributed to the problem. Southeast Asians
were asked to do nothing, and they were more than happy to
oblige. Asian leaders--notably in Japan--resented the notion
that American leaders would arrogate to themselves the right to
make decisions and take actions in the name of the greater good
of a broadly defined western world (including the advanced econo-
mies of Asia).
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Still more grating was that, having taken these steps,
Washington had the gall to twist their arms in pursuit of burden-
sharing funds, especially Japanese yen. None of this sat well
with Asian leaders, who generally empathized with the reluctant
Japanese. That some responded as forthcomingly as they did and,
in the Japanese case, a double digit $ billion range, had little
relevance to any sense that they were genuine partners with the
U.S. in a global coalition against distant aggression. Overwhelm-
ingly, Asians cooperated rhetorically and financially, albeit
reluctantly, to keep Americans off their backs and to help de-
flect further U.S. criticism of Asian trade practices. In effect,
Asians were engaging in political and economic deterrenc% versus
the U.S., postponing a while longer the day of reckoning.
This behavior points out clearly the ways in which Asians
are preoccupied by their tense economic relations with the U.S.
Their major goals are to placate Americans, to keep tensions
manageable, and to keep frictions from so frustrating Americans
that the U.S. could react adversely by retaliating through a
trade war or reducing its security commitments in Asia. These
would, in turn, compel Asians to deal autonomously and at much
higher cost with their own defenses. This behavior exemplifies
the ways in which most Asians hew to a broader and self-centered
interpretation of their national security than Americans do
regarding the U.S. It also highlights why most Asians were
relieved that the burdensharing spasm during the Persian Gulf
crisis was focused almost exclusively on U.S.-Japan ties, thereby
letting most Asians (especially Chinese and Koreans, who were no
more enthusiastic than the Japanese) off the hook.
On balance, U.S. promises of strategic continuity in Asia,
apparent American willingness to police the Asia-Pacific region
despite disavowals of any desire to play the role, American
hubris over unipolar victory in the Cold War, and a perverse
underlying sense that the United States' "feet of clay" gives
Asia's most advanced states a quiet long term advantage that has
not yet dawned on many Americans, collectively please Asians.
They feel comfortable that events are going their way, that the
U.S. will preserve the essential status quo for the next several
years, and that enough remnants of the Cold War persist in Asia,
despite U.S. and Soviet efforts to defuse them, to keep the U.S.
from applying any new strategy to Asia. Asians tend to feel that
their region will not, and should not, be influenced as much as
Europe by a new post-Cold War world order. This, in turn, raises
serious questions about how Americans might deal with Asians in
this context.
END OF ASIA'S COLD WAR
The reason more drastic changes in this theater have not
been made, by applying the new national security strategy as
vigorously in Asia as in Europe, is that the Cold War has not
completely ended in Asia. Some observers, notably former Soviet
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Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze,6 feel that Asia's Cold War
is fully over. American officials are, of course, well aware that
the global Cold War is over, but their actions regarding Asia
suggest lingering ambiguity.
Statements from the center of the U.S. Government indicate
that key officials want to apply post-Cold War thinking to Asia.
Similarly, examples in 1990, such as the Department of Defense
"East Asian Strategic Initiative" and the "President's Report (to
the Congress] of the U.S. Military Presence in East Asia," indi-
cate that they are putting such thought into action. Neverthe-
less, all these examples of forward thinking retain an emphasis
on residual Cold War era confrontation that are not cited as
instances of strategic contingencies which the U.S. must be
prepared to address.
Furthermore, despite such marginal progress in a lingering
Cold War milieu, many American officials on the scene in Asia are
much less flexible and responsive to change. In part, this gap
may simply be bureaucratic inertia. It seems more purposeful,
however, in that institutional conservatism--especially within
the U.S. Armed Forces--leads many in the field to drag their
heels in adjusting to new circumstances.
To be blunt, there is a widespread view in the field and at
sea that senior Pentagon and civilian agency officials are being
precipitous in their adaptation to global geopolitical change.
As a consequence, there is a tangible sentiment, expressed in
private, that the people in the field are best served by waiting
out the latest cycle of policy innovators. In short, they have
adopted an attitude that "this, too, shall pass." All signs
indicate that they are wrong, but the net result is sluggish
acceptance of the impact upon Asia of the end of the global Cold
War.
Has Asia's Cold War ended? To answer that fundamental ques-
tion, upon which much of a still evolving U.S. national security
strategy will be based, requires that Americans, Asians, and
Russians agree about what the "Asian Cold War" really is and the
nature of remaining threats. Though this may seem self-evident,
it is not. There are two fundamental choices. One can assume
remnants of Asia's Cold War are so persistent that the new na-
tional security strategy need not be applied as vigorously as it
will be in Europe (which is the U.S. assumption because U.S.
forces and commands in the Asia-Pacific region are changing far
less than in the Euro-Atlantic region) or one can demonstrate why
it should be applied to this region as well because its version
of the Cold War either has ended or will soon end. To make the
latter case requires that the "end" of Asia's Cold War also be
proven.
To sustain this proposition, it must be recognized that
Asia's Cold War has always differed from Europe's. In Europe,
where the U.S. and its Cold War allies shared common threat per-
ceptions, there was one front line, one prime adversary, one ring
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of satellites in orbit around the Soviet center, and a joint
security institution--NATO--through which the Cold War was waged.
Asia possessed none of these. Its version of the Cold War was
qualitatively different. Its Cold War threat perceptions have
been extraordinarily diverse. No two states associated with the
U.S. saw the Soviet adversary in the same light. Most Asian
participants in the Cold War lacked a real front line or the
strategic mentality such a barrier fosters. Korea's demilitarized
zone (DMZ)-arrayed deterrence stalemate is the clearest excep-
tion. Vietnam was a partial exception, though the front line in
its war with tha U.S. was amorphous. Hence, none of Asia's Cold
Warriors perceived the other's equivalent of a front line in a
manner suggesting a shared strategic vision.
The relatively weak indigenous ideological quotient of
Asia's Cold War, when coupled with a dual Soviet and Chinese
focus of communist power, despite occasional shrill ideological
rhetoric between Asia's divided nations, diluted the sense of "us
versus them." Asia never developed cohesive rival ideological
blocs comparable to those in Europe. The Sino-Soviet split fur-
ther obscured the alienation regarding "them." Which them? Which
us? The same phenomena muddied the notion of proxy or surrogate
states within an adversary's bloc. Whom did Hanoi and Pyongyang
heed? Conversely, whom did Seoul, Taipei, or Saigon heed? When
were either side's client states acting autonomously?
Because the villains in Asia's Cold War were, unlike in
Europe, never as precise or cohesive an entity to the defenders
of freedom, the U.S. and its allies could never construct the
equivalent of NATO in the Western Pacific, though some advocated
such an institution. The difficulty was compounded by the system-
ic asymmetry of Asia's Cold War camps. Again, unlike Europe,
where each side possessed rough parity in ground and naval
forces, in the Asia-Pacific region the U.S. and most of its
friends stressed mobile maritime-based power, embodied by the
U.S. Seventh Fleet, whereas the Soviet Union, PRC, and states
linked to them were overwhelmingly continental powers. In short,
there were enormous strategic differences between Europe's Cold
War and the version that Asia experienced.
Were it not for the United States' presence in the Asia-
Pacific region, transferring U.S.-Soviet tensions to the Soviet
Union's eastern flank, it is doubtful that the area would have
become a substantial participant in the Cold War. This contrasts
with Europe, where Americans and their European allies shared a
sense of common risk and destiny. In Asia the U.S. was the cen-
tral vehicle for transmitting Cold War tensions with the Soviet
Union to the region through various bilateral treaties and less
formal relations.
Simultaneously, American anti-communist ideology was the
glue bonding those bilateral ties into a loose network, with the
U.S. the nexus connecting disparate elements rather than as the
leader of a common cause. Furthermore, U.S.-Soviet frictions
superimposed a layer of global hostility upon existing Asian
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relations, intensifying some, obscuring others, and camouflaging
still others. While some anti-communist elements in postwar Asia
enthusiastically rallied around the U.S. cause, many phenomena in
Asia's Cold War did not emerge from that "war" but had a life of
their own.
Vivid examples of these are found in Japan-Soviet relations.
Disputes over the so-called Northern Territories, several fishery
zones, and a variety of economic issues may share a Cold War
veneer that remains essentially in act, despite President Gorba-
chev's April 1991 visit to Japan, but they would have existed
had the Cold War never developed. Japanese concerns about Soviet
potentials for aggression probably would also have emerged with-
out a Cold War. More likely, they would have been confrontational
for Japan because it would not have enjoyed a defense buffer
provided by the U.S. It was U.S.-Soviet hostility that wrapped
the Cold War around these events, which actually stem from long-
standing Russo-Japanese cross-national relations.
Comparable examples of national apprehensions becoming
entangled in the Cold War are reflected in Sino-Japanese, Japan-
North Korean, Southeast Asian-Chinese, and Indo-Pakistani animos-
ities. Regional concerns about intimidation by the once ascendant
Soviet empire did not differ greatly from earlier Czarist aggres-
sion. Those concerns would have developed had the Cold War never
occurred. Other shaky examples of perceived Cold Warrior behavior
in Asia include the patent ambiguity of North Korea and Vietnam
as proxies for either of their giant communist backers. Sometimes
they appeared to act as client states, but often they went their
own way. One could legitimately ask whether their proxydom was
more in the eye of American beholders than controlled by Ameri-
ca's adversaries in the Cold War.
In Asia the indigenous stronghold of the Cold War was the
Korean peninsula. Its division, destruction in war, and cultiva-
tion as rival armed camps are Asia's clearest (though not pre-
cise) parallels to the European Cold War. Unlike much of Asia,
Korea was divided by an unambiguous military front line and the
divided nation was riven by an imported ideological rivalry which
established deep roots. Korea was part of the Cold War's birth,
matured with that era, and now may be on the verge of ending its
conflict along with the reduction in tension in the global Cold
War.
Though many point to contemporary Korea as an example of the
Cold War's intractability in Asia, and a prime reason why the new
U.S. national security itrategy should not be applied as thor-
oughly throughout Asia, the changing situation in Korea illus-
trates how Asia's most extreme example of the Cold War also is
thawing. Dramatic recent improvements in South Korean relations
with the Soviet Union and China rank alongside the importance of
changes in Eastern Europe. Progress in Japan-North Korea rela-
tions also help to reduce tensions. Even U.S.-North Korean rela-
tions are mellowing, although impeded by American concerns about
International Atomic Energy Agency oversight of possible North
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Korean nuclear capabilities. If Korea's extreme version of the
Cold War can be resolved over the next few years, a real possi-
bility now that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union at long last
stand ready to help, and because Pyongyang's external support has
been damaged by the upheaval in the Soviet Union, then all else
in the Asian Cold War also should be manageable.
As the major players seek to reduce Cold War tensions in
Asia, it is vital for them to recognize what is, and what is not,
meant by "The Cold War." Those cross-national tensions which stem
from longstanding intra-Asian relations must be distinguished
from their Cold War trappings. Washington and Moscow must disas-
sociate the vestiges of their Cold War policies from those earli-
er contexts which, throughout the Cold War years, possessed a
vitality ensuring that they would have developed in any event.
Neither Washington nor Moscow should permit themselves to be
trapped by remnants of Cold War institutions, drift with the
momentum of anachronistic Cold War policies, be entangled by the
inertia of stale Cold War thinking, or be misled by the ghosts of
Cold War animosities. Most of Asia's remaining pockets of the
Cold War between the U.S. and whatever finally replaces the
Soviet Union can be rapidly resolved as "Cold War" phenomena if
Washington and Moscow devote sufficient attention to them. Once
this is done, the new U.S. national security strategy may be
applied as thoroughly to Asia as it is to Europe.
Much can be removed from the lingering Cold War environment
in Asia by simply agreeing that many of Asia's assumed Cold War
problems never warranted that description. Many can be redefined
out of existence, as the U.S. and PRC did with the Taiwan issue.
It was effectively removed from the list of Cold War hot spots
where it once seemed so prominent and relegated to an intra-China
concern. The other problems will not disappear, of course, any
more than Taiwan's place within China did as a regional issue.
Yet they too can legitimately be removed from a Cold War milieu
and returned to their rightful location, into a traditional
cross-national geopolitical context.
It is no longer necessary to treat outstanding Russo-Japa-
nese, Sino-Japanese, Japan-Korea, Indo-Pakistani, or various
Chinese-Southeast Asian disputes as lingering parts of the Cold
War. Neither are any intra-national problems necessarily linked
to the Cold War. Let these issues stand alone and be dealt with
by the regional parties concerned. Similarly, Washington and
Moscow no longer need perceive hostile third states as proxies.
Moreover, even their lingering hostility should be far more
manageable by Washington, Moscow, and regional actors if totally
removed from the Cold War environment. Should Washington and
Moscow choose, they could be much less sensitive to remaining ill
will from far-flung countries, since that animosity would be
redefined out of the Cold War context.
Consequently, much of Asia's remaining Cold War can be
disposed of quickly by redefining the areal terms of reference.
If the Cold War's antagonists agree that neither is any longer a
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danger to each other in Asia, the hoary axiom about capabilities
versus intentions will not sustain remnants of the Cold War in
Asia either. Too many Americans are reluctant to make that as-
sumption. Nonetheless it is warranted because the severely weak-
ened Soviet economy and troubled political system and those of
its republics, which allows the U.S. to revise sharply downward
any expectation of an attack in Europe, cannot sustain a more
effective military threat in far away Asia.
The rapidly changing Soviet system, behind its Asian armed
capabilities, is the same deteriorating and decrepit one behind
its European capabilities. Moreover, in the Far East it must
operate at the end of vulnerable, tenuous logistical supply
lines, thereby diminishing its capabilities further. It is diffi-
cult to understand the continuing American anxiety about Soviet
military strength in the Pacific region, especially in the form
of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, or why the Soviet Union should be
considered any more dangerous in Asia than in Europe. Even if, in
a worst case situation, one assumes the Soviet or Russian mili-
tary leaders in Asia were out of Moscow's control, they would
still be hobbled by their disastrous economy and cut off from its
European heart. Any such "worst case" scenario must be considered
a remote prospect in the wake of the failed coup of August 1991
and the dramatic changes which followed it.
Coupling this objective reality with the improved expressed
intentions of current leaders in Moscow, the prospects for com-
pletely ending Asia's Cold War must be assessed positively. It is
time the U.S. and Soviet Union, or its successor, redefine the
Asian Cold War out of existence. This will allow American defense
officials to apply the new U.S. national security strategy to
both Europe and Asia with equal thoroughness and enthusiasm.
TROUBLING ISSUES
Were the Cold War's antagonists to take these positive
steps, however, two areas still would loom as particularly trou-
blesome. One is Korea, where a genuine Stalinist relic of the
Cold War persists. The progress toward Korean tension reduction
made so far should be pursued, if possible. Just as in the super-
power Cold War, the capabilities versus intentions calculations
in Korea are now changing enough to further reduce tensions.
Since the singular parallels in Korea with Europe's Cold War
are genuine there is reason to hope that Europe's precedents,
especially German unification and nuclear arms control, and the
good will of Washington and Moscow, can be influential in Korea.
Every effort should be made toward that end. If it works, all
concerned can rejoice and welcome a stable, peaceful, and perhaps
unified Korea to the post-Cold War era. There is, however, a real
possibility that the stubborn Korean Cold War may prove uniquely
resistant to change because of the uncompromising nature of the
leadership in both Seoul and Pyongyang. Each seems unwilling to
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make genuine concessions to the other that have characterized
recent Washington-Moscow relations.
If tensions persist, Washington and Moscow confront a
difficult choice. Should they allow one isolated remnant of the
Cold War to entangle them indefinitely? Or should they jointly
decide to reduce their shared risk by leaving the Korean Cold War
to be resolved by the two Koreas? This would be unlikely today
because of persistent American assumptions that events in Korea
will affect adjoining states with serious consequences for the
remaining Cold War atmospherics in Asia.
If, however, Asian regional security concerns are effective-
ly removed from that anachronistic context by Washington and
Moscow disassociating themselves, then Korea's ability to disrupt
its neighbors' peace and stability--though no less real for
regional states--is no longer a quasi-Cold War vital issue. The
Korean Cold War can legitimately be left in a vacuum for them to
resolve, as a civil war stalemated by its own entrenched bipolar
deterrence. Their success or failure would no longer bear on U.S.
or Soviet/Russian vital interests vis-a-vis each other. Korean
tensions, as a regional issue, could then revert to priority
concerns for the peninsula's Asian neighbors, China and Japan.
That Korea is, and probably always will be, a crucial coun-
try for China and Japan (an because of that for the Soviet Union
and Russian Republic, too), does not necessarily mean the U.S.
must continue to assign as high a priority to Korean affairs as
it received during the Cold War. This emphatically does not mean
that Americans should be cavalier about Korea's fate. The U.S.
has major interests there and a moral obligation built up over
many years, but neither of those factors warrant perpetuating
Cold War-era security commitments if they damage larger U.S.
national interests. This may seem a cold hearted resolution for
Korea, but it is eminently realistic for Washington and Moscow as
they seek to spread the influence of the post-Cold War era.
Knowing that Washington and Moscow enjoy this viable option
should add to Seoul's and Pyongyang's incentives to make genuine
compromises to end the Korean Cold War rapidly before the Korean
peninsula has lost its strategic relevance to the superpowers.
Either way, Korea's stubborn perpetuation of the Cold War
could, and should, be dealt with. Much less manageable is the
second problem. There will remain an overarching disparity be-
tween Asia and the symmetry of U.S.-Soviet tension reduction in
the Atlantic-European realm, where comparable cuts can be negoti-
ated on both sides of their armed balance. The differences in
continental versus maritime power are not so glaring there and
can be easily accommodated. Naval power can remain in rough
parity, while ground-based forces are cut significantly. In the
Asia-Pacific region, however, trade-offs are extraordinarily
difficult between Soviet and Russian continental power and U.S.
maritime power. 9
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This is evident globally is the U.S. reluctance to negotiate
significant naval arms control and in its new national security
strategy which will allow large ground-based armed forces to be
demobilized or put in reserves to await unknown contingencies. In
part, this reflects the inherent personnel and industrial diffi-
culties in reconstituting naval forces which have been demobi-
lized or mothballed, even with the two year advance warning time
the new national security strategy assumes for reconstituting
American capabilities against a revived threat from the Soviet
Union. Equally important to the U.S., however, is the justifiable
perception that it remains more dependent upon maritime power in
a sharply reduced threat environment than any future major adver-
sary, including a revitalized Soviet threat.
So, even as the Cold War is terminated worldwide, the major
powers must simultaneously agree upon mutual acceptance of dif-
fering military (ground and air forces) versus naval emphases in
how to preserve their post-Cold War national security. In other
words, the existence of large Soviet or Russian gro,nd-based
armed forces in Asia should be considered by American's to be
"natural" and a quid pro quo for Moscow's acceptance of large
U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. Each's disproportionate scale
compared to the other's resources in that defense sector should
be accepted as a routine expression of the legitimate national
security establishment of a continental power versus a maritime
power. This step, which should be implemented by a Pacific
version of the U.S.-USSR Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
(MBFR) talks in Europe, is essential to end Asia's Cold War
completely and allow smooth implementation of the new U.S. na-
tional security strategy.
Examples of Asian circumstances that might be influenced by
the new U.S. national security strategy and, in turn, might
influence that strategy, are numerous. When asked about the
likelihood of war in the wake of the reduced Soviet threat,
General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, told the WashinQton Post "Haven't the foggiest. I don't
know. That's the whole point. We don't know like we used to
know. 11 American thoughts about hypothetical contingencies for
which U.S. forces should be prepared are outlined in the 1991
Joint Military Net Assessment. The major contingency it envisions
in Asia concerns Korea. This contingency and those ot lesser
probability, are to be handled by existing U.S. forces in the
region, prepositioned equipment available to mobile forces, and
with the cooperation of allies in the region. All these elements
are products of the Cold War years, made relatively less certain
and reliable by the post-Cold War era.
If the U.S. and Soviet Union, or its successor, actually
redefined the Asian Cold War out of existence, sore rationales
for U.S. and allied forces being located where they are in the
Pacific region, and their existing tasks, would be dissipated.
Furthermore, efforts at arms control and tension reduction within
Asia (i.e., between the two Koreas and China-Taiwan) also could
change the ground rules. Equally important, the expectations of
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Asian friends and allies about how they might be expected to
cooperate with the U.S. (never a dependable variable even at the
height of the Cold War) is made more uncertain by the rapidly
changing international environment. As a consequence, future
American decisions about force structure, deployments, basing
requirements, and command arrangements should be predicated on
evolutionary reality in the Asia-Pacific region--not on anachro-
nistic or static perceptions. American officials clearly think
they are moving in that direction now, but--to the extent that
they are--they are being hampered by remnants of the Cold War and
foot dragging by Americans -n the scene in Asia.
Certain issues will be relatively narrow in their focus on
the American defense bureaucracy such as the size and scope of a
revamped U.S. Pacific Command, or--even more narrowly--how the
unique U.S. Army command linkages from Korea to Washington will
be adapted to the future shape of the Pacific Command. Broader
issues such as the utility and availability of bases in the
Philippines, Korea, and Japan, the nature of binational commands
such as the Combined Forces Command in Korea, the willingness of
Asian nationalists to yield to American strategic desires, and
the growth of indigenous military power centers in Asia (i.e.,
China, Japan, and India) that might partially displace U.S.
military power, collectively will shape whatever post-Cold War
Asia that evolves from assertive U.S. and Soviet efforts to end
completely Asia's Cold War. Perhaps most important, these factors
will raise serious questions about the long-term viability of
existing U.S. security treaties in the region. The U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, in particular, will be subjected to pressure to
adapt to the new circumstances.
POST-COLD WAR PROSPECTS
The U.S. and the Soviet Union must also mesh this still
uncertain process with the reality that the end of Asia's Cold
War will remove the veneer of superpower constraints on long-
standing underlying regional tensions, as happened in Europe.
Removal of the geopolitical cork from the Asian strategic bottle
may be more acute than comparable European developments because
Asia's internal differences throughout the postwar period have
remained more diverse than Europe's. Furthermore, if Europeans
are anxious about adjusting to the U.S. strategic approach to
their part of the world, and are nervously trying to discourage
Americans from reducing their armed presence in Europe below the
two divisions to be retained within NATO, one can imagine the
consternation Asian leaders will experience over the next few
years if the new national security strategy's impact is felt as
acutely in the Pacific as in Europe.
The post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region will be both more
complex strategically and less well positioned than Europe to
foster a political surrogate for former military institutions.
The lack of a NATO-like structure in the Asia-Pacific area pro-
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hibits the relatively simple conversion process envisaged by
Europeans. This difference between the regions is compounded by
the momentum toward enhanced EC unity after 1992, which may
eventually absorb Eastern Europe and Russia. This would mitigate
the underlying European tensions exposed by the removal of NATO-
Warsaw Pact constraints. The Asianization of Asia's regional
security likely to emerge in its post-Cold War era holds little
promise of unity of purpose or shared aspirations.
On balance, however, the resurfacing of endemic regional
tensions in Asia may be inevitable and ultimately healthy. Its
prospect is no reason to perpetuate an artificial Cold War envi-
ronment to prevent unleashing repressed dynamics. The argument
which some Americans make, that the U.S. must remain as a stabi-
lizing force to prevent excessively powerful Asian states from
disrupting the equilibrium, is a relic of the Cold War. There is
no need for the U.S. to be a policeman for the region, self-
appointed or elected by default. Asian-Pacific dynamics should be
unleashed to be dealt with by regional actors.
As this occurs, moreover, all concerned--but especially the
U.S. and whatever remains of the Soviet Union--should reconsider
whether Cold War era alliances, overtaken by events, still make
sense for post-Cold War states. They could be retained intact if
Washington or Moscow want to maintain a commitment to a given
Asian country to defend it against its aggressive neighbors, for
reasons that have nothing to do with the Cold War motives which
led to the original commitments. Those motives were made obsoles-
cent by the end of the superpower Cold War and by the resurfacing
of regional tensions among states capable of dealing with each
other without external assistance.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union will be free to retain exist-
ing bilateral security relationships in the region, if they can
devise political rationales palatable to their respective pub-
lics. Similarly, each may wish to play a stabilizing role in the
region's security. American officials often speak of doing H in
the form of a so-called "balance wheel" for Asian security. In
the American case, pursuing this option is likely to be rough
where Asian economic power and political nationalism are on the
rise.
In the post-Cold War era there are substantial reasons why
such increasingly anachronistic bilateral and regional arrange-
ments should be reconsidered by American and Soviet/Russian
decisionmakers. Applying the new U.S. national security strategy
to the Asian-Pacific region as thoroughly as it is to Europe
would facilitate such reappraisals, based on post-Cold War U.S.
interests in the area. This does not imply that either the U.S.
or the Soviet Union/Russian Republic are likely soon to forego
their status as Pacific powers. American leaders note frequently
that the U.S. intends to maintain a presence in Pacific affairs
regardless of the Soviet Union's role. The same view is as legit-
imately expressed by Soviet and Russian leaders.
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Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or the Russian Republic,
are Pacific states with valid national interests in the region
and are likely to remain major factors long after the Asian Cold
War has utterly melted. If the total dissolution of the Soviet
Union actually occurs, the Russian Republic would remain as a key
actor in Pacific security affairs. However, both countries are
likely to be sharply constrained post-Cold War powers in a
dramatically altered strategic context. Their adjustment to the
new context promises significant changes in the ways they pursue
their interests, with greater emphasis on economic issues than on
the military issues which dominated the Cold War years. As this
unfolds throughout the 1990s, Asia, too, must adjust to, and help
shape, the new world order.
In this context the new U.S. strategic approach can, and
should, be as vigorously applied to Asia as to Europe. Asia like
Europe epitomizes the new security environment that the revamped
American national security strategy is designed to address: a
dramatically diminished Soviet/Russian threat; far less prominent
regional military threats which economically powerful local
allies are competent to handle despite minimal or no U.S. assist-
ance; and--most important--growing regional economic "threats"
which are a direct challenge to post-Cold War U.S. national
interests. Consequently, applying the new U.S. national security
strategy to Asia as thoroughly as it is being applied to Europe
should not be avoided by Americans for archaic, Cold War vintage
reasons. Though Asian security partners of the U.S. are no more
likely than its European partners to welcome the dramatic shift
in American strategic priorities, that should not deter Americans
from applying the new national security strategy to both major
regions in a spirit of parity. It is time to apply the new na-
tional security strategy universally, and move on to a more
innovative U.S. policy for Asia that is capable of redressing the
many economic issues which confront Americans in the region.
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U.S. Forces in Europe: The Search for a Mission
by
Jan S. Breemer1
For over 40 years protecting Western Europe against Soviet
aggression has been the central preoccupation of American defense
planners. Conversely, America's NATO allies have long come to
regard their transatlantic bargain, and especially the basing on
their soil of several hundred thousand U.S. troops, as an essen-
tial prerequisite for Continental security. Rarely questioned
have been the propositions that (a) NATO, that is to say, a U.S.-
led NATO should be the cornerstone of West European security and
defense planning, and that (b) American leadership would continue
to be underwritten by large-scale troop deployments on and about
the European Continent.
Within the span of two years, both propositions have lost
their sanctity. It has already become evident that, overseas at
least, the impact of the U.S. new national security strategy is
being felt most acutely in Europe, especially with respect to the
future political and institutional character of the transatlantic
bargain and the attendant role of U.S. military forces on the
Continent.
This chapter examines the implications for U.S. forces in
Europe of the Administration's avowed goal to re-define the
country's military-strategic planning priorities away from the
old scenario of a Europe-centered global war with the Soviet
Union, and to instead towards regional crisis response and
presence. Two particular implications are discussed: first, the
certainty of a much reduced U.S. military presence within the
next five years, and secondly, the need for a radical review of
the political and military purposes that a residual American
military presence can be expected to play in the new and evident-
ly post-Soviet Europe.
A QUESTION OF NUMBERS
President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, remarked in 1986 that, "there is no sFecial magic to
any particular number of U.S. troops in Europe." From a purely
military point of view, he was no doubt correct. But then the
particular size of the U.S. military presence in Europe has never
been dominated by military calculations alone. For the Europeans,
NATO meant American protection, and the presence of U.S. divi-
sions was the premium that guaranteed Europe's transatlantic
insurance policy.
Today, all bets are off. Collectively and individually the
NATO members are agreed that a significant North American mili-
tary presence remains necessary, but few Allied officials, on
either side of the Atlantic, are willing to predict what the size
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of its U.S. component will look like at the end of this century.
Equally uncertain, politically and militarily, is the future of
the roles and missions that should be expected of residual U.S.
forces on the Continent.
Two key NATO commanders were reported to have advocated
roughly the same residual force levels. General (GEN) Crosbie E.
Saint, the U.S. Army commander in Europe, reportedly told U.S.
officials that he needed a minimum of 80,000 Army troops.3 Count-
ing 20,000 Air Force personnel, this would add up to a deployment
of some 100,000. Meanwhile, the Chairman of NATO's Military
Committee, German GEN Wolfgang Altenburg, let it be known that he
envisaged a future U.S. force level in the central region as low
as 50,000.4
The Alliance's Supreme Commander in Europe (SACEUR), GEN
John R. Galvin, USA, adamantly rejected Altenburg's forecast. He
thought that the U.S. would keep some 150,000 troops in Europe,
including a full U.S. corps as well as the Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean, 20,000 navy personnel ashore and several Air Force
wings.
There remains considerable speculation that the ultimate
number will be considerably smaller in fact. For example, the
German Welt am Sonntag claimed, in April 1991, that it had re-
ceived information that the U.S. Army wants to reduce its German-
based forces to 70,000 by 1995. The U.S. Air Force, the magazine
reported, would probably come down to 5,000.6 At the time of this
writing, the Administration remained officially committed to a
1995 force level of no fewer than about 150,000 troops, mostly
organized in two Army divisions, three Air Force tactical wings,
and the Sixth Fleet.
A QUESTION OF PURPOSE
The uncertainty on both sides of the Atlantic about the
numerical future of U.S. forces in Europe is symptomatic of a
deep seated dilemma, the question of roles and missions, espe-
cially military roles and missions. The American (and NATO-wide)
quandary has been neatly summed up in a quote attributed to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), GEN Colin L. Powell,
USA: "Toda we do not even have the luxury of a plannable threat
any more." As long as the Soviet Union projected a plannable
threat, Allied deliberations on national force contributions had
at least the benefit of an agreed strategic concept.
The strategic concept that guided NATO force requirements
since December 1967 is the MC 14/3 document, better known as
Flexible Response. MC 14/3 became a lame duck strategy on July 6,
1990 and the announcement by NATO's heads of state that the
Alliance would "prepare a new Allied strategy moving away from
'forward defence,' where appropriate, towards a reduced forward
presence and modifying 'flexible response' to reflect a reduced
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reliance on nuclear weapons. ''8 Tasked with formulating a succes-
sor strategy to Flexible Response (presumably to be designated
MC14/4) was a newly-created Strategic Review Group, drawn from
NATO's International Staff. At the same time the Military Commit-
tee was given the responsibility for elaborating new force plans
for implementation of the new strategy.
The logical force planning process directs that the Military
Committee's recommendations with respect to the kinds and numbers
of forces that NATO will need in the future await the guidance of
the new Allied Strategic Concept. Actually, the opposite sequence
of events has occurred. The Alliance has been unable to agree on
such key issues as nuclear policy, how to address out-of-area
risks, and burden-sharing between NATO and a European defense
identity. Confronted at the same time with an accelerating trend
toward national force planning (meaning force reductions), the
Alliance was compelled to agree on a new force structure while
merely noting "with satisfaction that substantial progress has
been made,, n the development of the new Alliance Strategic Con-
cept. .
With impeccable Gallic logic, French Foreign Minister Roland
Dumas could complain that the Allied ministerial decision to
create a multinational Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) lacked clear
political or strategic reasoning: "Logic would require that one
first define the political objectives, then that one work out the
strategy, before deciding on force structures," h said. Instead,
he went on, "NATO has chosen the opposite path.1Il
NATO's decision to let force restructuring lead the adoption
of an agreed strategic concept signifies, of course, that uncer-
tain future military roles and missions is not peculiar to U.S.
forces alone but is a NATO-wide dilemma. Yet, it is true that the
question of a raison d'etre has particular urgency for the future
of U.S. forces on the Continent. The reason for this is simple:
being Europe's principal military outsider, the U.S. cannot rest
its claim for keeping forces on the Continent on the minimalist
argument that thpv betoken territorial integrity and national
independence.
This is not to say that Europeans and Americans alike have
found difficulty with advancing a plethora of political and
military rationales for safeguarding a significant U.S.troop
presence. Indeed, a skeptic might point out that the very diver-
sity of the menu of political and military purposes that has been
proposed is a tell-tale sign of confusion and lack of conviction.
Be that as it may, the long list of objectives that have been
proffered in the past two years or so in defense of keeping the
Americans in looks something like this. Collectively, they are
the potion that their proponents insist will recover the magical
quality that ensured the longevity of America's six-division
presence during the years of the Cold War.
Stability, confidence, and influence have become the most
frequently mentioned political reasons for keeping U.S. forces as
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a permanent fixture of Europe's military landscape. This theme
holds that the real contribution of America's physical presence
has been to glue together the European community. To this day,
many Europeans continue to perceive the visible presence of an
extra-continental outsider as a guarantee that the process of
economic and political community building will continue fairly
and equitably and not revert to the unpredictable politics of
balance of power considerations.
The proposition that a continued U.S. military engagement is
necessary as a European confidence-building measure has come to
embrace a rather fascinating mix of sub-themes. One holds that
American forces ought to remain in place - to paraphrase Secre-
tary of State James A. Baker - that they have become "a befrock
of stability in an era of uncertainty, even confusion.' The
thought here is that nations, like individuals, need a few famil-
iar landmarks to locate themselves in a rapidly changing and
unpredictable environment. For half a century a familiar feature
of the European landscape, America's military presence has as-
sumed an institutional importance that cannot be measured by
military calculations alone.
Another sub-theme is the notion that the real purpose of
U.S. troop entanglement has been to allay European anxieties over
the specter of a resurgent German military power. The "German
Problem" was central to the debate that attended NATO's formative
years, but, by the mid-1950s, was overtaken by the "Soviet Prob-
lem." For many Europeans, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and the accelerated pace toward German reunification spelled the
retreat of the old and familiar Soviet threat in exchange for the
even older German bogey.
Since confidence in Germany's continued Western orientation
is believed contingent on NATO membership, and as long as NATO's
longevity is seen to hinge on the presence of U.S. forces, it
follows that the latter are seen as an important guarantee that a
"large, wealthy Germany concerned only with its own security"
will not become a "'loose cannon' in the center of Europe, reviv-
ingte instabilities and insecurity that led to the world
wars.",,2
Some, including German commentators have proposed that
Germany's own self-confidence depends on the retention of U.S.
forces. This sub-theme proceeds along two tracks. One paints U.S.
military presence as a security blanket. It urges that the Ger-
mans themselves recognize that, without the moderating influence
of a U.S. presence the success of reunification may go to their
heads and prompt irresponsible policies. German membership in
NATO, Socialist parliamentarian Egon Bahr told members of the
U.S. Congress in October 1990, guaranteed that the Germans would
remain level-headed (vernuenftig).
The second, related, track takes its cue from the old suspi-
cion that American disengagement will make Germany vulnerable to
Soviet nuclear blackmail, perhaps forcing Germany's own nuclear
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armament. It is then claimed that only the U.S. can guarantee
Germany against nuclear blackmail and give firm but f ir direc-
tion to Germany's adaptation to its new circumstances.1
Closely connected with the belief that U.S. forces in Europe
serve a confidence-building purpose is the argument that they
provide stability. A "U.S. military presence," reported Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy) Paul D. Wolfowitz in a speech in
the Spring of 1990, "will reassure America's Europ an allies
during a transition period of potential instability." The newly
independent Eastern European states would benefit too, he added:
"U.S. presence can also provide the stability the Eastern Euro-
pean nations need as they attempt to become part of an undivided
democratic Europe."
Part of the price for Europe's emergence from bipolarity
will be incipient political and military instability, particular-
ly in and among the former Soviet satellite states. The civil war
in Yugoslavia has heightened fears that some countries may resort
to military solutions to resolve their new problems. According to
Wolfowitz in his Spring 1990 speech, the U.S. "must stay in
Europe to prevent the kind of catastrophe that would cost us far
more to put right."
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic President Vdclav Havel has
been a most outspoken proponent of an expanded NATO umbrella, but
he has limited his military reasoning to "signals from the Soviet
Union that give us concern and the threat that instability there
could bring for Europe."'1 At no time has he or any other Eastern
European leader suggested that the Alliance, including U.S.
forces, assume a responsibility for resolving Yugoslavia-like
domestic strife.
At the close of the June 1991 North Atlantic Council meeting
in Copenhagen, the NATO ministers' communique announced that the
security of the Alliance is "inseparably linked to that of all
other states in Europe," and the progress of Eastern European
democracy free from "any form of cqrcion or intimidation" was
"of direct and material concern."'4- The statement was widely
reported in the pfss as a de facto NATO commitment to Eastern
European defense. Far from opening the door, NATO had merely
cracked a window to allow the Eastern Europeans the satisfaction
of intensified military contacts.
Barring Eastern European accession to full membership (which
is permitted under Article Ten of the North Atlantic Treaty), or
alternatively, a reinterpretation of Articles Five and Six so as
to allow for out-of-area intervention, NATO or U.S. forces oper-
ating under NATO auspices lack a mandate to dampen or quell any
sort of Eastern European instability. In theory, U.S. forces in
Europe could be used to intervene in an Eastern European crisis
without the NATO cover, unilaterally or in ad hoc combination
with willing Allies.
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There are two major reasons why this is unlikely: first,
U.S. decisionmakers will be extremely reluctant to insert forces
into an area that is commonly considered a bottomless powder keg.
Next, between the new U.S. strategic focus on regional contingen-
cies and the Continent's move toward a European defense identity,
both Americans and Europeans will almost certainly conclude that
at hand is a European problem whose solution should be Europe's
responsibility. Washington's low key response to Yugoslavia's
civil war compared with the burst of European crisis management
activities is probably a portent of how the Alliance partners
will share the burden of reducing potential Eastern European
instabilities.
The third theme advanced in defense of the political signif-
icance of keeping U.S. military power on the Continent is that it
will preserve American influence. A widely accepted, though
unusually unspoken proposition, avers that the presence of Ameri-
can power on the Continent has served more than the altruistic
purpose of protecting Europe's liberty. Deliberately or not, U.S.
policymakers have used Europe's dependence on this power as a
lever to influence European policies on behalf of U.S. interests.
Such efforts have grown more problematic with the end of the
Cold War. That is particularly true since the goals of U.S.
policy are changing in a way that renders military sources of
power and influence less relevant. The Economic Community's
(EC's) refusal to compromise on its tough negotiating line during
the Uruguay round of talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade indicates that the U.S. cannot count on converting its
military presence into economic influence.
Before Eastern Europe's "revolutions" of 1989, security for
Europe meant mostly military security; more than any other con-
sideration, American forces shaped Europe's security calculus.
Today, West Europeans draw a clear distinction between (non-
military) security and (military) defense. Europe's security
dilemma will be dominated mainly by nonmilitary issues, notably
economic and ethnic instability in the East, and population and
fundamentalist pressures from the South. 19 Conversely, Western
Europe's (and NATO's) traditional preoccupation with the defense
aspect of security is widely expected to retreat to the back-
ground. Hence, of course, NATO's promise to become progressively
a "political" alliance.
Whether or not this perspective is factually correct matters
less today than that most European politicians seem to believe
that, on the Continent at least, military security solutions will
become increasingly irrelevant. If this assessment is correct,
then the implication is that, as an instrument of political
influence, U.S. military forces in Europe will be progressively
relegated to the sidelines of the Continent's "Great Game." Left
then is the prospect of military influence.
Published remarks by GEN Galvin strongly suggest that the
immediate influence-seeking pay-off the U.S. anticipates from
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keeping large forces on the Cort *nent is a strong voice in Euro-
pean defense decision-making. In Congressional testimony he
cautioned again that a military presence was the price the U.S.
had to pay to "have a seat at the table on the questions of
future security in Europe and the shaping of that security." He
also warned that the alternative could be for the U.S. another
"bloody war."'
The most immediate military influence that a U.S. corps-size
military presence is designed to safeguard concerns the weight of
Washington's voice in NATO's decision-making. Historically, the
allocation of major military commands within the Alliance has
followed the rule that "he who pays, plays." Hence, the number of
three- and four-star billets a member could claim has been rough-
ly commensurate with its contribution in troops and other mili-
tary capabilities. Traditionally, the U.S. has held the lion's
share of NATO's most important commands, including two of only
three major commands - SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Atlan-
tic. GEN Galvin evidently believes that a corps and three air
wings are the minimum stake the U.S. must enter if it is to stay
at the head table of the NATO command. This raises at least two
questions.
Keeping a corps instead of, say, no more than one division
in Europe will ensure a bigger American profile in NATO's future
command structure. But all this says is that having more forces
on the Continent gives the U.S. a greater voice in how those
forces may be used - it is silent about the instrumental military
influence the U.S. seeks to preserve. If our insistence on a
corps-size presence is prompted by concern that fewer forces
would deny the U.S. a commanding voice over their use, then
removing American forces altogether serves the same purpose.
Clearly, the military influence rationale for a large resid-
ual U.S. troops presence goes deeper. GEN Galvin's warning, cited
earlier, indicates that, without a substantial presence, the U.S.
fears thaL it might become dragged, once again, into a European
war. This had already happened twice before in this century, he
told legislators. Significiptly, he noted, in both instances "we
had stayed out of Europe."
The connection drawn by the SACEUR between Europe's propen-
sity for war and the presence of U.S. forces (and, as a corol-
lary, American leadership in NATO) has been a recurring theme in
recent American policy pronouncements. It is at the heart of U.S.
disquietness over the prospect of a European defense identity at
its own exclusion. Although U.S. policymakers are loath to admit
it, there is the unsettling sense that, left to their own de-
vices, the Europeans cannot quite be trusted to keep the peace;
that without U.S. military leadership they might make military
choices contrary to American interests and precipitate another
costly American rescue operation. The suggestion by some Euro-
peanists that a European army under the auspices of the Western
European Union (WEU) or EC might intervene in a (non-Soviet)
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Eastern European crisis, Yugoslavia, for example, has not allayed
American anxieties.z
Few and far between are Europeans prepared to lead a WEU or
EC peacekeeping force into Eastern Europe without broad NATO and,
more important, U.S. approval. But the reason has little to do
with the commanding influence of a corps-size U.S. military
presence: with many or few American troops in place, the Euro-
peans are simply not ready to embrar, a go-it-alone role.
Open to question is the apparent American assumption that
U.S. influence in Alliance decision-making is a function of
keeping the right number of troops. With the retreat of the
Soviet menace this assumption is debatable on at least two
counts. The 300,000-plus forces the U.S. kept on the Continent
for the past 40 years have never been the sole, or even dominant
determinant of U.S. leadership. Those forces mattered far what
they stood for: first, as the leading edge of large-scale rein-
forcements and next as a symbol of the ultimate guarantee of
America's nuclear commitment. What will become of these larger
elements of U.S. policy? Will NATO be recast accordingly?
NATO FORCE STRUCTURE
On May 28, 1991 the Alliance defense ministers approved
NATO's first force structure overhaul since its inception 42
years before. The scheme takes account of these three principal
factors: (1) the planned across-the-board reduction of some 20
percent over the next three years of NATO forces in the old
Central Region; (2) the prospect of much smaller active armed
forces and hence greater reliance, in the event of a major cri-
sis, on the activation of reserve formations; and (3) the need
for multilateral military contributions.
The Future Fo.ce Structure plan is to include these three
major components: 24 first, multinational reaction force, consist-
ing of an Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and an RRF. The first
will be a 5,000-strong brigade with supporting air elements and
will be available on 72 hours notice. Its purpose is quick-reac-
tion crisis management, and its organization is essentially an
elaboration of the existing Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile
Force.
The RRF is the centerpiece of NATO's new multinational
force structure. It will consist of elements drawn from all three
services, land, sea, and air, but the core will be a British-led
70,000-strong Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC). The latter is to be
built around two British divisions, a multinational division made
up of German, Dutch, and Belgian units, and (and this is much
less certain) a second multinational division composed of ele-
ments drawn from the southern flank armies. The RRC would require
up to ten days to, if necessary, augment the IRF. The model for
the RRC will be the existing Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).
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A main defense force (MDF) of seven (largely mobilizable)
corps. Six of the two-division corps will be multinational and be
stationed in the old Central Region. Two will be. German-command-
ed, one Belgian, one U.S., one Dutch, and one will have a com-
bined Danish-German staff. The seventh MDF corps will be all-
German and barracked in the former German Democratic Republic.
The MDF will retain the old Allied Forces Central (AFCENT) mis-
sion of deterrence and defense against traditional, longer-warn-
ing threats. Up to three months may be needed to bring the MDF
corps to full and combat-ready strcngth.
Augmentation forces (AF) of undetermined size are to round
out the Future Force Structure. They would reinforce the MDF
should the latter prove unable to defend agairst threats to the
Central Region. AF elements will presumably include national
reserve and (mainly U.S.) active forces and, should hostilities
escalate, reconstituted U.S. divisions. The MDF and AF are osten-
sibly designed to blunt an attack from any direction. Their
practical focus, however, appears to be against long-warning
Soviet aggression.
Two points stand out with respect to the U.S. role. Most
important, it appears that the Army's V corps that will comprise
the bulk of the remaining American presence in Europe will be
assigned to the MDF. One of its divisions will evidently team up
with a German division to remain under U.S. Corps command, where-
as the second will report to a German-led multinational corps.
1he next, related, point is that no major in-place U.S. maneuver
unit will evidently be attached to the RRC. The word "in-place"
is emphasized since it 2 as been reported that the U.S. may commit
a U.S.-based division.
This leads to two observations: first, the RRC will be
mainly a European army. This has fueled speculation that the RRC
may eventually assume a second identity as the WEU's European
Reaction Force. 2 6 Next, it seems rather anomalous that the U.S.
has chosen to exclude the most obvious candidate (i.e., V Corps)
from participation in the RRC. From even an institutional per-
spective, clearly the RRC will be the centerpiece of NATO action.
More important, the RRC symbolizes the Alliance's main military
task of risk management and crisis prevention - not defense
against Soviet aggression. With this in mind, the menu of Ameri-
can military purposes can be discussed next.
U.S. MILITARY ROLES AND MISSIONS
The military value of keeping more or less U.S. forces in
Europe has been advocated on these three grounds: first, it is
argued that no less than a corps-size presence along with some
three tactical fighter wings and naval forces will suffice for
U.S. forces to retain a credible on-the-spot defensive capabili-
ty; second, a U.S. military presence is to serve as a reception
capability should the need arise for overseas reinforcements
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during the reconstitution for a European-centered global war with
the USSR; and third, Europe affords te U.S. a convenient spring-
board for out-of-area contingencies.
SACEUR acknowledges that the chances of Soviet aggression are
extremely small, but he has refused to rule out the possibility
of a crisis, not necessarily of Soviet making, "into which the
Soviets feel drawn. ''2 Regardless of Moscow's intentions, the
General informed journalists in June 1991, the Soviet Union still
had the capability to amass 45 divisions with 13,000 Wnks and
launch an attack from a standing start in about 45 days.
Before the August 1991 Soviet coup attempt, U.S. planners
assumed that they would have two years advance warning of a
reborn Soviet European-centered global war. It goes almost with-
out saying that since then, the concept of a two-year warning
period for a global war has lost its plausibility. U.S. strate-
gists will probably join their European colleagues and relegate
reconstitution to the scrapheap of strategic bumperstickers whose
time has passed.
Even before the Russian revolution of 1991 the European one-
half of NATO had evidently reached the conclusion that, for
Europe at least, the retention of a military-industrial reconsti-
tution capacity was not feasible. The term appeared sporadically
in a few NATO communiques following President Bush's speech at
the Aspen Institute, but was absent from speeches by key NATO
leaders since the beginning of 1991.30 Referred to instead are
"force augmentation" and "force build-up," meaning the mobiliza-
tion and activation of existing military reserves, weapons in
storage, and industrial facilities - not the creation-from-
scratch of new military-industrial capacities as pure reconstitu-
tion implies.
Discussions with European NATO planners point to several
reasons why the American way of reconstitution has evidently
failed to get their agreement. Because of the novelty of the
word, planners evoked different perceptions of its meaning,
especially political meaning. For some, reconstitution signified
the restoration of the old, Cold War, state of affairs, including
the politically sensitive issue of preparing to break-out from
the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE)-agreed ceiling on European
forces. Others evidently thought that the term could be too
readily confused with nuclear reconstitution, and feared that it
could become associated with the (provocative) regeneration of
NATO's nuclear forces.
The concern that an avowed strategy of reconstitution may
turn out to be crisis-escalatory appears to have dominated NATO's
political reasoning for its rejection. Specifically, given the
likely ambiguity of warnings and indicators of a re-emerging
Soviet menace, it is feared that NATO may act too hastily and
trigger the kind of escalating series of tit-for-tat force build-
up decisions that dragged both sides to World War I.
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There is a practical reason as well why the Allied defense
establishments have failed to embrace the reconstitution concept
with enthusiasm. Faced with steeply declining defense budgets and
the popular expectation of a peace dividend, they fear that
reconstitution will be an excuse for even further cut-backs; that
the option of creating forces in lieu of maintaining a standing
force could be expanded to hedge against non-Soviet, so-called
lesser contingencies as well. According to this theme, the
national Treasures will not fund a standby reconstitution capaci-
ty that most politicians believe will never be used. Instead, the
military can expect to be told that if they believe reconstitu-
tion important, they must decide how to apportion a fixed defense
budget between standing and reconstitutable capacities. It takes
no imagination to figure out which way the decision will go.
Despite official declarations, reconstitution has not gener-
ated political passions, even in the U.S. It is likely that,
between its rejection as a NATO strategy and the revolutionary
events in the Soviet Union in the Summer of 1991, the concept
will wane to a slogan and disappear from the American and Allied
lexicon. The principal reason is, of course, the dominant expec-
tation that the Soviet threat will not return. This is the only
realistic basis for assessing the military relevance of a U.S.
presence in Europe. The present outlook is that neither defense
nor reconstitution will be tenable.
The same observation holds concerning the future of U.S.
forces as custodians of NATO's forward-based nuclear weapons.
Historically, the military and political values of the American
presence were intimately connected with their ownership of most
of the Alliance's short-and medium-range nuclear weapons. Those
forward based systems ensured the extended deterrence of American
strategic nuclear forces, and extended America's influence in
NATO's military councils irrespective of the number of GIs on the
Continent. It has been a long-standing adage that, "no nukes, no
troops."
Officially, NATO remains adamant about the need for the U.S.
nuclear guarantee. The reason has less to do today with the fear
of an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack, than the fact that
the U.S. is the only NATO member which can offset the Soviet
strategic nuclear capability. However, indications that this
guarantee will be decoupled from America's forward based nuclear
deployment and, before long, the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe
will be limited to sea-based systems and some Air Force squadrons
based in the United Kingdom. The implication is clear: if the
U.S. and the Europeans wish to keep American troops on Continen-
tal soil, valid reasons other than nuclear custodianship must be
found.
This leaves projection of force for out-of-area contingen-
cies as the most persuasive military rationale for preserving a
U.S. presence in Europe. Lacking credible anti-Soviet scenarios,
it makes pri..tical sense for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
to institutionalize the precedent set by DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and
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reorient its day-to-day operational planning to out-of-area
contingencies. This mission is consistent with current U.S.
strategic planning, and it would also match the de facto out-of-
area thrust of mainstream European defense thinking. The latter
is reflected in (a) increasing recognition among the principal
Western European powers that risks beyond NATO territory, not the
risk of a re-emerging Soviet threat, will henceforth be the main
preoccupation of standing forces; (b) the broad expectation that
the centerpiece of NATO's new force structure, the RRC, will
assume a dual NATO and European identity and will, in its second
capacity, be the WEU's (and eventually the EC's) out-of-area
intervention force; and (c) the momentum toward creating an
independent European security and defense identity whose princi-
pal military planning focus will, again, be out-of-area.
U.S. strategists are agreed that planning for and structur-
ing U.S. forces to a general war with the Soviet Union no longer
makes sense; that, instead, the criterion for force readiness
must be the ability to respond quickly to regional crises and
conflicts. To remain relevant to the demands of the new world
order, U.S. forces in Europe must be given a relevant and mili-
tarily defensible role. Providing for Europe's main or augmented
defense against a resurrected Soviet threat is no longer an
adequate purpose; out-of-area contingency operations in collabo-
ration with the Europeans and as part of a new transatlantic
bargain is.
CONCLUSION
In a monograph published by the International Institute for
East-West Security Studies in early 1991, author Jan Will$m Honig
posed the question: "NATO: An Institution Under Threat?"'  There
is little question that, especially since the Moscow coup at-
tempt, the old, that is to say anti-Soviet NATO, has become an
institution whose time has past. The cornerstone of the Al-
liance's old military strategy, the presence of U.S. military
forces, risks the same fate.
Before the Soviet upheaval, it could still be argued plausi-
bly, that American forces ought to remain in Europe to guard
against a reversal of perestroika and reassure the Europeans
that, should matters come to a head, the U.S. would have a recep-
tion capability for large-scale, including reconstituted rein-
forcements. The scenarios advancing this rationale have clearly
lost whatever merit they had before August 1991. Gone too is the
strategic justification for NATO's (anti-Soviet) main defense and
augmented forces, including, America's contributions to them.
The only credible military rationale for maintaining a U.S.
expeditionary force on the Continent is out-of-area operations.
NATO's de facto direction must parallel this if the Alliance is
to survive as a military institution. Using Europe as a spring-
board for regional contingency operations will not necessarily be
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cheaper than forward-deploying the same forces from the continen-
tal U.S. More important than cost, however, is that European
forward-basing allows U.S. forces to continue to train and exer-
cise with the Europeans and preserve the material and doctrinal
compatibility that proved crucial for the success of coalition
forces in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, keeping U.S. forces in
Europe will preserve their long-time stabilizing and confidence-
building role.
The telling significance of a USEUCOM out-of-area mission
will be political. Most important perhaps, the recognition that
the U.S. presence no longer serves European security first will
mean that U.S. leadership in the Alliance will devolve to part-
nership. The other partner will become a distinct and cohesive
European defense identity under the auspices of the WEU, but
later, under the umbrella of the EC.
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Although the new national security strategy is still in a
state of flux, it is apparent that the Bush administration is
altering American defense priorities and policies in fundamental
ways. The modification of U.S. defense policy is of course a
logical response to the sweeping changes in Europe that have
ended the Cold War, a development universally welcomed. But
revolutionary change in U.S. defense policy, regardless of the
actual content of the transformation, is bound to provoke a good
deal of shock and disorientation. Over the last forty years,
Americans, their allies, and even their adversaries have grown
familiar, if not always comfortable, with the military policies
adopted by the U.S. during the Cold War.
Now that the slate has been virtually wiped clean, it is
difficult to anticipate the impact of the new national security
strategy. Will defense industries, converted to commercial
production, be capable of mobilizing from a "cold" start and
again begin producing military hardware? What will influence
Congressional decisions now that Cold War assumptions no longer
guide defense allocations? How will allies respond to the Bush
administration's new strategy?
The contributors to this volume have offered the first
tentative answers to these types of questions. By highlighting
the hidden implications or potential ramifications of the new
strategy, they identify challenges that could preoccupy U.S.
policymakers and officers as they adjust to the end of the Cold
War. This conclusion focuses on these challenges.
At the heart of the new national security strategy, as James
Tritten notes, lies a fundamental reorientation. In the past,
American policymakers and officers have based plans and force
structures on an event that was both unlikely and gravely threat-
ening, a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation along the Central Front.
In contrast, the new strategy is directed against smaller con-
flicts on the periphery, conflicts that have occurred with regu-
larity since the end of World War II. But the draw down of
forces and the reorganization of the U.S. command structure
represent only the first step in this reorientation. Questions
remain about how the American military will adjust to the new
situation.
In Sam Tangredi's view, the outline of a nascent interserv-
ice battle between the Navy and the Air Force, especially over
the future of tactical airpower, is already discernible. The
Navy appears willing to adjust to the new international situation
by reducing capabilities specifically designed for Cold War
contingencies; reductions in anti-submarine warfare forces and
the new SEAWOLF nuclear-powered attack submarine program appear
likely. Yet, the Navy and the other services will struggle to
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prevent the transfer of their missions and the organizations that
they have traditionally controlled to other branches of the armed
forces.2  Not surprisingly, it is the Navy and not the Air
Force, which currently supplies the officers who serve as Com-
mander-In-Chief (CinC) Strategic Air Command, that seems inter-
ested in raising the question of which service will fill the new
position of CinC Strategic Forces. Similarly, the vision of a
world in which the Navy patrols the oceans and delivers the
Marines to Asia and the Army to the Middle East leaves little
room for the Air Force. Because the new strategy holds out the
possibility of a fundamental modification of the services' roles,
missions, and commands, Tangredi's prediction of a looming inter-
service battle, reminiscent of the "revolt of the Admirals,"
appears justified.
If the services are gearing up for a major bureaucratic
battle, it is clear from Tangredi's analysis that at least the
Navy has not come to terms with the strategic and operational
implications of the new strategy. Admittedly, the Navy might be
the service least effected by the end of the Cold War. Naval
forces constructed to meet the Soviet threat have served effec-
tively in other contingencies; it is impossible to reconstitute a
fleet in two years. But unless the Navy develops a clear and
compelling strategic justification for its preferred force struc-
ture, it is unlikely that it will persevere in a climate of
budgetary austerity.
Will the services alter fundamentally their approach to
warfare in response to the new strategy? Before the outbreak of
the Gulf war, it would have been safe to assume that they would
continue to rely on weapons and concepts suited to European
contingencies. Indeed, observers often noted that during the
Cold War the U.S. military relied on a force structure and opera-
tional style based on the formative experience of the Second
World War. Unwilling or unable to adjust to the exigencies of
local circumstances--Vietnam is a case in point--the military
implemented procedures intended for European contingencies.
But Operation DESERT STORM, as Michael Pocalyko notes, could
serve as a new organizational bench mark as the services begin
planning in earnest for the post-Cold War era. Even though the
assessment of the war against Iraq is still underway, Pocalyko
identifies several ways the recent experience in the Gulf could
influence strategic and procurement choices. For example, the
conflict highlighted the importance of forward presence, coali-
tion warfare, and the maintenance of a surge capability, factors
emphasized in the new strategy. Yet, the potentially unique
aspects of the recent Middle East conflict--the availability of
an advanced military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, coalition
solidarity, and a tolerant Soviet Union--could reduce the rele-
vance of these lessons to future conflicts. Similarly some
lessons will simply fuel existing strategic and procurement
controversies. Did technological superiority or "force suffi-
ciency" (the availability of large forces) produce the quick
victory in the Gulf?
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Additionally, the potential political lessons drawn both
domestically and internationally from DESERT STORM will shape the
new strategy. American and allied publics might expect the
U.S. to take a leading military role in future crises. They
could also demand quick military resolutions of nascent con-
flicts. As a result, future administrations might be quick to
resort to military force. At the same time, future adversaries
might not allow an international coalition led by the U.S. to
build its military response at a leisurely rate. Because poten-
tial adversaries may also learn from Iraqi mistakes, military and
political strategists must be selective in applying the lessons
of DESERT STORM to future contingencies.
Even without the requirements produced by the new national
security strategy, the end of the Cold War has presented the
intelligence community with a challenging set of tasks. If the
bipolar structure of the Cold War becomes unstable, notes Thomas
Grassey, former Superpower clients on the periphery may have more
opportunities to pursue their own agendas. And as Soviet influ-
ence over former clients wanes, intelligence analysts will have
to bridge cultural, historical, and ideological gaps to under-
stand the internal developments that often govern the external
behavior of Third World nations. For that matter, analysts will
have to become increasingly attuned to the diversity that now
characterizes politics in the USSR if they are to anticipate
Soviet domestic and international initiatives. Under these
circumstances, analysts will find Cold War concepts of diminish-
ing value in estimating threats to U.S. national security.
Potential demands for verifying multilateral arms control agree-
ments, tracking individual terrorists, monitoring specific
weapons manufacturing facilities and economic intelligence and
counterintelligence activities would only add to the intellectual
and organizational challenges facing analysts as they adjust to
the transformation in world politics.
According to Grassey, these changes raise questions about
the intelligence community's ability to make the organizational,
personnel, and intellectual shifts needed to accommodate the
issues that will dominate the political agenda in the years
ahead. Will the "old Soviet hands" be willing or capable of
acquiring new skills? Will organizations abandon their raison
d'etre and adopt new tasks and procedures? Further complicating
these impending institutional changes is nascent Congressional
interest in streamlining intelligence operations. Whether they
are undertaken for reasons of austerity or to find an organiza-
tional remedy to the perennial problem of intelligence failure,
it is likely that Congressional initiatives will only exacerbate
bureaucratic turmoil as intelligence managers struggle to react
to post-Cold War issues.
Compounding these challenges, however, are the demands
created by the new national security strategy, demands that might
require intelligence organizations to operate continuously at the
theoretical limits of efficiency and effectiveness. If analysts
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are to warn of a deteriorating international situation two years
in advance of potential hostilities in Europe, they will have to
base their estimates on highly ambiguous information. Given the
reduced size of standing U.S. forces, only the smallest margin of
error can be tolerated in intelligence estimates of opponents'
military capabilities; in "peacetime" the U.S. military probably
will be unable to employ numerical superiority to overwhelm Third
World opponents. In effect, as U.S. military capabilities dimin-
ish, the intelligence community will be required to take up the
slack.
It is apparent that historians, political scientists, and
intelligence practitioners, who have recognized that failures of
intelligence are more or less inevitable, wer not consulted in
the formulation of the new security strategy. Indeed, Richard
Betts, a leading spokesmen for this consensus, persuasively
argued in the early 1980s against the type of intelligence poli-
cies included in the Bush administration's strategy. Given the
inevitability of intelligence failure, according to Betts, in-
creased military preparedness is the best way the U.S. 5can pro-
tect itself against the consequences of surprise attack.
Admittedly, given the new climate of relations between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, the risk of catastrophic intelligence
failure might be diminished. But, to reduce further this risk,
it it imperative that two additional actions be undertaken.
First, administration officials, members of Congress, officers
and the public must be made aware of the intelligence risks
inherent in the new strategy. From both a military and intelli-
gence perspective, the margin for error in American policy has
been greatly reduced. Second, the intelligence community must be
provided with the resources and time needed to adjust to the
dual shocks produced by the end of the Cold War and the new
national security strategy. Budget reductions could be appropri-
ate in the years ahead, but only after the intelligence community
adjusts to the new demands it faces.
Paul Stockton's analysis of the Cc ressional response to
the new national security strategy, ever, indicates that
Congress will shape the Bush administ Lon's plans for future
intelligence and defense policy. By Iting the terms of the
policy debate, the administration preempted the burst of Congres-
sional activism that accompanied the dramatic changes in Europe
in late 1989. Members of Congress no longer criticize the Bush
administration for failing to adjust to the new strategic reali-
ties brought about by the end of the Cold War. Instead, many
legislators have already embraced their own interpretation of the
new strategy, an interpretation that often varies from the admin-
istration's view of future defense priorities. Already, the new
strategy has been used by some members of Congress to support
programs that were deemed unnecessary by the administration.
It is surprising how quickly Congress has adopted the phi-
losophy behind the new national security strategy. Programs
interpreted as vestiges of the Cold War, the B-2 stands as a case
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in point, are shunned, despite the obvious benefits they can
provide to constituents' pocketbooks. But the administration
also has been taken to task for failing to devote resources to
programs that Congress has deemed important to the new strategy.
As a result, officials in the defense and intelligence communi-
ties should take note that the Cold War concepts used to justify
programs for the last forty years will receive a hostile recep-
tion on Capitol Hill. Special efforts will now be needed to
continue ongoing programs, the procurement of strategic nuclear
weapons, for example, that have not been rendered obsolete by
recent international developments.
Still, there is little evidence that Congress has come to
terms with the darker side of the new national security strategy.
Indeed, Stockton's analysis suggests that Congressional debate
about the broad implications of recent global events ended with
the Aspen speech; the new strategy apparently now just serves as
the terms of reference in distributing pork to constituents. Has
Congress recognized the military and intelligence risks entailed
in the new strategy? Have legislators come to terms with the fact
that someday they might be asked to authorize a massive increase
in defense expenditures on short notice? These questions remain
unanswered. It is clear, however, that if the U.S. is to be in a
position to increase its defense capabilities quickly, Congress
must incorporate an awareness of both the positive and negative
implications of the new strategy into its budgetary delibera-
tions.
One issue that should enjoy a place of prominence on the
Congressional agenda is the future of the defense industrial
base. Even though it has been unwilling to develop a national
industrial policy, Congress, with the help of the administration,
will have to adopt programs to insure that the U.S. could win a
reconstitution race. As Tritten suggests, the perception among
allies and potential adversaries that the U.S. would win this
type of race could strengthen deterrence in the years ahead.
Yet, it is difficult to imagine how this capability would be
exercised, thereby enhancing the credibility of the threat to
reconstitute. Would former defense contractors on the brink of
bankruptcy be rescued by a well-timed reconversion to defense
production? Would corporate executives object to the disruption,
and possible destruction, of their businesses in a reconstitution
exercise? Ultimately, these concerns pale in comparison to the
real challenge inherent in reconstitution. Without a vigorous
economy, internationally competitive at the cutting edge of
technology, the threat to reconstitute will ring hollow. Recon-
stitution exercises, conducted to mask economic decay, could
actually prove counterproductive for purposes of deterrence.6
Another question raised by the issue of reconstitution
concerns the future of the weapons acquisition process. Given
the planned reduction in standing forces, U.S. units will turn
increasingly to technology as a force multiplier. Yet, the
procurement of even small numbers of high technology weapons
could measurably reduce the peace dividend, cooling Congressional
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enthusiasm for defense expenditures. It also appears unlikely
that the requisite political support exists to produce a never
ending series of prototypes, an endeavor that could prove enor-
mously expensive. For that matter, the services might not be
satisfied with a single prototype and might demand at least
limited production runs to gain operational experience with new
weapons systems. For a nation that has become accustomed to
"come as you are" wars, the notion of reconstitution represents a
revolutionary departure in U.S. defense policy.
If the new strategy holds out the prospect of fundamental
change in the domestic and bureaucratic aspects of U.S. defense
policy, what impact will it have on longstanding relationships
with America's allies? As Edward Olsen perceptively notes, the
new national security strategy was primarily developed in re-
sponse to the revolutionary changes in Europe and potential
European contingencies. Yet, as a global strategy, it will
impact U.S. interests in Asia.
To realize fully the new strategy in the Pacific, Olsen
argues that Soviet and American attitudes toward Asia must under-
go a change similar to the one that transformed the intellectual
and political context of European security. Superpower statesmen
must recognize that regional disputes have long been needlessly
labeled as manifestations of the Cold War. When viewed in a post-
Cold War context, these regional disputes, and Asian politics in
general, are best managed by Asians. Even the last Asian mani-
festation of the Cold War, a divided Korea, would become a domes-
tic political issue for Seoul and Pyongyang and would no longer
serve as a potential flash point for a global war.
Interpreted in this manner, the new national security
strategy is simply a tactical shift in an ongoing U.S. effort to
interest Asian allies in bearing a greater share of the allied
defense burden in the Pacific. Instead of obtaining increased
contributions from allies, the new strategy would redefine the
threat faced in Asia, allowing for a unilateral reduction in
American forces. But as Olsen hints, it might be irresponsible
for the U.S. to scale back rapidly its commitments in Asia with-
out helping former allies and antagonists develop mechanisms to
manage the end of the Cold War in the Pacific. Unlike Europe,
which can turn to the European Community to deal with problems
once handled by the Warsaw Pact or NATO, Asians lack a regional
organization that could replace Superpower tutelage.
Even though one of the purposes behind the new national
security strategy is to save money, in Asia the policy could take
on controversial political overtones. U.S. resources, no longer
devoted to the defense of Asian allies, could be invested in
America's industrial infrastructure, improving the competitive
position of U.S. firms in the international marketplace and
helping to offset the impact of the new strategy on the defense
industrial base. Simultaneously, the new strategy might force
Asians to devote more resources to their own defense, possibly
reducing the international competitiveness of their industries.
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Recrimination and political turmoil will follow if Asians inter-
pret the new strategy as a veiled form of economic warfare. But,
as Olsen notes, Asians and Americans have only started to think
about the implications of the new national security strategy for
the Pacific rim. It remains to be seen how interested parties
respond to the application of the strategy in Asia.
Surprisingly, the same conclusion can be drawn concerning
the application of the new strategy in Europe. According to Jan
Breemer, a desire to reduce the U.S. presence in Europe has
overtaken the creation of a strategic justification not only for
the size of the U.S. withdrawal, but for the continuing presence
of American forces on the Continent. Politically, the case for
retaining at least one U.S. Corps in Germany rests on somewhat
different objectives for Europeans and Americans. For Europeans,
the stability provided by a modest U.S. presence keeps in check
the specter of a resurgent and irresponsible Germany. Yet,
Americans seem reluctant to intervene to quell domestic turmoil,
the type of event that apparently poses the greatest threat to
European stability. For Americans, U.S. forces on the Continent
promise continued influence in the affairs of Europe. But Breem-
er convincingly argues that U.S. policymakers have not yet ex-
plained how military power will influence European decisions in
the realm of economics, the probable focus of relations among
NATO members in the years ahead. As Breemer hints, U.S. policy-
makers wili be disappointed if they expect military power to be
fungible across a wide range of issue areas.
Of course, Americans have always valued the political sta-
bility and influence generated by the U.S. military presence on
the Continent. In the past, however, these political goals
often were of secondary importance when compared to the practical
military objective of improving NATO's ability to resist a Warsaw
Pact attack across the Central Front. Indeed, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that it was the perception that American
forces were needed to deter Soviet aggression, not the actual
size of U.S. military deployments, that engendered U.S. influence
and even European stability. NATO members generally attempted to
keep disputes within Western Europe and quarrels with the U.S. as
limited as possible to prevent Americans from becoming disillu-
sioned with their European partners. Now that the traditional
military justification for the U.S. presence in Europe has evapo-
rated, it is unlikely that Europeans will feel compelled to bow
to American wishes on alliance matters.
In fact, the seeds of a significant dispute within NATO
could be found in Breemer's identification of the remaining
justification ft :.S. deployments in Europe: to serve as NATO's
standing force for out-of-area contingencies. Despite the fact
that the U.S. and several of its NATO allies cooperated during
the recent crisis in the Gulf, it is too much to expect that the
next out-of-area crisis will produce the same degree of consensus
within the alliance. In reality, American capability for unilat-
eral action might be constrained by its continued relationship
with NATO.
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It is clear that the contributors to this volume agree that
the U.S. stands at a major crossroads in its approach to defense
policy. The outlines of the new national security strategy are
evident. The Bush administration has created an opportunity to
reassess America's post-war approach to national security. Yet,
exactly hcw the new strategy will unfold and the institutions,
events, and issues that will have the greatest impact on its
development remain to be seen.
At the moment, a desire to reduce defense expenditures
appears to be the major force shaping the evolution of the new
national security strategy. Austerity lies behind the fundamen-
tal, if little recognized, change in U.S. strategic forces out-
lined by Bruce MacDonald. Yet, if adjustments in American
strategic procurement policy represent the first hard evidence of
the new strategy, these developments have taken place without a
clearly articulated strategic justification or even a considered
debate over their merits. Moreover, there is a distinct possi-
bility that this paucity of debate will be reflected in the
evolution of the conventional and political elements of the new
strategy, or that interservice rivalry will drive procurement
tradeoffs in the years ahead.
In a sense complacency, bread by the relatively benign end
of the Cold War and the sweeping coalition victory in the Gulf,
represents the greatest threat to the Bush administration's
vision of American defense policy. Without a clear articulation
of U.S. political objectives and a thorough debate over the best
way to achieve them, retrenchment will come to characterize the
new strategy. But retrenchment alone cannot guarantee the con-
tinuation of nearly fifty years of international stability. In
effect, the Bush administration's strategic vision poses a funda-
mental challenge: if Americans take the "Long Peace" for granted,
then the new national security strategy will not be a source of
stability in the years ahead.'
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Sources of the New Strategy
by
James J. Tritten1
This Appendix contains a narrative of the sequence of
appearance of the various source documents for the new national
security strategy and the Base Force, and commentary on those
sources, along with full documentation for each in the form of a
note. Throughout the text of the book, individual notes were not
used to document general references to these sources--instead the
reader may cross reference the item referred to in the text to
documentation in this Appendix. Currency for sources is general-
ly through the end of September 1991.
The sequen e starts with the President's speech at Aspen on
August 2, 1990. Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait on the same day, the concepts outlined in the
President's Aspen speech were brief and visionary - destined to
be fully developed by official spokesmen in the following months.
The New York Times covered the new strategy and force structure
in depth on the same day, but based its story on leaks of a
confidential briefing of the plan to the President in late June
1990, and subsequent briefings to the Defense Policy Resources
Board.3 Aviation Week & Space TechnoloQy covered the new nation-
al security strategy and force structure in depth - in their
August 13, 1990 issue.4
General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), provided details on the new national
security strategy and associated force structure in two speeches
to the Veterans of Foreign Wars5 and the American Legion,6 late
in August 1990. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Dick Cheney spoke
at the 32nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) on September 6, 1990 and explained that
the new strategic concepts outlined in Aspen would form the basi
cf programming documents to be made public in early 1991.
Cheney's IISS remarks were followed at that conference by I.
Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Principal Deputy Under SECDEF (Strategy
and Resources), who provided additional details.8
Moscow's Pravda reported Cheney's remarks at the IISS meet-
ing and that President Bush had ordered changes in American
security strategy. Cheney followed up his IISS address with a
similar speech at the Comstock Club/Air Force Association (AFA)
in Sacramento on September 13, 199010 at the Bay Area Council in
San Francisco on September 14,11 another briefing to AFA on
September 17th, an address to the National Association of Busi-
ness Economists on September 26th, and a talk to the Pittsburgh
World Affairs Council on October 30th.12
Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, USAF, former Joint
Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), gave fur-
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ther details at the National Press Club late in September 1990.13
The essence of this speech 1 ppeared subsequently in the Spring
1991 issue of Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War
College.
Secretary Cheney's visit and remarks in Moscow in October
1990 about the new national security strategy and future force
structure, were widely covered by the Soviet press1 but general-
ly not reported in the U.S. GEN Powell authored an article in
the October 1990 issue of The Retired Officer.16 This article,
however, was based upon his presentation at the National Press
Club immediately preceding the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait--hence it
should be placed ahead of the Aspen speech. Similarly, GEN
Powell's February 1991 article in the magazine of the Reserve
Officers Association i should be read from the perspective of
currency through October 1990.
GEN Powell gave two December 1990 speeches: one to the Royal
United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), 18  the
other at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Associa-
tion (AFCEA).1 9 The Chairman's RUSI remarks also appear in the
Spring 1991 issue of The RUSI Journal but these should be read
assuming a December 1990 currency with superficial updating for
the obvious.2
0
Vice CJCS, Admiral (ADM) David E. Jeremiah, USN, echoed GEN
Powell's concepts in another December 1990 speech to the 2resi-
dent's National Security Telecommunications Committee.2' The
Commander-in-Chief (CinC), U.S. Space Command, GEN Donald J.
Kutyna, USAF, told a San Diego Space Day audience, in January
1991, that GEN Powell had asked each of the CinCs to examine
their forces and present that minimal "base force" structure
necessary to maintain our superpower status.22
Only limited commentary about the new national s urity
strategy or force structure appeared in the U.S. media, other
than the reports in the New York Times and Aviation Week & Space
Technology, until the February 1991 Department of Defense (DoD)
testimony to the Congress. The U.S. press had been otherwise
engaged in major defense-associated reporting of events in the
Middle East. In 1991, the testimony to the Congress by the
SECDEF and the CJCS preceded the delivery of the annual DoD
report to the Congress.
The first testimony was presented by the SECDEF and the CJCS
befor5 the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on February 7,
1991.' 4 Their second testimony ws before the House Appropria-
tions Committee on February 19th.2% Two days later, on February
21st, they testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee. 26  Following this testimony, the 1991 SECDEF Annual
Report to the President and the ConQress was actually 2 istribut-
ed, although it is dated the previous month (January).
In mid-March 1991, "Scooter" Libby2 8 and ADM Jeremiah 29
appeared before the HASC and provided the first unclassified de-
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tails on future force structure. 3 0  Later in March, Paul D.
Wolfowitz, the Under SECDEF for Policy, also appeared before the
HASC and testified with GEN Butler, now CinC of the Strategic Air
Command, on the strategy and how i1 would affect strategic nucle-
ar offensive and defensive forces.
Secretary Cheney prepared an address on the new nationi
security strategy for delivery at the Georgetown University."
By the end of March 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued
their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) which included a
Foreword by the Secretary. j The March 1991 JMNA is a major
source of details, especially regarding contingency scenarios. On
April 3, 1991, GEN Powell once again spoke on the new national
security strategy and force structure ij4 an address to the
American Defense Preparedness Association. Powell also made
some remnarks on reorganization in mid-April, reported in Army
Times.3 5 The CJCS made the force structure associated with this
new national security strategy, the Base Force, the centerpiece
of his testimony bef ore the Defense Base Closure Commission at
the end of April. 3 6 April also saw major recognition of the
Adminiftration's efforts by a Soviet academic writing in Kommu-
nist.
In his May 29, 1991 commencement address at the U.S. Air
Force Academy, President Bush mentioned his previous announcement
of a shift defense focus, bu 9he did not expand on his origi-
nal vision. "Scooter" Libby returned to Congress in early
June 1991, accompanied by the Deputy Director for Force Struc-
ture, Resource, & Assessment Directorate on the Joint Staff (J-
8), Brigadier General William Fedorochko, Jr., USA.4 0  Both
testified further on details of the strategy and force struc-
ture. Later that month, Major General John David Robinson, USA,
the J-8 Director, gave a similar presentation to the 59th Sympo-
sium of the Military Operations Research Society.41
GEN Powell made note of the Base Force and reconstitution
forces in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in July -991. 42 The CJCS also outlined the new strategy
and Base Force to the Soviet military in a July presentation in
Moscow4 3 and a September 1991 presentation at Harvard. 4 The
DoD's Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to
Congress, published in July, makes specific reference to the new
national security strategy and links it to the Gulf war.45  July
also saw a direct criticism of the strategy qzd associated force
structure in the conservative Soviet press. In August 1991,
ADM Jeremiah spoke to 4 nother AFCEA gathering and once again
outlined the Base Force and gave an interview to Jane's Defeng
Weekly, where he discussed changes in the Unified Command Plan.45
The White House's revised version of the National Security
Strategy of the United States, incorporatiu the new national
security strategy, npeared in August 1991. Publication was
noticed in Moscow. The JCS are readying an ensuing text,
entitled the National Military Strategy for the 1990s, that
should by the end of 1991.31
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GEN Powell addressed Base Force and strategy issues in his
remarks to the City Club52 of San Diego and in an interYiew in
The San Diego Union and Tribune in mid-September 1991. The
final primary source available at the time of preparation of this
report was the September 25, 1991 testimony by GEN Powell on the
Future of U.S SMilitary Bases before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee.i After an extensive prepared presentation, GEN
Powell spent more than an additional hour fielding Congressional
concerns regarding the Base Force. On September 27, 1991, Presi-
dent Bush addressed the nation on national television 5 n the
subjects of national security policy and nuclear forces. Bush
outlined to the American public the new strategy and Base Force
and the reasons for them. The next morning Secretary Cheney and
GEN Powell held a ews conference in the Pentagon and provided
additional details.
Although it took some time, the new national security
strategy and force structure eventually appeared in the oral and
written testimony and other writings of additional officials in
the Pentagon. For example, Christopher Jehn, Assistant SECDEF
(Force Management and Personnel) appeared before Congress on
April 9, 1991 and used GEN Powell's concept of four-force package
with four supporting capabilities.57  Similarly, Deputy SECDEF
Donald Atwood expanded upon the Aspen speech in his address to
the Aurican Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics on May 1,
1991.
Air Force Chief of Staff, GEN Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak, made
public reference to consolidating air forces into the new Base
Force structure.5 9 The U.S. Army Posture Statement reflects a
thorough nderstanding and support of the new national security
strategy. Similarly, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), and former Commandant of the Marine Corps
jointly authored an article in the April 1991 U.S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings that makes specific mention of the Aspen speech
and the new national security strategy. 6 1  The CNO also made
specific reference to tke Aspen speech and strategy in his April
1991 Sea Power article. 2
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Saddam Hussein to thank for our domestic political purpose and
resolve. In another major regional crisis, domestic political
cohesion may not, and probably will not, be as easily attained.
Furthermore, our early success in the Operation DESERT STORM air
war factored greatly in public support for this war, as did its
brevity, intensity, and low coalition casualties. Not all future
crises will have as sharp definition for the Congress and for the
American public. When these elements line up as they did before
the Persian Gulf War, solidified by the Saddam-qua-Hitler under-
standing well nurtured in press and government, the political
effect can be unbelievably potent. It should not, tiowever, be
relied upon.
Force sufficiency is a sixth expectation for future crisis
response under the new strategy. Some commentator in years to
come will no doubt remark on the "inevitability" of the Persian
QGulf War, given that it came at a moment in history when the U.S.
had just completed its largest peacetime military force building
ever. That commentator will be wrong, but he or she will have
raised a good point. The success of the Persian Gulf War as a
crisis response was made possible by the military power we had
available at the moment it was needed.
In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, one of the most fre-
quently-asked questions from the Congress is "Can this be done in
1995?" The answer is always conditional--on threat, warning
time, place, scenario, geopolitics, intensity of conflict, like-
lihood of occurrence, and a lot of undeterminable trends in the
future strategic environment.13 What is clear from Aspen is that
we will respond to crises in the future with a leaner, restruc-
tured force. Its sufficiency is a good expectation, one to which
the American public has a right. But its overwhelming triumph as
cj in the Persian Gulf War could be dangerous to expect, especially
during military planning and in constructing foreign policy
responses in crises.
The seventh expectation, under the new strategy for future
crisis response is a technological advantage. We expect, and in
all likelihood will attain, a distinct technological advantage
over any strategic adversary. But this expectation must be
hedged, as the defense establishment is already doing in planning
for crises to come.
Reliance on technological advantage is an expectation that
we should embrace, but one which the Persian Gulf War must not
cause us to take for granted. This expectation is a corollary to
force sufficiency. With the war's heavy reliance on high tech-
nology to enable a ground incursion, there will be a tendency for
the body politic to take our technological margin for granted.
This expectation is also part of our ethnocentric psyche: Ameri-
can technology is best, we ardently believe, and shall prevail.
The cautionary note needed to be sounded with this expectation is
not that it exists, but that we could believe it to be perpetual
and therefore take it for granted.
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